After Orbán, Hungary Is Falling Out of Love with Russia

In the leadup to this year’s elections in Hungary, then–Prime Minister Viktor Orbán castigated Ukrainian leaders for calling on the country to give up its importation of cheap Russian energy.

“Anyone who says this is an enemy of Hungary, so Ukraine is our enemy,” Orbán said at a February rally. Since taking office in 2010, Orbán has pursued closer relations with Russia, refusing to reverse course even after Russia invaded Ukraine despite the demands of erstwhile allies in the European Union and NATO.

In April, months after Orbán declared Ukraine an enemy, his Fidesz party lost in a landslide to its rival Tisza, led by eventual Prime Minister Péter Magyar. Under Tisza control, Hungary is looking to reverse the legacy of Orbán’s love affair with Russia while stopping short of embracing Ukraine fully.

“We basically promised to the Hungarian people that we will keep Hungary out of harm’s way,” Márton Hajdu, a Tisza official who chairs the Hungarian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, said in an interview with National Review in the Hungarian Embassy in Washington, D.C. “But we, by virtue of rebuilding our international relations and our partnership and our cooperation with our allies, will not be holding up anyone from helping Ukraine, whatever they wish to [do], and that’s where we stand right now.”

While he was clear that Russia was the aggressor in the war, Hajdu ruled out the possibility of supplying troops or weapons to Ukraine. But Hungary is open to cooperating with Ukraine, he said, on non-military matters, so long as officials in Kyiv protect the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine, which has long been a sticking point between the two countries.

“Our promise to the Hungarian people was that you don’t have to be worried about Ukraine, and that explains why we have to be so categorical about our relationship with Ukraine,” Hajdu said.

Hajdu’s comments indicate that — though Putin will no longer have an ally in Hungary, which shares an eastern border with Ukraine — Kyiv has not necessarily found a new cheerleader. They also reflect the legacy of 16 straight years of Orbán’s rule on public opinion, something that cannot be undone overnight.

During his time in power, Orbán repeatedly clashed with his allies in the EU as he deepened Hungary’s relationship with Russia, often opposing EU measures to support Ukraine or sanction Putin. He also made Hungary dependent on Russia for energy, even increasing the share of Hungarian imports that Russian oil made up as the Ukraine war raged.

One of Tisza’s first priorities has been to reverse course on Russia. In a speech to NATO allies this year, Magyar broke with Orbán’s line, stating clearly that “Ukraine is the victim, and Russia is the brutal aggressor.” According to Hajdu, the party is also attempting to repair the relationship with those EU and NATO allies alienated by Orbán.

“During the 16 years of Orbán’s rule — but in particular in the last few years — basically, Hungary became an obstructive force, a veto-wielding government in almost all of our foreign policy relations,” Hajdu told NR.

But while it is becoming friendlier to the West, there are limits to how much Tisza can help Ukraine.

“Hungary has stopped being Putin’s Trojan Horse in the EU,” Dalibor Rohac, director of research at GLOBSEC, a European foreign policy think tank, told NR. “It’s not holding Ukraine hostage for Putin’s benefit anymore, which was a common pattern by the previous government. But that doesn’t mean that it has become Ukraine’s advocate.

That’s mostly due to the fact that the Hungarian population that elected Tisza still has some reservations about Ukraine. A poll from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) released soon after the Hungarian election found that Hungarians generally oppose allowing the shipment of military aid to Ukraine through Hungary, providing financial support to Ukraine, and especially, giving military aid to the country. Hajdu indicated much of that is due to a hangover from Orbán and his control of the discourse in Hungary.

“Orbán and his friends had an 80-percent cloud over the Hungarian media,” he said. “Public media was under their fist, and also his oligarchs owned a lot of private media. And this allowed them to tell a narrative to the Hungarian people in which Ukraine was a national security threat.”

It’s that public sentiment in part that has led Hungary to continue to oppose fast-tracking Ukraine’s joining the EU. Hajdu argued that the promise of an accelerated accession was “always a mirage” and “unrealistic.”

“The EU enlargement is one of the most regulated processes inside the European Union. It has its own rhythm, it has its own rules, and departing from the merit-based approach would be suicide, both for the European Union and for Ukraine.”

Asked about the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO once the war is over, Hajdu said that the prospect of both NATO and EU accession for Ukraine is a discussion for the distant future and emphasized that the region’s main priority should be bringing a just end to the war.

“Let’s assume that we reach at a certain point a just and sustainable peace,” Hajdu said. “Then it will take years, if not decades, in which we have to talk about Ukraine reconstruction, reforms, military cooperation, all sorts of things before any of these can be realistically discussed.”

But Tisza officials are showing some willingness to buck public opinion on certain issues. While Hungary still opposes accelerated EU accession for Ukraine, Magyar in June lifted the country’s Orbán-era opposition to beginning formal talks with Kyiv to bring Ukraine into the EU through the ordinary process — despite a majority of Hungarians opposing Ukrainian accession in the ECFR poll.

Tisza may soon be forced to confront public opinion on the issue of Russian oil. Per the ECFR, 53 percent of Hungarians want the country to keep buying oil from Putin, but recent legislative moves in the United States could make relying on Russian oil, which makes up over 90 percent of Hungarian oil imports, untenable.

The recently passed Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 gives President Donald Trump new powers to sanction those who import their energy from Moscow. On a trip to Washington, D.C., last month, Hajdu asked lawmakers not to impose tariffs on Hungary while it attempts to wean itself off of that energy source. Trump last week broadly waived the sanctions the bill would have imposed.

Speaking to NR, Hajdu was reluctant to commit to completely cutting off imports of Russian energy, but he was clear that he hoped to decrease them.

“What is absolutely certain at this stage is that, for the protection of our own national interest and security, we need to stop — or decrease and then stop — our unilateral dependence on Russia for energy,” he said.

Broadly, Hajdu expressed an interest in cooperation with the United States. He insisted there was no awkwardness on Hungary’s part, even given the fact that Vice President JD Vance went to Hungary to campaign for Orbán in the leadup to this year’s election.

“We look for something durable, something value- and interest-based, not something that is down to personalities or any kind of personal emotions,” Hajdu said.