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Ukraine and the Meaning of This War

Damaged Ukrainian national flags wave over graves of Ukrainian soldiers killed in the country’s eastern regions at a cemetery in Chernihiv, Ukraine, April 6, 2022. (Serhii Nuzhnenko)

I very much wanted to talk with Eliot Cohen, and have — in this Q&A. Cohen is a scholar of international relations. His affiliations are several: the School of Advanced International Studies, at Johns Hopkins; the Center for Strategic and International Studies; The Atlantic magazine. Years ago, Bill Buckley asked Cohen to write regularly for National Review, and he did. For many years, he was on our masthead. In our podcast, Cohen refers to WFB as “that wonderful man.”

Among Cohen’s books are Supreme Command (2002) and The Big Stick (2017). He studied at Harvard with, among others, Richard Pipes and Samuel Huntington. Both of those names come up in our podcast.

Here on the Corner, I will provide a taste of what Professor Cohen has to say — paraphrasing him (though closely) in italics.

Why now? Why did Putin launch his all-out assault on Ukraine in February 2022, rather than earlier or later?

This is not necessarily knowable. There may always be an element of mystery. But we can make some guesses.

There have always been rumors about Putin’s health. He may have wanted to do one last big thing, before shuffling off this mortal coil. One last thing in the fulfillment of what he regards as his historical mission.

But other things? He did not respect Zelensky. He may have misjudged Olaf Scholz. He expected the Europeans to roll over. 

He could have interpreted the American withdrawal from Afghanistan as weakness. The Chinese interpreted it as a shift to the Indo-Pacific. Putin, however, might have thought simply: weakness.

Also, he may have thought that his military was ready. He had poured a lot of money into it.

But I return to the personal element. One reason Hitler launched World War II in 1939 is that he had premonitions of mortality. Hitler would have been better off launching the war several years later. But he had this conviction that he was going to die young, so, if he was going to do big things, he needed to get on with it.

This assault on Ukraine: Is it a Putin thing or a Russian thing? John Bolton wrote a highly interesting piece in which he said, “This is not Putin’s war, it’s Russia’s war.” Russia is trying to devour Ukraine now. It may try to do so again in 50 years. Or a hundred years. Etc.

Yes, I think of Richard Pipes — who had a dark view of Russia as a patrimonial state that has perpetually committed violent, aggressive acts. We may have a Russia problem, as well as a narrower Putin problem. But that does not mean that, for all eternity, a predatory Russia will be ready to lunge into eastern or central Europe for the purpose of reestablishing the old empire.

Speaking of your teachers: Are we in a Huntingtonian moment? Are we seeing a clash of civilizations? Or is that too grand?

It may be a little too grand. Sure, there is something to it. The problem is, the world is complex, and there are many explanations for what occurs. Is there a general split between the Orthodox world and the Catholic world? Maybe — but think of the great division now between the Ukrainian Orthodox and the Russian.

What is the role of NATO in Putin’s thinking?

Of all the explanations for Putin’s war, the most stupid is that he has reacted to NATO expansion. As he says over and over, he does not believe that Ukraine is a nation. He believes that it belongs to Russia. Also, he is deathly afraid of a color revolution, such as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

Obviously, he doesn’t like NATO expansion, but that is not the point here. And the irony is: He’s likely to get NATO expansion as a result of his war.

Talk to people in the Baltic states. There is no question in their minds that being in NATO has protected them from the kind of behavior we are seeing in Ukraine. Putin’s attitude toward the Balts is not all that different from his attitude toward the Ukrainians. And Russian hostility to Poland is as great as it has ever been.

I am haunted, or semi-haunted, by something that Peter Pomerantsev said. The response we have seen from the West in the last couple of months has been impressive. It would have been great in 2014. But now . . .

Well, that’s the nature of liberal democracies, right? That’s the story of the late 1930s. It would have been a lot easier to stop Hitler at the Rhineland. 

Look, the West doesn’t know a whole heckuva lot about Ukraine. The Ukraine experts — they tend to be Russia experts, really. In 2014, people may have thought, “The Donbas is Russian-speaking, and they’re going to be pro-Russian, so Putin’s invasion isn’t great, but at least he’s not trying to overthrow the Ukrainian government or anything.” 

The response of eastern Ukraine to the invasion has stunned many people. The nature of Ukrainian patriotism has changed in recent years. Ukraine has developed as a nation. People in Kharkiv and other Russian-speaking cities have put up as ferocious a resistance to the invasion as anybody.

Is there anything more the United States should be doing?

Yes. Take secondary sanctions. You say to big companies, “You have a choice: You can do business in Russia or you can do business in the United States. But not both. Which do you prefer?”

A word about weaponry:

There’s no such thing as a defensive weapon! Or rather, weapons can be used for defensive and offensive purposes. Say someone bursts into your house with the intention of strangling your children. You shoot him with your pistol. Which is a defensive weapon in your hands. But if you burst into someone else’s house, with the same intention — now your pistol is offensive.

This is elementary.

People say, “Beware escalation.” But Putin is probably the biggest escalator on the planet.

True. And Putin is not a master strategist. He is a KGB thug. He knows how to play mind games. And he likes to say, in so many words, “Ooh, you better not upset me. Who knows what I’ll do?” The truth is, Russia is in a very weak position.

As in the Cold War, we are seeing apologists for the Kremlin. Fellow travelers. Useful idiots. “Blame America first.” “Moral equivalence.” Everything old is new again. And yet the Kremlin-friendly folk may be coming from a different direction . . .

You and I are good conservatives – which means we’re virtually homeless – so we tend to look at the dark side. That’s what we do. I don’t mean to be a Pollyanna, but there are bright spots. Look at Congress, where there has not been much difference between Republicans and Democrats, on the issue of Ukraine. If anything, Republicans have been critical of Biden for not doing more.

The extremes on left and right have gotten worse: in their worldviews, their dishonesty, and in some cases their cruelty. But most Americans, I think, are in the sensible middle.

A final question: What is the importance of Ukraine to the United States?

The stability of Europe is involved. We must contain a pretty malign Russia. But there is a larger importance, too.

We’re seeing in about as stark a way as we’ve seen since World War II what it means for a free people to fight for their very existence and for freedom, and that should inspire us profoundly.

If they fail or go under because we’re not willing to support them — I mean, help them defend themselves — it is a terrible blow to who we are and what we think we’re about in the world. 

Conversely, if they’re successful — as I hope they will be, and tend to think they will be — it is a tremendous victory for the very principles on which this country was founded.

Our podcast, again, is here. Professor Cohen is informative, judicious — all that. You can learn a lot from him. Also, he is moving, or so I found.

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