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Putting the Chinese-Negotiated Saudi–Iran Deal in Perspective

From left: Minister of state and national security adviser of Saudi Arabia Musaad bin Mohammed Al Aiban; Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission; and Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council pose for pictures during a meeting in Beijing, China, March 10, 2023. (China Daily via Reuters)

A number of conservatives have raised alarm about the new agreement mediated by Chinese president Xi Jinping to restore diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and lower tensions. A foreign policy-analyst I know called me after this deal to say, “All is lost — China won.” I beg to differ.

I agree with other experts that this was a win for China that will advance its influence, but this story has been overblown. The Saudis are not about to end their defense relationship with the U.S. They use China for trade reasons but don’t trust China. MBS understands Xi’s global ambitions and longtime support of Iran. Also, unlike members of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the Saudis can’t be bought off by China. China also needs Saudi Arabia more than the Saudis need it, because of its energy needs.

I also note that the Saudi–Iran deal would have occurred without China’s involvement. Saudi Arabia and Iran were engaged in talks to normalize relations for several years. MBS asked Xi to mediate the final stage of this agreement last December when Iraq, the previous mediator, backed out.

MBS does not trust Iran and remains extremely concerned about its nuclear-weapons program, support of terrorism, and hostility toward Saudi Arabia, the Saudi royal family, and Saudi Sunni clerics. MBS is not going to drop his opposition to reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (the JCPOA), but with the Biden administration’s determination to revive it, he felt it was in Saudi interests to make this deal to lower tensions.

The real story is how MBS is using the agreement to force the U.S to agree to his demands. This has been driven by his anger over how the Biden administration has mistreated him and his country. He also sees the U.S. as unreliable and Biden and his foreign-policy team as incompetent. The Wall Street Journal got this right in a March 14 article, especially in this passage:

Some analysts say Prince Mohammed is using closer relations with China and Russia to gain leverage for a deeper U.S. security relationship that some in Washington have resisted. Saudi officials are still negotiating over U.S. security guarantees that could convince Riyadh to eventually normalize relations with Israel — a decision that is likely to be some time away because of domestic resistance, the heating up of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and opposition in Washington to meeting Saudi demands.

This morning, I shared my views on this issue with a prominent U.S. media executive who regularly talks with Saudi officials. He agreed and said a Saudi official told him the new agreement with Iran might be temporary.

China will naturally try to build on this agreement. Xi plans to host a meeting of the Gulf Coordination Council–Iran summit in Beijing later this year. China probably will make additional major gains with Gulf states because the Biden administration does not have a serious China strategy. That said, given Iran’s historical hostility toward Saudi Arabia and its record of violating agreements, it is very possible that the new Saudi–Iran agreement won’t last long.

Fred Fleitz is vice chairman of the America First Policy Institute Center for American Security. He previously served as chief of staff of the National Security Council, a CIA analyst, and a member of the House Intelligence Committee staff.
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