If reports are true, the gambler in the Kremlin may be poised to make further mistakes.
Over the weekend, I mulled over this report from the New York Times, which suggests that Vladimir Putin is involving himself in the gritty details of the Ukraine campaign and giving specific directions to his generals.
American officials briefed on highly sensitive intelligence said that behind the scenes Mr. Putin is taking on an even deeper role in the war, including telling commanders that strategic decisions in the field are his to make. Although Mr. Putin has accepted some recommendations from military commanders, including the mobilization of civilians, his involvement has created tensions, American officials said.
CNN’s Katie Bo Lillis reported a very similar item last week, so it’s likely that the Times’ source in U.S. intelligence is also whispering to CNN.
Setting aside our Western norms and expectations of civilian control over the military — which don’t apply in Russia, or at least not in the same way — what’s confusing here is whether the Times‘ writers are using the term “strategic” in its technical sense.
If the Russian dictator is sitting in the Kremlin and giving his generals directives or guidance on the overall aims, goals, and outline of the Russian army’s campaign in Ukraine, that not only isn’t outrageous — it’s his job as head of state and commander in chief of the Russian military.
If war is, in Carl von Clausewitz’s famous phrase, “the continuation of policy with other means,” then it’s entirely appropriate for the politicians to set the policy. Let the generals (i.e., the professionals) figure out how to achieve that policy.
Of course, it appears the Times’ writers meant “operational” — i.e., the level of warfare that connects tactics with strategy through the planning and execution of campaigns, battles, and operations — where they wrote “strategic.” (The word “operational” doesn’t appear in the Times report.)
The divisions over Kherson are only the latest disagreements between Mr. Putin and his top commanders. Senior Russian officers repeatedly questioned the early plans for the war, American officials said, particularly an initial stage that envisioned a quick strike on Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital. The Russian officers believed Mr. Putin was going to war with insufficient troops and weaponry, American officials said. . . .
The Russian officers’ concerns proved correct, and after the defeat of the Russian army outside Kyiv, Mr. Putin eased up his control of military planning. He allowed senior generals to create a new strategy focused on massive artillery barrages, American officials said. The new strategy was effectively a grinding war of attrition that played to the Russian military’s strength and succeeded in pushing the army forward in eastern Ukraine.
Since Mr. Putin ordered his commanders to continue fighting in Kherson, the Russian military has tried to halt the Ukrainian advance there. Last week the Russians blew up a dam on the Inhulets River to make the current counteroffensive more difficult.
Putin’s reported interference in the operational planning here isn’t, as far as I can tell, immoral or illegal. It’s just dumb.
What does this mean for Ukraine and the West?
There’s little chance that the Kremlin has a picture of what the conditions are like at the front that’s as accurate as that at the theater-level headquarters. Putin is very likely going to make decisions that don’t have very much connection to the facts on the ground — and that’s assuming that the “facts” he’s getting aren’t colored by the obvious incentive on the part of his underlings to avoid bringing bad news to el jefe.
Of course, we shouldn’t discount that all this could be some good old-fashioned CYA on the part of Russian generals who have not exactly earned sterling reputations since February. If you’re an embarrassed Russian field commander, what better excuse is there than to point the finger at the former KGB agent running the Kremlin?
PHOTOS: Russian-Ukraine War
What it may mean, however, is that Putin may choose to order his army to continue fighting for an exposed position such as the city of Kherson for reasons of prestige, vanity, or politics, when a competent field general would choose to withdraw and regroup. After suffering the defeat that it did in early September, an outmanned and under-equipped army such as Russia’s should probably be shortening its lines and moving behind a defensible barrier such as the Dnipro River east of Kherson, even if it means abandoning ground for which it already fought and bled.
The Russians do not appear to be taking this very sensible course of action.
Stay tuned. If reports are true, the Ukrainians may have an opportunity to bait Putin, and the gambler in the Kremlin may be poised to make further mistakes.