Since I published a timeline of the Robb Elementary school shooting in Uvalde, Texas, a few items have come up that are worth examination.
First, it’s alleged by a new report from Texas State University’s Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) group that a Uvalde officer had sighted in on the gunman as the latter approached the school, but the officer first called for permission to fire. Upon hearing nothing from his superior, the officer re-sighted, but the gunman had already entered the school through a closed but unlocked exterior door. The report states:
A Uvalde PD officer reported that he was at the crash site and observed the suspect carrying a rifle prior to the suspect entering the west hall exterior door. The UPD officer was armed with a rifle and sighted in to shoot the attacker; however, he asked his supervisor for permission to shoot. The UPD officer did not hear a response and turned to get confirmation from his supervisor. When he turned back to address the suspect, the suspect had already entered the west hall exterior door at 11:33:00. The officer was justified in using deadly force to stop the attacker. Texas Penal Code § 9.32, DEADLY FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PERSON states, an individual is justified in using deadly force when the individual reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to prevent the commission of murder (amongst other crimes).
Second, ALERRT’s well-documented and concise report contributes additional information about how officers failed to engage the gunman and how the steady increase in police manpower and equipment thereafter was not matched by an added urgency to neutralize the gunman.
The report states:
In addition to information that should have increased the exigency of the situation, a variety of factors increased the capabilities of the officers while dealing with these threats. These included breaching tools, shields, tactical operators, and CS gas. Please refer to Figure 8 on page 20 for a detailed timeline of the factors that increased both exigency and officer capability. Breaching Tools. A UPD officer stated that they had a Halligan at 11:41:30 when asked by dispatch if the doors were locked. This tool was not seen on camera, and if he was referring to the tool being on scene or at the UPD is unclear. A Halligan tool was captured on camera at 12:35:39. A USO deputy arrives on scene with a sledgehammer at 12:47:57. This completed the toolset needed to breach an outward opening door.
Ballistic Shields. The first ballistic shield arrives on scene at 11:52:08. A second ballistic shield arrived at 12:03:51, a third ballistic shield arrived at 12:04:16, and a fourth ballistic shield arrived at 12:20:46. Each ballistic shield afforded first responders additional protection from potential gunfire. We do not have information about the ballistic rating of each shield at this point.
Tactical Operators. While many officers flowed through the scene, the first known tactical operators (i.e., BORTAC) arrived at 12:15:27. BORTAC operators receive extensive training and equipment to respond to barricaded suspects. Additionally, it is common for tactical operations to be turned over to tactical operators upon their arrival; however, it appears that control of tactical operations was not given to the tactical operators on scene.
CS Gas. Between 12:10:17 and 12:14:10, gas masks were passed out and CS gas cannisters and launchers were on scene. The assault team entered the room at 12:50:03, 1 hour, 11 minutes, and 26 seconds after the first responding officers took static positions. The assault team had keys that could unlock the door. It does not appear that any officer ever tested the doors to see if they were locked. As we described earlier, we do not believe the door to room 111 was locked. As this section illustrates, there were multiple points in time where the driving force increased through additional gunfire; however, officers did not act on these increases in driving force. Additionally, officers on scene continually received additional equipment and tactical components that increased their capabilities to address the suspect. Ultimately it is unclear why the officers decided to assault the room at 12:50:03. There was no apparent change in driving force or response capability at this point. While we do not have definitive information at this point, it is possible that some of the people who died during this event could have been saved if they had received more rapid medical care. In the next part of this AAR, we intend to address that Stop the Dying portion of the response that occurred following the killing of the suspect. Additionally, we have noted in this report that it does not appear that effective incident command was established during this event. The lack of effective command likely impaired both the Stop the Killing and Stop the Dying parts of the response. The final part of this AAR will address incident command issues.
Third, in an interview with National Review, retired NYPD police sergeant and host of the Police Off the Cuff podcast Bill Cannon shared about types of policing and what immediate changes schools can implement to improve police-response time, locational accuracy, and communication with staff.
To better understand the composition of police forces, Cannon suggests separating them into two camps — that of the “Warrior” caste, and the other “Guardians.” When responding to an active shooter, the best men to have there are the warriors, those who look to immediately confront the shooter no matter the harm inflicted on themselves. The Guardians, on the other hand, are at their best when community policing, doing the soft but necessary work of meeting the general needs of public. In the context of Uvalde, the BORTAC officers would be squarely in the former group, whereas the school district and local police might be better considered as the latter.
As the ALERRT report puts it, “it is not surprising that officers who had never been shot at before would be overwhelmed by the directed gunfire. This is especially the case if they had not been consistently training to deal with this type of threat.”
This does not absolve the first officers at the scene, but may help illuminate their inability or hesitancy in pushing forward after initially taking fire. Cannon and ALERRT repeatedly emphasized the necessity of confronting the shooter, with Cannon further offering that officers must obey orders of those above them but are permitted to disobey an unlawful order. This naturally would be extremely difficult in the moment for any one officer to consider were UCISD Chief Arredondo telling him not to enter the classroom, but holds nonetheless.
The police’s assumption of a hostage situation stance was bluntly described as “bullsh**” by Cannon, who reiterated the officers’ knowledge of wounded victims within the room and the need for everyone — police and victims alike — to take aggressive actions toward the shooter until he was neutralized.
When asked about what schools are to do going forward as gun control and other unrealistic and specious solutions are considered in legislatures, Cannon commended Nassau County’s adoption of the RAVE application as a practical, inexpensive, and immediately available tool for teachers and first responders. The app, downloaded on the phones of school staff, would be able to contact the officers’ devices directly, alerting them of the location and nature of a school emergency like an active shooter. The app removes the intermediary of a dispatcher and relays, allowing an on-scene officer to speak directly to a barricaded educator. Her exact location, a crucial piece of information that was unknown to Uvalde officers, is pinged to the officer, who can move confidently to the threat. When seconds matter, this simple app can use wi-fi and cellular data — meaning the signal is more reliable than radios and cell service alone in school structures, often made of cement and steel.
While no one system will prevent school shootings, Cannon stressed the benefits of “concentric defenses” — a combination of physical fortification, communication, and training that slows the ability of an attacker to achieve his goals while allowing officers an expeditious response time and greater odds of immediately identifying and neutralizing the target.
An item to look for in the coming days is the release of the full 77 minutes of hallway video. Calls for the release of the school-camera footage are coming loudly and frequently from Texas state lawmakers but have thus far been rebuffed by Uvalde’s district attorney, who is reviewing the footage for possible charges. It falls to her as to when the video will be released.