Each of our conclusions about Ukraine rests on a series of disagreements about other factors.
Charles Cooke decided to give listeners to The Editors what they said they wanted, which was more of me and Noah Rothman debating Ukraine. So we took about an hour of the Charles C. W. Cooke Podcast to do just that. One of the nice things about this debate is that Noah and I are allergic to name calling and genuinely get along.
I noticed something about our debate, too. Each of our conclusions about Ukraine rests on a series of disagreements about other factors. We have corresponding disagreements about whether the U.S. has really threatened Russian access to its naval resources, the level of Putin’s ambitions in Europe, the fragility of the European order, America’s ability to effect a positive outcome under the limits of democratic constraints, the viability of Ukraine as a member of Western institutions, etc. But, we can have a productive debate because our disagreements rest on a fundamental agreement about how American power works. While we ended on what felt like a note of profound disagreement, I reviewed the exchange and found we were describing the exact same thing from opposed angles.
Toward the very end of the debate, I argued that American credibility is defined by what Americans are willing to sacrifice for in blood and treasure. I expressed my worry that the alliance structures we have been expanding over the last decades are straining beyond America’s willingness. I also expressed my conviction that our predominance was strong enough to endure occasional setbacks, especially at the peripheries.
In Noah’s final comments, he writes about all the goods and common benefits that our structure of alliances provides for us, and the fragility of those institutions. And he frets that we are not doing enough to maintain it, and that the day will come when our alliances will suffer a setback, and we will have to invest much more or sacrifice all those goods and global benefits.
Essentially, we agree that there is an equation that must balanced: America’s willingness to fight and America’s global commitments must match. It seems to both of us that currently, they may not. (I take Representative Crenshaw’s argument that Biden has failed to explain America’s interest in Ukraine as one attempt to explain why there seems to be a gap between our willingness and a positive outcome.) What Noah and I disagree on is which side of that equation is more tractable, and which side of that equation, if overweighted, will lead to disaster. In other words, our views on Ukraine flow from fundamental convictions about whether America is overcommitted, or America is lacking (or hasn’t yet tapped) its full resolve to meet its commitments.