As in Mullin v. Doe, the Court decided the immigration case of Mullin v. Al Otro Lado by a 6-to-3 vote, with a majority opinion by Justice Alito and with the liberal justices in dissent. Here is a quick summary.
Under federal immigration law, an alien who “arrives in the United States” is entitled to inspection, is deemed an applicant for admission, and may apply for asylum. The question in this case is whether an alien who seeks to enter the United States from Mexico “arrives in the United States” when he is standing in Mexico at the border or only when he crosses the border into the United States.
Beginning in 2016 (under President Obama), the Department of Homeland Security adopted a policy of “metering” the number of arriving aliens whom it would inspect each day and allow to apply for asylum. To enforce that policy, it prevented aliens beyond that number from crossing the border.
From Alito’s majority opinion:
This case presents a straightforward question: whether an alien who seeks to enter the United States from Mexico “arrives in the United States” when he or she is still in Mexico. In the decision below, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit answered “yes.” That is wrong. In ordinary speech, no one would say that a person “arrives in” a place—for example, a house, a city, or a country—before the person enters that place. The context in which the phrase “arrives in the United States” is used in the immigration statutes at issue here supports an ordinary-meaning reading. So does the presumption against extraterritoriality. We therefore reverse….
We begin by considering what the phrase “arrives in the United States” means when used in everyday speech. That meaning is clear. A person arrives in a geographic location only when he enters it….
Everyday examples confirm that understanding. A running back does not arrive in the end zone when he reaches the 1-yard line. A guest does not arrive in a house when he knocks on the front door. An army does not arrive in a city by encamping outside its walls. And a letter does not arrive in a mailbox while it remains in the mail carrier’s hand just inches away….
Several features of statutory context suggest that the meaning of the phrase “arrives in the United States” in §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) conforms to ordinary usage. [Slip op. at 9-11.]
Alito responds to an argument based on the canon against surplusage. (Slip op. at 11-15.) He also invokes the presumption against extraterritoriality. (Slip op. at 15-16.)
Justice Thomas, who joins Alito’s opinion, writes separately to argue that the district court “appeared to effectively grant the classwide injunctive relief that Congress has prohibited in this context” and that its relief “may well have unconstitutionally infringed on the President’s inherent authority to exclude aliens from the country.”
Justice Sotomayor has a long dissent, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. From her introduction:
Since 1917, Congress has required immigration officers to inspect noncitizens who arrive at ports of entry to determine whether they may enter the United States. Since 1980, Congress has allowed noncitizens who are fleeing persecution in their home country to apply for asylum as part of this inspection process. Congressional statutes lay out a mandatory set of procedures to guide this process. A noncitizen who “arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . . )” and seeks admission “shall be inspected by immigration officers,” 8 U. S. C. §§1225(a)(1), (3), and “may apply for asylum,” §1158(a)(1). If a noncitizen who “is arriving in the United States” lacks valid travel documents, the officer “shall order [her] removed,” unless she conveys an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution, which in turn requires the officer to “refer” her for further processing of her asylum application. §1225(b)(1)(A). This system is designed to ensure that the Government processes each person seeking to come into the United States to determine who should be let in, who should be turned away, and who should be allowed to apply for asylum.
The Court today holds that the Executive Branch may circumvent all these mandatory procedures by having U. S. immigration officers stand at the border and physically block noncitizens from setting a foot onto U. S. soil. They may do so even if the asylum seeker is at the threshold of a port of entry designated to receive all noncitizens who seek entrance into the country. Even if the port of entry has ample capacity to inspect that person, including an available asylum officer trained to process asylum applications. Even if the asylum seeker is certain to be persecuted, or killed, if she is turned away.
The Court’s illogical interpretation is driven almost entirely by a fixation on a single word: “in.” Words, however, must be read in context and with attention to how they fit into the statute as a whole. The majority ignores the statutory context and history, not to mention the longstanding position of the Executive Branch, all of which show that any noncitizen arriving at our doorstep and seeking admission must be inspected and allowed to apply for asylum, regardless of whether her foot has crossed the threshold.
In a separate solo dissent, Justice Jackson argues that the Court has issued an advisory opinion and that it should never have granted certiorari in the case.