Rich, one last response and I’ll leave it here.
I don’t think Russia can gobble up the whole of Ukraine. Ed Luttwak was correct that the large Russian invasion force was not sufficient to occupy or subdue the entire country.
And even in the event that a native Ukrainian government collapsed — something which may yet happen — the prospect of administrating Ukraine or continuing to subdue its ultra-nationalist paramilitaries would be a gruesome task for Russia.
My ideal scenario is for us to make Russia’s experience in Ukraine more like its experience in Afghanistan. Reagan was right not to try to make Afghanistan part of some Western experiment in global liberal order.
My nightmare scenario is making our Ukraine experience more like our Afghanistan experience. We babysit, fund, and provide the state capacity to a corrupt government. Our subsidy enables its leaders who are most incapable of reaching a durable settlement with the people in peripheral territories. We build up a massive NATO-trained army that gets slaughtered — demoralizing the alliance — because we are ultimately unable to effect regime change in the nuclear-armed neighbor that is sponsoring the chaos and violence. If, in the final test, we knew we couldn’t confront the problem of Pakistan’s ability to influence Afghanistan, I don’t want to pursue a strategy that will strain NATO and drain our resources trying to deny Russia’s ability to influence its neighbor. If the limits of American power are at the Dnipro and mountains of Afghanistan, I’ll still sleep soundly.
My belief from the beginning of this war remains relatively unchanged. Russia cannot create its desired Ukraine without unsustainable sacrifices. And the U.S. and the West cannot create the Ukraine of its dreams without massive risks (straining NATO to the breaking point, or leaving the Pacific undefended). That is why both sides must avoid escalating this conflict to the point where the players become convinced it can only end with NATO’s total humiliation or a regime change in Russia.