Why all the hurry in talking to Syria or Iran or any other terrorist-sponsoring regime that might offer (they really won’t) concessions in one theater for an American pass on their roguery in another?
These regimes may talk, but only when it is in their interest (i.e., they are desperate) to do so. IF the UN ever found the Assad government responsible for the serial murdering in Lebanon or the Iranians guilty of lying about nuclear proliferation, and IF in response the Security Council ordered economic sanctions or a boycott/embargo, then either country might be willing to discuss its role in destabilizing Iraq. Or IF Iraq and Lebanon were stabilizing and became prosperous, then Damascus and Teheran might seek to stave off a regional wave of reform through “dialogue. ” The same is true if either thought their terrorism had earned them the possibility of a retaliatory air strike.
But they won’t now when they think we need them more than they do us. The only reason Hamas-supposedly the most radical of all the Palestinian terrorists-is talking to Israel over Gaza, is the IDF’s improved defence and offense, that have stymied suicide bombing’s effectiveness, and put into jeopardy almost all of the so-call wannabe martyrs of Hamas. The same was true of 1972. What thawed the Paris Peace Talks was Nixon’s supposed “Christmas” bombing, and what doomed the accords were the later cut-offs of American support. The communists were willing to talk in 1973 but not in 1975 because of differing perceptions of American power.
The latest crop of realists should review allied efforts circa 1939 to talk to Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, or Turkey about their respective roles in aiding the Third Reich. They got nowhere.
(And of course, later British feelers in 1940 to the Soviet Union in hopes they would stop supplying Hitler ores and oil while the Luftwaffe was hammering London were futile.)
Fast forward to spring 1945, suddenly all these neutrals had systematically cut ties with Nazi Germany, and were scrambling to find ways, informally or officially, to tie themselves with the Allies. Only the perception of the course of the war had changed and the leverage that comes with winning. In contrast, each time a peace feeler is extended to either Syria or Iran, expect more murders in Lebanon and full-speed ahead on nuclear acquisition in Iran.
In general, we should neither seek to negotiate nor threaten either regime, but instead very quietly press ahead with winning in Iraq, and galvanizing allies to prepare sanctions against both–while preparing for the worst.