1997—Best is worst. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, that is.
In this case, the Illinois supreme court, by a vote of 5 to 1, rules unconstitutional Illinois’s 1995 tort-reform act. Among its rulings, the court holds that a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages in personal-injury cases—a cap that applies generally to all plaintiffs in such cases—violates the state constitutional ban on “special” (as opposed to general) legislation.
In twisted confusion over which branch has the authority to make law, the court also rules that the cap violates separation of powers—because it “undercuts the power, and obligation, of the judiciary to reduce excessive verdicts.” Under the “special” legislation pretense, it further strikes down the act’s abolition of the common-law doctrine of joint and several liability. And so on, and so on, for other provisions of the act.
Faulting the majority for “hoping to persuade the reader by prolixity,” dissenting justice Miller succinctly sums up the defects in the majority’s approach:
“Today’s decision represents a substantial departure from our precedent on the respective roles of the legislative and judicial branches in shaping the law of this state. Stripped to its essence, the majority’s mode of analysis simply constitutes an attempt to overrule, by judicial fiat, the considered judgment of the legislature.”
2024—Perhaps eager to cement its status as Worst State Supreme Court, the Montana supreme court (in Held v. Montana) rules that (1) sixteen Montana children have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Montana’s state energy system, and that (2) a state law that bars agencies from considering greenhouse gas emissions and climate impacts for any project violates the children’s right to a clean and healthful environment under the state constitution.
Montana accounts for less than ½ of one percent of global carbon-dioxide emissions, so its courts are unable to grant relief that would redress plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. The Montana supreme court doesn’t dispute that redressability is an essential component of standing under state law, but instead offers this inane response: “This [redressability objection] is akin to the old ad populum fallacy: ‘If everyone else jumped off a bridge, would you do it too?’”