Admiral Karambir Singh (Ret.) of the Indian Navy and Blake Herzinger of the American Enterprise Institute have produced a fascinating piece for War on the Rocks, a journal of defense commentary, titled “Partnership, Not Threats: How to Deepen U.S.-Indian Naval Cooperation.”
When standing in one’s study and considering our nation’s geopolitical realities on the surface of a globe minibar (as I’m sure many of you have done), it makes all the sense in the world to have as populous an ally as India functioning as a stay against Chinese aggression in the region. After all, the two largest nations by population are looking over the frigid privet hedge that is the Himalayas. Why not foster a relationship with the friendlier of that pair?
Developing such an alliance has been a challenge, dating back generations.
As Singh and Herzinger recap:
A generation ago, U.S.-India maritime cooperation was limited by India’s commitment to non-alignment during the Cold War, Delhi’s close relationship with the Soviet Union, and Washington’s partnership with Pakistan. While these issues are still salient, mutual concerns about China and American acceptance of India’s nuclear weapons program have created pathways for the two sides to cooperate.
As half of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, their cooperation would also send a strong signal of the group’s continued momentum and commitment to maintaining security in the Indo-Pacific. The operational familiarity both partners would gain through greater cooperation would create a solid foundation in five specific areas to help bolster cooperation for future contingencies ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to high-end naval operations.
(For more on the Quad, see here.)
The authors mention five sectors wherein increased communications and teamwork could be mutually beneficial.
I’ll summarize with a clip from each:
- Security Assistance
The U.S. and Indian navies should seek to align their respective capacity-building programs. Doing so will identify where efforts may be overlapping, or divergent, allowing the two forces to find more efficient ways to lift regional naval capacity.
- Stronger Staff Links
Staff exchanges are a time-tested mechanism for creating confidence and clear communication at the operational levels of militaries and have the added bonus of creating positive interpersonal ties that pay dividends over time and build trust. Progressing the naval relationship to more complex combined operations will rely on these kinds of staff relationships. The U.S. Navy has one liaison officer placed within Delhi’s Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region supporting its domain awareness mission, but this is insufficient for two navies of this caliber. To move cooperation forward, major commands and fleet headquarters should also exchange liaisons.
- Maritime Domain Awareness
The two could do even more to integrate and share their own common operating pictures. This might start off in a more limited form, focusing on agreed-upon critical chokepoints and sea lines of communication, such as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, but could grow to encompass the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The two should also consider developing a shared undersea common operating picture, starting with preliminary discussions on potential areas of focus and the fidelity of detail each side might be willing to share.
- Learning to Share
A U.S. Navy transit across the Indian Ocean that occurs without meeting an Indian Navy resupply vessel represents a missed opportunity to use these carefully negotiated tools at their disposal. In the same vein, Indian Navy vessels being greeted by U.S. resupply ships when leaving the Indian Ocean would highlight the reciprocal nature of the relationship and increase burden-sharing. The same Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement applies to port services and billeting, creating space for cooperative basing, whether that manifests itself in U.S. ships operating from Indian bases or Indian Navy ships from U.S. facilities.
- Getting Beyond Training
The maritime domain presents an unparalleled opportunity to the navies of the United States and India to advance the security relationship between them. The sea itself is an advantage, as those cooperative activities the two navies pursue can be conducted in international waters, far from prying eyes and without appearing to be overtly pointed in any other state’s direction. While both states face a challenge from China, their relationship need not be entirely defined as a reaction to Beijing. By collaborating more and integrating operations, both navies will further their broader objectives of ensuring free, open and inclusive seas and positively contributing to the regional security architecture.
The two authors tread carefully around the China question: “A strong India-U.S. naval relationship’s reason for being need not be an explicit bogeyman,” they write, which is probably wise. But the thrust of the piece is about two giants — one economic and the other in raw manpower — that have much to gain from collaboration in the face of a fearsome third party that boasts both their attributes of giantism.