And why George W. Bush’s administration toed that line carefully, too? Eli Lake offers a useful answer to the question in a column today, albeit one many won’t find satisfactory: “The long war against radical Islamic terrorists requires at least the tacit support of many radical Muslims.”
His whole piece is worth reading, but the short summary is that American counterterrorism policy, to varying degrees over time, has assumed that we want the support of Muslim allies — many of whom don’t love vociferous condemnations of their religion, even just the extreme bits of it. There are varying degrees of this kind of accommodation: Accepting essentially radical but non-violent allies, especially clerics, as the Obama administration has, or just worrying, in general, about the sensitivities of our key Arab allies (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf kingdoms). Regardless, it’s left American foreign policy in the same place, with a diplomatic code that requires non-Muslims to keep saying they don’t see their enemies as representing true Islam.
Lake’s piece jibes with what I’ve heard from others who’ve dealt with implementing this policy over the years, and it’s worth keeping in mind. Of course, the explanation says nothing about whether the bargain we’ve made is a wise one.