Rich, I think counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy goes to how you suppress the insurgency, critically including winning over the population. Democracy promotion (DP) forces you to ask (a) whether it is worth enduring the high costs of COIN (i.e., what do we realistically think the country will look like at the end), and (b) how costly and likely of success is COIN going to be (i.e., even assuming the population dreads the insurgents’ methods, is it realistic to believe population will switch to our side and what do we have to do — in the way of resources and compromising our principles — to make that happen)?
These are very difficult questions. As Mark points out, it’s a mistake to be doctrinaire about these things: DP, for example, is neither always good nor always bad — it depends on the circumstances. Moreover (and this is what I always struggle with), if we take out a regime, there is no one-size-fits-all prescription for what we do next. I’ve always thought Colin Powell’s “you break it, you own it” philosophy was foolish, but I don’t think we want to go to Derb’s “rubble doesn’t make trouble” solution too often either. There’s a range of possibilities between those poles.
In the Islamic world, I’m closer to Derb. I agree with the late great Samuel Huntington’s analysis that we are different civilizations.* I don’t think we can plant a Western culture in Dar al-Islam; and I’m quite sure most Americans don’t realize that – even though we see ourselves as freeing Muslims from tyranny and trying to give them a better life – we are seen by many millions of Muslims in the world as infidel occupiers whom it is duty to fight until we leave Islamic territory. No one wants to leave a void, but neither is it practical — unless you want to be an empire, which we don’t — to say that in order to defend our nation we must commit to stay as long as it takes, and pay as much as it takes in lives and resources, to fix a basket-case country that really doesn’t want our help.
COIN issues are also not black-and-white. Your question focusing on General Petraeus nicely cuts to the chase. The surge in Iraq was multi-faceted: Defeat al-Qaeda and suppress the insurgency (which was much broader than al-Qaeda). One could support some of it and therefore support doing it, without being convinced that all the goals were worthwhile. (That was my position.) Then there are the complexities of the Iraqi population, which has very different segments. But in general, they don’t see all terrorism as wrong and don’t see all the terrorists the same way. They came to have contempt for al-Qaeda’s brutality, but they have a high degree of tolerance (if not outright affection) for Hezbollah and some other Iran-backed terrorists (and the reasons for that are more complex than the Sunni/Shiite divide). Iraqis’ views of us are also variegated. They eventually liked the idea that we could and would suppress al-Qaeda, but that doesn’t mean they like us. As between us and Iran, they like Iran better, but Michael (Ledeen) would probably say that has a lot to do with their knowing that we’re leaving and Iran isn’t going anywhere — maybe lots of the population would feel differently if they thought we might take out Iran’s regime or its nukes. (I think the fact that we’re the West and the Iranians are Muslims weighs very heavily with Iraqi Muslims.)
There are important similarities and important differences in Afghanistan. The salient point is you have to weigh how possible/difficult it would be to win over a population, how expensive it will be in resources and compromised principles (e.g., negotiating with terrorists, legitimizing sharia, etc.), and whether the prize is worth the cost. On your narrow point, Petraeus is a military officer, not a policy maker. There would be nothing inconsistent in saying that he was brilliant at executing COIN but that COIN was the wrong policy.
As I tried to make clear in the column, I am not prepared to say it is the wrong policy in Afghanistan; but I am very open to the possibility that it’s the wrong policy, and I think it’s a mistake to dismiss Will out of hand. To go back to Iraq for a second, when the Left complained about Iraq, we were satisfied that we had the game-ender response: “So you’re saying it would be better if Saddam were still in power?” If, at the end of the road, Iraq has conclusively turned into an Iranian satellite, the Saddam response is no longer such a game-ender. Some of my mail today says I’ve overstated how bad things have gotten in Iraq; some of it says things are worse than I portrayed. We’ll have to wait and see.
We obviously have to stay and fight as long as it’s in our interest to stay and fight. On that score, you mention the potential re-emergence of an al-Qaeda safe haven, and Michael, in fact, argues that al-Qaeda is still in Afghanistan. As I said in the column, I’m all for routing bin Laden & Co. wherever they are — I would not limit us to Afghanistan and Iraq. I am not a military strategist, but among people who are, there is considerable disagreement about whether COIN is necessary — especially at escalated troop levels. I think it’s very useful to have this debate because we need a clear explanation of what our goals in Afghanistan are, what it will cost to attain them, and how realistic we are being about the challenge of Islamism.
Finally, I think these claims about surrender and humiliating Western exits are overblown — and I say that as someone who supported the Iraq surge because the Left really did want to surrender while we were losing, so I am not insensitive to this imperative. I do not take George Will to be saying, and I am certainly not saying, that we should surrender. We have pulled back in Iraq because of changed circumstances on the ground without the appearance of surrender. Will is not saying, “Surrender”; he is saying (I’m summarizing), having already decimated al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, we can accomplish our remaining vital interests from remote bases. I am saying he may be right or he may be wrong, but someone needs to explain to me (a) exactly what we’re trying to accomplish, (b) why we still need 60,000 (or more) troops to do it, and (c) how it justifies the opportunity costs (and, relatedly, why we think we can succeed without dealing with Iran and without conveying to al-Qaeda that we will hunt them down in whatever country they operate)? If the answers to these questions are satisfactory, I’d be fine with sending in a lot more than 40,000 more troops; but if we’re mainly there for nation-building, I’m with Will.
______________________
* I didn’t take Huntington to be arguing, as some assume, that the clash of Islam and the West is inevitable; I understood him to be saying that we are different civilizations, that means our differences are enduring, and that the worst wars, when they happen, will be wars between — rather than within — civilizations.