Bench Memos

Law & the Courts

Re: The Radical Consequences of an Immediate Senate Recess

On top of this post, one other observation, perhaps too obvious, that many people are either ignoring or don’t care about:

If Trump were to get away with this recess-appointment scheme, the next Democratic president could of course do the same.

Imagine President Gavin Newsom in January 2029. If he faced a Republican majority in the Senate and had a Democratic majority in the House, he could completely bypass the Senate.

Again, I believe that the scheme is unconstitutional and that the Supreme Court, after months of chaos, would find it so on either or both of two grounds: (1) the House has no authority to disagree with the Senate’s staying in session (so the president’s adjournment power under Article II, section 3 would never come into play), and (2) that the president has no authority to make intrasession recess appointments (the compelling position taken by Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito ten years ago in NLRB v. Noel Canning and that all three of Trump’s appointees to the Court likely agree with).


This second position would require the Court to overrule the majority opinion in NLRB v. Noel Canning. As should be clear, I regard Trump’s scheme as a “constitutional abomination” (to borrow from Yuval Levin) even on the assumption that Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Noel Canning is correct.

If you support Trump’s recess-appointment scheme, you presumably disagree with me that the Court would invalidate his recess appointments. All the more reason, then, for you to be concerned about the weapon that Trump would be handing future Democratic presidents.

Ed Whelan holds the Antonin Scalia Chair in Constitutional Studies at the Ethics and Public Policy Center and is a regular contributor to National Review’s Bench Memos blog.
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