I don’t know why exactly, but it seems like there is an incredible absence of commentary and opinion being offered on U.S. policy toward Venezuela. Trump took a number of steps in his first admin to punish the Chavista state, and Caracas responded by turning toward our rivals: China, Moscow, and Iran. Susie Wiles let out in an interview, with an underappreciated note of sarcasm (I thought), that the Trump administration’s thinking is that if we bomb enough boats, Maduro will say “Uncle.”
I think our Venezuela policy under Trump has been drifting toward regime change, and I think far too many opinion-influencers are waiting to see how the policy turns out before telling us what they think about it. Well, I care about warning against a disaster more than I care about preserving the ability to praise whatever policy is adopted. So, for Commonplace, I wrote about the drift of our policy, and my skepticism that any of the means being deployed serve the ends of creating a stable, democratic, Western-aligned Venezuela.
The sanctions layered on top of a crisis created by Chavista misrule and foreclosed paths to stabilization. Millions fled the country in a vast exodus, fueling northward migration. As the United States pulled the rug out from under Venezuela, Caracas turned to Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran. A more modest policy would have sought to stabilize a nearby oil producer and contain its worst abuses while keeping some influence over its economic orientation. Probably worst of all, the Trump administration and Western institutions influenced by the foreign policy blob have identified a new alternative leader for Venezuela, pumping up María Corina Machado. While no one doubts her bravery, the fact that the Guaidó option already blew up should caution us. National institutions have their own logic and even their own nationalistic pride. Maduro was able to keep the loyalty of his military officers and other government institutions, likely because those breaking with him would have trouble gaining native legitimacy, acting so openly—as they would have been—in concert with the U.S. State Department. Guaidó’s own allies ended his “interim presidency” because once it could not enforce its maximalist position, it looked like a legal fiction used to justify sanctions and asset seizure.
Read the whole thing here.