The Journal’s editors are right. For now, ‘the Houthis have the upper hand.’
“Wait until you see what we do to Iran,” Trump told his supporters at a Tuesday night rally in Alaska. “We’re going to do a number.” But Trump isn’t singling out the Islamic Republic alone. Yemen’s Ansar Allah militia — the so-called Houthis — have become another increasingly intolerable pain in the president’s side. “They’ve been silent for a long time, but now they’ve emerged again,” Trump wrote of the Houthis in a recent social media post, “purposefully trying to drive up Oil Prices, probably prior to the U.S. Elections.” And, so far, they’ve succeeded.
After largely sitting out the war that began on February 28, the Houthis launched an offensive in early September that culminated in the seizure of key cities and islands along the Red Sea coast — positions that threaten traffic flowing through the Gulf of Aden toward the Suez Canal. A Saudi-supported counteroffensive led by Yemen’s government forces has, over the last few weeks, succeeded in blunting that offensive. But the battle lines are fluid, and the Houthis are by no means defanged:
NEW: The Houthis fully encircled Taiz City on October 12, which will impose multiple dilemmas on Yemeni government-aligned forces. A complete encirclement further restricts Yemeni government-aligned forces’ ability to reinforce and resupply their positions, withdraw forces, and… pic.twitter.com/hzHIlfpRyk
— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) October 12, 2026
At the same time, the Saudis and the Houthis continue to exchange missiles, with Houthi ordnance striking the international airport in Riyadh over the weekend in the single deadliest strike on Saudi Arabian territory since the outset of Operation Epic Fury.
The Institute for the Study of War and Trump agree that the conflict on the Arabian Peninsula cannot be divorced from the war against Iran. The Islamic Republic, too, has ramped up its attacks in recent days. Dozens of ships in the Strait of Hormuz have been targeted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps since October 1, with reported hits on at least six vessels on Sunday alone.
The regime’s remnants are taking advantage of Trump’s reluctance to resume airstrikes on Iranian targets prior to the midterm elections, one CNN analysis concluded. “Tehran has insisted that if it can’t export its oil, its neighbors won’t be able to either,” it read. Tehran’s objective is clear: “The strategy included a change in the type as well as the pace of attacks, with one goal being to influence the outcome of the US vote,” the Jerusalem Post reported, citing remarks from Iranian officials.
According to the Wall Street Journal, the Iranians are preparing for a resumption of hostilities. They’re fortifying nuclear sites and border areas, training civilians to use shoulder-fired anti-air missiles against U.S. aircraft, and warning their Gulf neighbors that Iran’s forces will target regional infrastructure or even invade the United Arab Emirates if the American bombs start falling again. But while the Iranians are trying to fight their way out of a corner, the Houthis have far more latitude.
The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board recently expressed all the consternation that the Saudis deserve and more over Riyadh’s failure to both anticipate and contain Houthi aggression. “The Saudis spent $83 billion on defense in 2025, more than Israel or Iran,” the Journal noted. Yet, the Kingdom’s budgetary priorities have had little impact on Yemen’s battlefields. By maintaining an arms-length relationship with Israel while also inking an illusory defense agreement with Turkey and Pakistan, the editors further note, Riyadh has foolishly tried to have its cake and eat it, too.
“How does joining forces with Israel really help the Saudis in Yemen, though?” The Economist’s Gregg Carlstrom countered. “The biggest problem for Saudi is its lack of competent, united proxies in Yemen. Israel doesn’t solve that problem.” And Israel probably hasn’t penetrated the Houthis as thoroughly as it has Iran. “It didn’t really start paying attention to Yemen until a few years ago,” he contended. “Gulf states presumably have much better intel networks.” Possibly. But Israel’s August 2025 strike on Sana’a, in which it killed at least twelve high-ranking Houthi officials, suggests that Jerusalem’s capabilities on the Arabian Peninsula are hardly nil.
Neither the Saudi Kingdom nor the United States lack options for dealing with the Houthis, though those options carry risks and costs. A cease-fire between the U.S. and the Islamist militia has held since the conclusion of Operation Rough Rider last year, but Houthi attacks on Saudi territory in which an American citizen was killed can reasonably be construed to have violated that compact. But while some American lawmakers are urging the president to provide Saudi-backed forces with lethal support, Trump is reportedly reluctant to unleash forces that will, in the near term at least, contribute to higher global energy prices.
The Journal’s editors are right. For now, “the Houthis have the upper hand.” At least, they do until voters register their dissatisfaction with the last two years of Trump’s governance, after which Iran and its regional partners can expect that the president will take out all his frustrations on them. “Wait and see what we do to Iran, because we’ve had enough,” the president stressed at his Tuesday night rally. “We’re going to hit them hard.”