Here are two snippets worth highlighting:
We conclude that, on the basis of the intelligence assessments at the time, covering both Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the statements on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa in the government’s dossier, and by extension the prime minister in the House of Commons, were well founded. By extension, we conclude also that the statement in President Bush’s state of the union address of 2003 that “the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa” was well founded.
Even now it would be premature to reach conclusions about Iraq’s prohibited weapons. Much potential evidence may have been destroyed in the looting and disorder that followed the cessation of hostilities. Other material may be hidden in the sand, including stocks of agent or weapons. We believe that it would be a rash person who asserted at this stage that evidence of Iraqi possession of stocks of biological or chemical agents, or even of banned missiles, does not exist or will never be found. But as a result of our review, and taking into account the evidence which has been found by the ISG and debriefing of Iraqi personnel, we have reached the conclusion that prior to the war the Iraqi regime:
a) Had the strategic intention of resuming the pursuit of prohibited weapons programmes, including if possible its nuclear weapons programme, when UN inspection regimes were relaxed and sanctions were eroded or lifted.
b) In support of that goal, was carrying out illicit research and development, and procurement, activities, to seek to sustain its indigenous capabilities.
c) Was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted under relevant United Nations security council resolutions, but did not have significant – if any – stocks of chemical or biological weapons in a state fit for deployment, or developed plans for using them.