There are at least three (at times overlapping) ways of looking at the GOP’s disappointing midterms: candidates, policy, and voting.
The topic that has gotten perhaps the most coverage is candidate quality, especially at the gubernatorial and senatorial levels. Many swing voters are not hard-core ideologues, so perhaps they are particularly attuned to the immediate presentation of a candidate (whether she has experience, a closet full of skeletons, and so forth). The GOP struggled at candidate recruitment. Top-tier potential candidates often passed on running in key battleground races, as when Chris Sununu decided against a Senate run in New Hampshire. Sometimes, very weak candidates triumphed in fractured primaries. Doug Mastriano is perhaps the most prominent example of this. And weak candidates at the top of the ticket often dragged down other candidates, costing seats in the House and state legislatures. Moreover, these flawed candidates were often associated with fringe policy positions.
On issues, Republicans often settled on a purely negative campaign — hoping that inflation and other national trends would carry them across the finish line. While there were some efforts (such as the House “Commitment to America”) to articulate a more positive policy vision, a coherent policy message never really achieved critical mass. This relative lack of an affirmative platform ended up heightening the salience of issues that were harmful to the GOP. Donald Trump persuaded many candidates to center their campaigns (especially during the primary) on conspiracy theories about the 2020 election. The idea of overturning elections turned off many swing voters, and it’s telling that secretary-of-state candidates tied to election-conspiracy theories often lost their bids by big margins. A policy vacuum also allowed Democrats to seize on various Republican remarks about entitlements to argue that the GOP supposedly represented a threat to Social Security — a theme they hit hard in the closing days of the campaign.
Flawed candidates and stumbles with policy in part explain why Republicans failed to win over many of those voters who disapproved of Joe Biden. But there was a third structural challenge for Republicans: the lack of an infrastructure to turn out votes in an age of mass mail-in and early voting. The 2020 election helped polarize Republicans away from voting early, even as that election solidified a new paradigm of extending the voting season over days and, in many states, weeks. Relying on Election Day while Democrats turn out voters for weeks almost certainly undermined Republicans in key states. Florida was one of the few states where Republicans outperformed national trends, and part of the reason for that may be because the state GOP has a real apparatus for gathering mail-in and early votes. (It also had compelling candidates on the top of the ticket.)
All this suggests that a way forward for the GOP has at least three prongs: picking better candidates, crafting a platform that rises to the challenges of the moment, and developing a turnout infrastructure that can win under that current electoral model. Voters seem to prefer competence and experience to outrage and scandal. More than complaining, the GOP has to show that it can govern, especially that it can address challenges facing working families. There may be good policy arguments for revising some Covid-era changes to elections. However, many states (particularly those with Democratic governors) are likely to have extended seasons for voting in future cycles. If Republicans cannot learn how to turn out voters under those circumstances, they may face further electoral disappointments.