Does Russia Think That Peace Is in Its Interest?

The key to understanding the Trump administration’s strategy in its negotiations with Russia is that it believes that a cease-fire is in the interest of the United States, and of Ukraine, and of Russia.

That’s why Andy McCarthy’s point bears repeating: Contrary to the Trump administration’s assumptions, a cold-blooded analysis of American interests suggests that we should continue supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia because it would be to our benefit, whatever the short-term humanitarian advantages afforded by an end to the conflict.

The national interests of the United States are to degrade the threat posed by our Russian enemy and to make clear that we will never accept — as in never formally endorse the results of — an aggressor state’s unprovoked invasion of another recognized nation, annexation of its territory, butchery of civilians, kidnapping of children, and rampant violations of the laws and customs of war.

The Trump administration and its “restrainer” supporters, of course, take a different view. Their concerns are founded, not entirely unreasonably, on the burden on the U.S. taxpayer, the need to focus on Communist China’s ambitions, the downside risk that the continued support for Ukraine could lead to direct U.S. involvement in a confrontation with a nuclear-armed Russia, and, yes, the tragic loss of life on both sides.

I think there are good answers to all of these points that ought to lead to a dispassionate acceptance of the proposition that it’s in the U.S. interest to support Ukraine, rebuild our military industrial base, bleed an aggressive, adversarial Russia, take a stand against those who would redraw Europe’s borders by force, and deter Beijing via our continuing action and our support for our friends on the other side of Eurasia.

But Trump and his negotiators disagree. Again, in their view, peace is in America’s interest, in Ukraine’s interest, and in Russia’s interest. 

It shouldn’t be surprising to us that Ukrainians are skeptical that just any negotiated peace is in their interest — they’re keenly interested in the details of just what exactly is being negotiated.

But what’s interesting — and often ignored here in the U.S. — is that Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin doesn’t appear to agree with the Trump administration’s assumptions about what’s in Russia’s interest. Oh sure, the Russians would take a cease-fire if they needed one, or if they thought a temporary halt to hostilities would work to their advantage down the road, or if a negotiated deal gave them everything they wanted. (Trump’s proposed deal is not too far off from the latter.)

But Putin hasn’t gone in for peace, and it’s worth asking: “Why not?”

Obviously, Putin believes the war has so far, on balance, worked to his benefit. Famously, the Russians began the war slowly, and shambolically, in traditional Russian style. But now, three years on? 

• First, the war has pressure-tested Russian society in ways that the Kremlin must like or at least tolerate. The Russian government has ramped up its pro-war propaganda efforts, “patriotic education,” and an emphasis on Russian nationalism. The Russian economy, so far, has weathered the storm of Western sanctions. It’d be foolish to say that Russia is more prosperous today than it was in 2021, but its economy hasn’t cracked, and unemployment is quite low. And would anyone be surprised if the kleptocrats around Putin haven’t taken the opportunity to skim the top off the vast sums that have been funneled into the Russian war machine? The war is working for Putin and his top lieutenants. That must be understood.
• Second, casualties have fallen disproportionately on ethnic minorities in Russia, who have been recruited in large numbers. Middle-class Russians in Saint Petersburg and Moscow have been relatively shielded from the war, while Chechens, Daghestanis, Siberians, and Turkic soldiers from Russia’s Far East have borne much of the fighting and dying. Let no one think that the Kremlin regrets such an outcome: It aligns with the Russian government’s long-standing goal to Russify its overall population over time.
• Third, the Russian military is getting better through the fighting, at least in some respects. Yes, the Russians have lost an enormous amount of kit. Their casualty rates have been grisly. Their tactics at the Battalion Tactical Group level and below have been atrocious. But in the areas of electronic warfare, the use of drones, and in drone defense, the Russians have made significant advances from where they were three years ago. The Kremlin could be wagering that while foot soldiers are expendable, some of the techniques the Russian military has been learning in this fight will pay dividends down the road.
• Finally, and in my view most importantly, the Russians have to be aware that if they can continue the war while maneuvering in such a way that leads the ever-mercurial Donald Trump to conclude that the Ukrainians and the Europeans, as opposed to the Russians, are more responsible for its continuation, they could wake up one day to find the American president taking drastic action to disentangle himself from what he might conclude to be a quagmire of which he wants no part. Is it impossible to think such a decision could lead to a formal U.S. withdrawal from NATO and a fracturing of the Atlantic Alliance? I don’t think so — even if I don’t necessarily think it’s the most likely outcome.

The Russians understand that the U.S. government’s policy toward the war since January 2025, and Donald Trump’s growing frustration, has brought into view the possibility that the war could end with Russia achieving something it was never able to across the eight decades of the Cold War and its aftermath: the withdrawal of the United States from European security commitments.

Lord Ismay, the first NATO secretary general, is often credited with saying that the raison d’être for NATO was to “Keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.”

The mere possibility of an eventuality that leads to the failure of the first and second of those goals for NATO has certainly helped keep Russia in the war on the chance that the Kremlin’s patience might lead to a dramatic result.

One hopes that the Trump administration’s negotiators are considering such a dynamic.