A defensible use of force, a tragedy, and a powder keg of civil unrest.
James has an excellent report on the shooting in Minneapolis, in which a male ICE agent (unidentified as this is written) killed a female driver who — depending on one’s interpretation of the videos from various angles — was either trying to run him over or turn speedily away from him (and other agents) to evade capture. The woman has been identified as Renee Nicole Good, 37; Minnesota officials say she was “observing” the ICE activities (as opposed to being a suspect of an ICE investigation).
Unfortunately, this is fertile field for demagogy. The state side features some of the most irresponsible progressive ideologues in Democratic politics — Governor Tim Walz, Mayor Jacob Frey, and Attorney General Keith Ellison. Minnesota Democrats need a big controversy to try to turn the page from the ongoing multibillion-dollar fraud scandal, and this is made to order.
Then we have Trump Department of Homeland Security officials, for whom it is not enough to defend the agent’s actions as “self-defense”; they have accused the deceased driver of committing “an act of domestic terrorism.” That is the kind of hyperbole we don’t need from an agency that exists because of terrorism (it was established due to the 9/11 atrocities) and should, presumably, know what it is — and is not. Whether we conclude it’s an attempted murder or an attempted escape, it’s not a terrorist attack.
The battle lines are being drawn on what seems to me to be a flawed legal assumption, to wit: If the woman — who was allegedly blocking ICE agents with her car — was “merely” trying to flee rather than run the agent over, she should be understood as a murder victim rather than a criminal engaged in a dangerous act that justified the use of lethal force by law enforcement.
It’s really not an either/or situation.
Undoubtedly, if it is reasonable to construe the woman’s action as a deliberate attempt to mow down an ICE agent with a speeding vehicle, the use of force was justified. But even if the woman was mainly trying to get away (which is what it looks like to me), she was engaged in an actionable assault on a federal officer, a felony under Section 111 of the federal penal code.
One of my first cases as a young prosecutor was an assault on a federal officer — a probation officer. The defendant was convicted even though he never actually struck the officer; he just clenched his fist and assumed an offensive stance, suggesting an imminent swing.
That was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt because the statute targets anyone who “forcibly assaults, resists, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with” a federal officer. To constitute assault, there need not be battery; and here, the statutory language reaches conduct less serious than assault. If the agent is put in reasonable fear of imminent harm, that’s enough.
In fact, in this instance — unlike in my case all those years ago — if the assault or intimidation is carried out with “a deadly or dangerous weapon,” the penalty is up to 20 years’ imprisonment. That’s a weighty felony offense.
Even if you believe, as I’m inclined to believe based on what we’ve seen so far, that the woman was just trying to get away, she did so by swiping the car in the agent’s direction. She may not have intended to run him over, but she sure didn’t appear to be trying to avoid running him over if that was necessary to escape.
Either way, the agent’s life was jeopardized, and the responsive use of force would be reasonable. It is settled Fourth Amendment law that a police officer may use deadly force against a fleeing suspect if he has a good-faith belief that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. (See, e.g., Tennessee v. Gardner (1985).) Here, I believe the driver was in the act of committing a dangerous assault when the agent opened fire. And the driver’s reckless operation of the vehicle, coupled with the fact that she was heedless of harming armed law enforcement agents as they were carrying out their official duties, underscores that it was reasonable to believe she posed a serious threat to the agents and others.
To be sure, the existence of a viable reasonable-force defense is, from a federal standpoint, largely irrelevant. The Trump Justice Department will not prosecute the agent under the circumstances; and if Democrats win the 2028 election, and there appears to be any chance the new administration’s Justice Department could try to prosecute the agent in 2029 under the civil rights laws, President Trump would pardon the agent before leaving office.
The state authorities in Minneapolis, who are Democrats, have announced that they are investigating. Politically, this may help the Democrats stoke controversy, but legally it should go nowhere.
The feds will not cooperate in the investigation. If state law enforcement brings charges, the federal government will seek to have the case removed to federal court — an application that should succeed because the government will be able to show that the state is interfering in federal enforcement of federal law (both immigration law and the law protecting federal agents in the performance of their duties). In federal court, I believe — even if any pardon didn’t void the prosecution — the agent would be able to claim immunity from state prosecution and that the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances.
Consequently, I don’t think the agent faces a real possibility of being charged and convicted. That doesn’t lessen the tragedy, and it won’t stop Democrats from encouraging civil unrest.