November 10 is the birthday of the Marine Corps, celebrated in every American embassy and every major city in America. Why? Because for 247 years, the very word Marine has symbolized discipline and toughness in battle. The statue of six Marine grunts raising the flag on Iwo Jima in 1945 is emblematic of American grit. Marines are seen as being ready to fight anywhere at any time, bringing to bear its aircraft, artillery, and tanks to support the riflemen who close with and destroy the enemy.
The grunt is the organizational heart and the guiding soul of the Marine Corps. Until now. On this birthday, for the first time in its history, the grunt is not the Marine centerpiece. Advised by only a few officers, the current Commandant, General David H. Berger, has decided that shooting missiles, not rifles, will be the centerpiece of the Marines going forward.
The reason for this basic shift is that China has emerged as America’s most formidable military foe. To contribute to defeating China, should war break out, the Commandant slashed the size of infantry and reduced the amount of artillery, tanks, and aircraft. This meant that the Marines were less capable as a combined arms force ready to fight anywhere.
With the money thus saved, the Commandant intends to buy anti-ship missiles and electronic-detection gear. The U.S. Navy is expected to buy two dozen shallow-draft ships to land small packets of Marines armed with those missiles on islands in the South China Sea. If the Chinese surface warships attempt, in war, to sortie into the broad Pacific to attack Guam or Pearl Harbor, Marine missileers will sink them.
This tradeoff from infantry man to missile man has been applauded by the administration and Congress. And why not? It seemed innovative and forward-looking, and it came at no additional dollar cost. The Marines transformed themselves. If you are an outside observer, what’s not to like?
The flaw lies in the logic. First, to insert the missile force before hostilities requires Vietnam or the Philippines to become actively involved by granting landing rights at a moment of great peril. Second, the key to dominating the Pacific is the seizure of Taiwan, far out of range for the missile Marines a thousand miles away in the empty theater of the South China Sea. Taiwan has 1,000 anti-ship missiles and can buy as many as they want. The Marines have taken themselves out of the main fight. Third, the Marines want the U.S. Navy to procure about 30 shallow-draft ships to get to the islands, at a total cost of $500 to $900 million over the next ten years. To do that, the Navy will have to take money from other accounts, especially the attack submarines. But our SSNs are stealthy, while the Marine missile force is overt. With our underwater acoustic systems, Chinese warships cannot move anywhere without being detected and sunk with torpedoes. It’s doubtful if the Navy will take money from other programs to buy ships to duplicate a mission the SSN fleet can do better. On balance, Marines as missileers adds too little and gives up too much. Let the U.S. Navy deal with the Chinese navy.
Obviously, the Marines must innovate. The lesson to guide them is clear. The war in Ukraine has driven home the lethality of small infantry units equipped with drones and linked to mobile, long-range precision artillery. Buy those proven systems instead of morphing into a redundant anti-ship missile force. The Marines should celebrate their birthday by resolving to remain an infantry-centric combined-arms force in readiness.