America Needs an Arsenal of Democracies

A n Israeli-developed missile is now rolling off an American production line. On October 9, Raytheon-Rafael Protection Systems, an American Israeli joint venture, announced the first Tamir interceptors manufactured in Camden, Ark. They are intended for Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defense system, with plans to produce a U.S. variant for the Marine Corps.

The Camden facility builds on decades of allied weapons production, including the AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile with West Germany as well as the F-16 with multiple partners. But today’s conflicts require an industrial network that produces weapons at scale, maintains deliveries during disruptions, and replenishes forces across theaters. Co-production alone does not deliver that. It changes where a weapon is built; resilience depends on whether production can continue when something breaks.

The Camden example illustrates the potential and promise of allied defense production. The United States and its allies need alternative suppliers, geographically dispersed facilities, and systems for replenishing weapons during prolonged conflicts.

By combining American and allied innovation and manufacturing, Washington can strengthen the U.S. defense industrial base and expand capacity to meet shared threats. To safeguard American interests this century, the United States should renew “freedom’s forge” at home while building an arsenal of democracies abroad.

Recent conflicts underscore the urgency. During Operation Epic Fury, American forces reportedly fired more than 200 THAAD interceptors — more than two years’ output at the previously announced annual rate of 96. Capacity plans to raise production to 400 are a sign of progress, but repeated operations could consume that output while leaving depleted stockpiles unrestored. And because much of the funding to replenish stockpiles depends on the reconciliation bill’s passage, there is no guarantee it will arrive, leaving interceptor reserves further imperiled.

Ukraine demonstrates how quickly sustained combat consumes affordable weapons. During intense fighting in 2022–2023, its forces were estimated to fire 4,000–7,000 artillery rounds daily across multiple calibers. Ukrainian companies also produced and assembled more than 1.5 million FPV drones in 2024. Although production does not equal expenditure, that volume illustrates the scale needed to sustain warfare with inexpensive, expendable capabilities.

American efforts remain far more limited in scope. By December 2024, U.S. monthly 155mm capacity had reached 40,000 rounds — the equivalent of six to 10 days of Ukraine’s usage. The Pentagon’s Drone Dominance program calls for 340,000 drones over two years, averaging roughly one-ninth of Ukraine’s annual FPV output. This procurement target is not total U.S. production, but the disparity illustrates the scale of the challenge.

America need not replicate Ukraine’s arsenal. A Western Pacific conflict could require fewer FPV drones and more long-range missiles. Yet wars in Europe and the Middle East demonstrate that regional conflicts have global consequences, drawing on shared inventories and competing for industrial capacity. Different operational requirements demand coordinated production and sustainment across the alliance.

Joint military manufacturing agreements allow allies to specialize, drawing on their respective industrial strengths and making better use of limited resources. By sharing expertise and avoiding unnecessary duplication, partners can expand output without each country building every capability independently.

America’s adversaries already cooperate on weapons production and supply, with China supporting Russia’s defense industry and Iran and North Korea providing military assistance. Their cooperation connects threats across theaters; the United States and its allies must organize an equally deliberate industrial response.

Where specialization draws on each ally’s unique strengths, manufacturing redundancy keeps those capabilities in production even when a partner’s factories come under attack or its country is at war. Factories in Ukraine and Israel already face missile and drone strikes, but that risk should not deter co-production with these allies or others closer to the front lines. Even distant U.S. facilities remain vulnerable to sabotage or terrorism. Distributing critical manufacturing across qualified sites — as Ukraine’s production initiative in Denmark illustrates — helps ensure that weapons keep flowing when one factory goes offline.

Redundancy also protects against industrial disruptions. In 2024, the Government Accountability Office identified a U.S. missile program that was halted for more than a year because of a supplier’s production problems. The program funded a second source — but establishing alternatives after deliveries stop can be too late during war.

Allied production must be resilient. Most co-production agreements are effectively production-sharing arrangements, with components manufactured in one country and assembled in another, and do not necessarily create alternative sources or surge capacity. Two assembly lines offer limited protection if both require the same irreplaceable input.

Similarly, allied production can shorten replenishment routes for American forces overseas. Qualified factories in Europe or the Indo-Pacific could reduce dependence on transoceanic shipments and increase speed to warfighters. Production standards, procurement access, and wartime allocation must be negotiated beforehand, with alternative facilities available if regional production is disrupted.

Washington should require alternative manufacturing sources for critical co-production programs, backed by production rights, technical data, tooling, and trained workers. The AUKUS export control reforms offer a precedent for predictable technology-sharing among trusted partners.

Co-sustainment should also be pursued with speed by allies. The Pentagon’s Regional Sustainment Framework calls for allied repair capabilities closer to operational needs. Production partnerships should similarly support spare parts, maintenance, and rapid battle-damage repair forward.

Industry will hesitate to expand domestic or allied production without confidence that sustained demand will justify the investment. Governments must therefore make additional capacity commercially viable. Multiyear orders, coordinated purchases, shared investment, and compensation for intellectual property can sustain alternative production lines. The Pentagon should support domestic industry and allies through multiyear contracts, co-production, and co-sustainment.

Camden offers a starting point for a modern U.S.-led defense technology alliance. America and its allies must coordinate innovation, production, and sustainment around distinct military requirements and shared strategic interests. American security requires building that arsenal of democracies now — before another regional war exposes shortages with global consequences.

Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and an Advisory Board member of the Defense Technology Alliance, where Daniel Flesch serves as executive director.