



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

June 18, 2025

President Domenico Grasso
University of Michigan
500 S State St.
Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Dear President Grasso,

Earlier this year, after receiving a letter from the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee), the University of Michigan (UM) announced it would be closing its joint institute with Shanghai Jiao Tong University.¹ That letter outlined how the joint institute was a risk to national security and the federally funded research being done by UM faculty and staff. We are grateful to the university for heeding the recommendation to close the institute. Unfortunately, your university's research security challenges with respect to the People's Republic of China (PRC) were not entirely solved with that decision.

We are deeply alarmed about recent reports and related criminal charges involving Chinese nationals with direct ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) allegedly smuggling dangerous biological materials into the United States for use at UM laboratories. On June 2, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) charged Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu, both citizens of the PRC, with conspiracy, smuggling goods into the United States, making false statements, and visa fraud.² Just five days later, on June 8, 2025, authorities arrested Chengxuan Han for smuggling biological materials into the U.S. and making false statements to border officials,³ exposing a troubling pattern of apparent criminal activity within a single week. The Select Committee previously revealed that a PRC national ran an illegal biolab in California filled with thousands of unlabeled pathogen samples and containing a freezer labeled "Ebola," a CDC-designated Select Agent—highlighting a broader pattern of concerning PRC biological activities.⁴

The Committees found that Jian and Liu conducted research under the supervision of, or in concert with, UM professors funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF). It is our position that Chinese researchers tied to the PRC defense research and industrial base have no business participating in U.S. taxpayer-funded research with clear national security implications—especially those related to dangerous biological materials.

According to public reports, Jian and Liu attempted to smuggle a fungus identified as a potential agroterrorism agent.⁵ This toxic fungus, *Fusarium graminearum*, causes "head blight," a disease that affects wheat, barley, maize, and rice, resulting in billions of dollars in worldwide

agricultural losses annually.⁶ The toxins it produces can cause vomiting, liver damage, and reproductive harm in both humans and livestock.⁷ According to the DOJ, a WeChat conversation shows Liu instructing Jian on how to smuggle the fungus.⁸ Liu later admitted to investigators that he planned to conduct research experiments in the same UM laboratory as Jian.⁹

Jian worked as a postdoctoral fellow in UM's Molecular Plant-Microbe Interaction Laboratory, led by Professors Ping He and Libo Shan.¹⁰ She joined the lab in August 2022 after completing two years of postdoctoral research at Zhejiang University¹¹—a university co-administered by China's State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), which supports China's military-civil fusion and defense modernization goals.¹² According to an October 2023 publication, Jian was affiliated with the State Key Laboratory of Rice Biology and the Key Laboratory of Molecular Biology of Crop Pathogens and Insects at Zhejiang University.¹³ She received PRC government funding for a postdoctoral position at Zhejiang University from July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2024, a period that overlapped with her postdoctoral appointments at Texas A&M and UM.¹⁴ The CCP recognized Jian as an Outstanding Graduate Student for both her scientific achievements and Party membership.¹⁵

Zunyong Liu—the alleged partner and co-conspirator of Jian—co-authored publications with Shan and He¹⁶ and was listed as a postdoctoral fellow in their lab at UM as of April 2024,¹⁷ three months before his blocked entry by U.S. Customs and Border Protection for attempting to smuggle an undeclared biological material.¹⁸ Liu's most recent co-authored publications with Shan appeared in November and December 2024, where he listed UM as his institutional affiliation.¹⁹ Similar to Jian, records show Liu was also affiliated with the State Key Laboratory of Rice Biology and the Key Laboratory of Molecular Biology of Crop Pathogens and Insects at Zhejiang University.²⁰ Liu is now listed as a "Hundred Talents Program" researcher on Zhejiang University's website.²¹ The Hundred Talents Program is a Chinese government-sponsored talent recruitment initiative that, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, "focuses on attracting a younger talent pool" of individuals who "demonstrate internationally-recognized expertise."²² Liu has benefited from several streams of PRC funding, including 973 Program support in 2015,²³ a China Postdoctoral Science Foundation grant in 2017,²⁴ and Zhejiang government funding in 2025 to continue his *Fusarium* research.²⁵

According to NIH and NSF records, UM professors Shan and He have received over \$9.6 million in U.S. government funding since 2010,²⁶ including multiple active grants from both agencies.²⁷ Several of these federally-funded projects supported publications co-authored by Jian and Liu.²⁸ Additionally, according to a 2019 publication that cited NSF and NIH as funding sources, both Professors Shan and He appear to have maintained dual affiliations with China Agricultural University, while simultaneously holding positions at Texas A&M University.²⁹

These concerning patterns of CCP-affiliated researchers at UM extend beyond the Jian and Liu case. On June 8, 2025, U.S. authorities arrested Chengxuan Han for smuggling biological materials into the U.S. and making false statements to border officials.³⁰ According to the FBI complaint, Han sent four packages containing concealed roundworm specimens from

China to recipients at UM.³¹ Han serves as Party Secretary of the Second Graduate Student Party Branch in Biological Sciences at Huazhong University of Science and Technology (HUST) and was named a university-level “Red Model” in 2020—an award the CCP grants to exemplary Party-aligned students.³² Like Zhejiang University, HUST is co-administered by SASTIND and maintains ties to China’s defense industrial base,³³ including direct recruitment pipelines for components of the People’s Liberation Army.³⁴

In order to ensure that American citizens are the sole beneficiaries of government-funded research, and to protect against waste, fraud, and abuse, the award of NIH and NSF research funding requires strict compliance with federal research security laws and regulations. President Trump’s 2021 National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33) requires that agencies and research universities collaborate to develop research security programs and share information about individuals whose behavior poses a risk to research security.³⁵ While compliance with NSPM-33 would broadly enhance research security, full compliance has proved difficult, as the Biden Administration’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) missed the congressionally mandated deadline for implementing guidance. The final guidance was issued in July 2024, which delayed timely implementation by institutions of higher education.³⁶

Building off of this progress, as part of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2021, Congress moved to standardize disclosure policies by mandating that each federal agency require individuals applying for federal R&D funding to disclose all current and pending research support during the application process.³⁷ In 2023 NSF updated its Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide to include requirements for institutions of higher education to disclose current financial support of \$50,000 or more from a foreign source, directly or indirectly.³⁸

Further, the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 included several research security provisions. Title IV prohibits all federally funded research grantees from being a member of a malign foreign talent program or participating in similar activities.³⁹ This includes requiring all researchers working on federally funded research projects to disclose any participation in foreign talent recruitment programs.⁴⁰ Under Title IV, federal research agencies have the authority to require the submission of additional supporting documentation and the authority to act on findings that identify undue foreign influence or grant fraud.⁴¹ Additionally, Title IV requires all federally funded grantees to take annual training on research policies and foreign threats.⁴²

Given the recent criminal charges within the span of a week, the Committees have respectfully urged the NIH and NSF to initiate a full review of any grants related to these incidents. To support this effort, we request that UM produce all documents and records of any due diligence, investigations, or other reviews—conducted by or on behalf of UM—concerning conflicts of interest or commitment involving any UM faculty, researchers, or individuals granted access to UM facilities. Additionally, please provide documents and information sufficient to answer the following questions no later than **July 2, 2025**:

1. How are you preventing unauthorized access to labs, including unauthorized access granted by a party that has authorized access? Please provide all documentation related to

approved access to laboratory equipment and spaces, including records of issuance of keys or access codes, access approval documentation, or any mandatory lab safety or training certificates for the laboratory spaces utilized by Professor He, Professor Shan, Liu, Jian, and Han.

2. Were Liu, Jian, and Han listed as covered individuals on any disclosure forms or grant proposal documents certified by UM and submitted to either NSF or NIH? Please provide all documents and disclosure forms for grants supporting research conducted by Professors He and Shan.
3. How often has UM updated disclosures requirements or attestations for active awards funded by NSF and NIH?
4. Does UM share due diligence reports on faculty with federal agencies? If so, how?
5. Does UM have any knowledge about whether or why Professor Shan, Professor He, or any other UM faculty asked visiting researchers to obtain biohazardous materials? Does UM require documentation or approval to bring biohazardous material onto campus?
6. What safeguards does UM have in place with regards to visiting researchers, like Han, who fall outside of the scope of required research security disclosures?
7. Did any intellectual property derive from research conducted by Professors He and Shan at UM?
8. Does UM conduct compliance, monitoring, and additional due diligence on faculty during their employment?
9. Does UM have the necessary language support capabilities when conducting due diligence? Much of the information that shows ties, affiliations, grants, contracts, awards, etc., are in the Chinese vernacular and necessary to uncover when conducting due diligence.
10. Please conduct a full review of Professors He and Shan's activities in relation to university policies and federal grant requirements.
11. What research did Professors He and Shan conduct at UM? Please provide all foreign gifts and contracts documentation associated with Professors He and Shan.
12. Could any of the awards to UM Professors He and Shan be used to develop bioweapons capabilities?
13. What steps are being taken to ensure fundamental research at UM is not being utilized to create bioweapons?
14. Did any federal awards pay for any travel expenses or accommodations, including stipends, for Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu? If yes, to where?
15. Did Professors Shan and He travel to China during the period of performance of their grants while Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu worked with them?
16. Did UM know that Professors He and Shan had dual affiliations in the past or investigated whether they still had dual affiliations for more recent grants?
17. How are dual appointments handled at UM—particularly if they are with a non-U.S. institution such as China?
18. What are the consequences at UM of incomplete or incorrect disclosures by faculty regarding foreign relationships?
19. Does UM coordinate with federal agencies regarding faculty foreign relationships or potential security concerns?

20. What steps are you taking to protect UM research from the PRC's targeting of foreign expertise, technology, and 'know-how' in support of its national technology, economic, and military goals?
21. Has UM established a research security program office that meets the requirements outlined in July 2024 memorandum titled *Guidelines for Research Security Programs at Covered Institutions*?
22. Did the previous administration's delay in releasing the congressionally-mandated guidance prevent UM from instituting policies that would have prevented the research security incidents described above?
23. Was UM contacted by members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) regarding potential threats to its research facilities?
24. How often does the IC share information about threats with UM?


House Resolution 5 delegates to the Select Committee broad authority to investigate and submit policy recommendations on countering the economic, technological, security, and ideological threats of the Chinese Communist Party to the United States and allies and partners of the United States.⁴³ Under House Rule X, the Committee on Education and Workforce (Committee) has legislative and oversight jurisdiction over "education or labor generally."⁴⁴ Under House Rule X, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology has legislative and oversight authority of scientific research, development, and demonstration projects as well as special oversight authority over all laws, programs, and Government activities relating to nonmilitary research and development. Upon receipt of this letter, please maintain and preserve all hard copy and electronic documents, including electronic communications, related to the subject matter of this letter.

We appreciate your prompt attention to these concerns and request your immediate confirmation of receipt, followed by a full response no later than **July 2, 2025**.


Sincerely,




John Moolenaar
Chairman
Select Committee on the CCP



Brian Babin
Chairman
Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology



Tim Walberg
Chairman
Committee on Education and Workforce



Virginia Foxx
Member of Congress



Dr. Neal Dunn
Member of Congress



Gus Bilirakis
Member of Congress




Nathaniel Moran
Member of Congress




Rich McCormick
Member of Congress




Max Miller
Member of Congress



Daniel Webster
Member of Congress




Ashley Hinson
Member of Congress




Vince Fong
Member of Congress




Scott Franklin
Member of Congress



Jay Obernolte
Member of Congress



Elise Stefanik
Member of Congress



Randy Weber
Member of Congress




Glenn Grothman
Member of Congress



Burgess Owens
Member of Congress



Pat Harrigan
Member of Congress



Michael Rulli
Member of Congress



Claudia Tenney
Member of Congress



Chuck Fleischmann
Member of Congress


President Domenico Grasso

June 18, 2025

Page 7 of 11

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Randy Fine".

Randy Fine
Member of Congress

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Mike Kennedy".

Mike Kennedy
Member of Congress

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Mike Haridopolos".

Mike Haridopolos
Member of Congress

¹ John Moolenaar, *Letter to President Santa Ono, Urging Closure of University of Michigan's Partnership with Shanghai Jiao Tong University* (Oct. 31, 2024), <https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2024-10-31%20-%20Letter%20to%20UM%20re%20Research%20Security%20House%20Select%20Cmte%20CCP.pdf>; *University of Michigan to End Joint Institute with Chinese University*, Press Release, House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (Jan. 10, 2025), <https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/press-releases/university-michigan-end-joint-institute-chinese-university#:~:text=U%2DM%20is%20the%20third%20American,concerns%20about%20national%20security%20risks>.

² Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Chinese Nationals Charged with Conspiracy and Smuggling of Dangerous Biological Pathogen into U.S. (May 30, 2024), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/chinese-nationals-charged-conspiracy-and-smuggling-dangerous-biological-pathogen-us>; Criminal Complaint at 1, *United States v. Jian*, No. 2:25-mj-30353 (E.D. Mich. June 2, 2025), <https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2025-06/Jian%20Liu%20complaint.pdf>; Press Release, Univ. of Mich., University Statement on Chinese Research Fellow (June 3, 2025), <https://publicaffairs.vpcomm.umich.edu/key-issues/university-statement-on-chinese-research-fellow/>.

³ U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the E.D. of Mich., Alien from Wuhan, China, Charged with Making False Statements and Smuggling Biological Materials into the U.S. for Her Work at a University of Michigan Laboratory (June 9, 2025), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/alien-wuhan-china-charged-making-false-statements-and-smuggling-biological-materials>.

⁴ A prior Select Committee investigation revealed that a PRC national who was a senior official at multiple state-owned entities ran an illegal biolab in California filled with thousands of samples of potential pathogens, including malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV, and contained a freezer labeled "Ebola" containing unlabeled, sealed silver bags consistent with lab storage of high-risk biological materials. Ebola is a Select Agent with a lethality rate between 25-90%. *See* Investigation into the Reedley Biolab: Findings, H. Select Comm. on the Chinese Communist Party (Nov. 15, 2023), <https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/scc-reedley-report-11.15.pdf>.

⁵ Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Chinese Nationals Charged with Conspiracy and Smuggling of Dangerous Biological Pathogen into U.S. (May 30, 2024), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/chinese-nationals-charged-conspiracy-and-smuggling-dangerous-biological-pathogen-us>.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ Peter D'Abrosca, Suspected Chinese Bioterrorists Smuggled Dangerous Agent into US in Boots, Officials Say, Fox News (June 4, 2025), <https://www.foxnews.com/us/suspected-chinese-bioterrorists-smuggled-killer-agent-into-us-boots-officials-say>.

⁹ Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Chinese Nationals Charged with Conspiracy and Smuggling of Dangerous Biological Pathogen into U.S. (May 30, 2024), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/chinese-nationals-charged-conspiracy-and-smuggling-dangerous-biological-pathogen-us>.

¹⁰ Molecular Plant-Microbe Interaction Working Groups, Current Lab Members, Univ. of Mich., <https://web.archive.org/web/20250605195126/https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mpmi/people-2/current/>.

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² Zhejiang University, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Nov. 18, 2019), <https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/zhejiang-university/>.

¹³ Kewei Sun et al., HapX-Mediated H2B Deub1 and SreA-Mediated H2A.Z Deposition Coordinate in Fungal Iron Resistance, 51 *Nucleic Acids Res.* 10238 (2023), <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37650633/>.

¹⁴ Criminal Complaint at 1, *United States v. Jian*, No. 2:25-mj-30353 (E.D. Mich. June 2, 2025), <https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2025-06/Jian%20Liu%20complaint.pdf>.

¹⁵ Zhejiang Univ., Outstanding Graduate Student Recommendation Form [优秀研究生推荐表], http://www.cab.zju.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/66/dc/8438bb80418390416560b17a8118/33c6bd4a-d925-444e-96f8-aa694da00d87.xlsx (last visited June 5, 2025).

¹⁶ For example, *see* Zunyong Liu et al., Phytocytokine signalling reopens stomata in plant immunity and water loss, *Nature* (May 2022), <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35508659/>; Zunyong Liu, Yunqing Jian & Libo Shan, Disarm resistance: Fungal effectors target WAK alternative splicing variant for virulence, *Cell Rep* (Jan. 2023), <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36640313/>; Yongliang Zhang et al., The PTI-suppressing Avr2 effector from *Fusarium oxysporum* suppresses mono-ubiquitination and plasma membrane dissociation of BIK1, *Mol. Plant Pathol.* (Oct. 2023), <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37391937/>; Zunyong Liu, Shuguo Hou & Ping He, Detection of Ligand-Induced Receptor Kinase and Signaling Component Phosphorylation with Mn²⁺-Phos-Tag SDS-PAGE, *Plant Peptide Hormones and Growth Factors* (Nov. 2023), https://link.springer.com/protocol/10.1007/978-1-0716-3511-7_15; Shuguo Hou et al., Small Holes, Big Impact: Stomata in Plant-Pathogen-Climate Epic Trifecta, *17 Mol. Plant* 26 (Jan. 2024), <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38041402/>; Jun Liu et al., The antagonistic role of an E3 ligase pair in regulating plant NLR-mediated autoimmunity and fungal pathogen resistance, *Cell Host Microbe* (July 2024), <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38955187/>; Shuguo Hou et al., Small Holes, Big Impact: Stomata in Plant-Pathogen-Climate Epic Trifecta, *Mol. Plant* (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.molp.2023.11.011>; Huimin Wu et al., Mechanistic study of SCOOPs recognition by MIK2-BAK1 complex reveals the role of N-glycans in plant ligand-receptor-coreceptor complex formation, *Nature* (Nov. 2024), <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41477-024-01836-3>; Yunqing Jian et al., An emerging connected view: Phytocytokines in regulating stomatal, apoplastic, and vascular immunity, *Current Opinion in Plant Biology* (Dec. 2024), <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369526624001146>.

¹⁷ Liu appears in an archived version of the lab's member list from April 2024 but is no longer listed by September 2024. *See* Molecular Plant-Microbe Interaction Working Groups, Current Lab Members, Univ. of Mich., <https://web.archive.org/web/20240415090629/https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mpmi/people-2/current/> (archived Apr. 15, 2024); Molecular Plant-Microbe Interaction Working Groups, Current Lab Members, Univ. of Mich., <https://web.archive.org/web/20240910052249/https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mpmi/people-2/current/> (archived Sep. 10, 2024).

¹⁸ Criminal Complaint at 1, *United States v. Jian*, No. 2:25-mj-30353 (E.D. Mich. June 2, 2025), <https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2025-06/Jian%20Liu%20complaint.pdf>.

¹⁹ One of those papers acknowledges “staff at the State Key Laboratory of Agricultural Microbiology Core Facility” and the Center for Protein Research at Huazhong Agricultural University for “facilities support,” and credits Liu and Jian with preparing transgenic plants and performing MAPK, ROS, root growth, and subcellular localization experiments. *See* Yunqing Jian et al., An emerging connected view: Phytocytokines in regulating stomatal, apoplastic, and vascular immunity, *Current Opinion in Plant Biology* (Dec. 2024), <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369526624001146>; Huimin Wu et al., Mechanistic study of SCOOPs recognition by MIK2-BAK1 complex reveals the role of N-glycans in plant ligand-receptor-coreceptor complex formation, *Nature* (Nov. 2024), <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41477-024-01836-3>.

²⁰ Chang Liu et al., Biological and molecular characterization of pydiflumetofen and phenamacril dual-resistant *Fusarium graminearum* strains, *Pest Management Science* (June 2024), <https://scijournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/ps.8226>; Qiaowan Chen et al., A novel highly antifungal compound ZJS-178 targeting myosin I inhibits the endocytosis and mycotoxin biosynthesis of *Fusarium graminearum*, *Crop Health* (Sep. 2024), <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44297-024-00034-z>.

²¹ Zhejiang Univ., Professors – College of Agriculture and Biotechnology, <http://www.cab.zju.edu.cn/swjs/7217/list1.htm> (<https://archive.md/4nSDV>).

²² Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Intelligence Note: Chinese Talent Programs, SPIN: 15-007 (Sept. 2015), <https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-ChineseTalentPrograms.pdf>.

²³ Prof. Ma Zhonghua's Group Makes Important Progress in *Fusarium* Pathogenesis Research on Wheat, Zhejiang Univ. (July 14, 2015), <http://www.cab.zju.edu.cn/chinese/2015/0714/c11148a514003/page.htm> (<https://archive.vn/dU3ra>).

²⁴ List of Recipients of the 62nd Batch of China Postdoctoral Science Foundation Surface Support (Military System Recipients Omitted) [中国博士后科学基金第 62 批面上资助获资助人员名单（军队系统获资助人员名单略）], Peking Univ. Postdoctoral Mgmt. Office [北京大学博士后管理办公室] (Dec. 2022), <https://web.archive.org/web/20250605203820/https://postdocs.pku.edu.cn/docs/2022-12/9a8df9b8f81a40d4866ac2c851237234.pdf>.

²⁵ 2025 Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation Funding List [2025 年度浙江省自然科学基金资助项目清单], Zhejiang Provincial Department of Science and Technology [浙江省科学技术厅] (Jan. 12, 2025), <https://kjt.zj.gov.cn/module/download/downfile.jsp?classid=0&filename=65733347c01047e986d9e87af895b892.docx>.

²⁶ This total includes more than \$2.5 million from the National Institutes of Health—\$1.7 million to Shan (R35GM144275) and \$780,000 to He (R35GM149197)—as well as over \$7 million from the National Science Foundation, awarded across multiple grants from programs. See National Institutes of Health, Immune Signal Perception and Integration by Cell Surface Receptors and Peptide Ligands, Project No. 5R35GM144275-05, Univ. of Mich. at Ann Arbor, PI: Libo Shan, <https://reporter.nih.gov/search/W6sZ3q4pTkyeuOoRwsjovg/project-details/10986097> (last visited June 5, 2025); National Institutes of Health, Signaling Activation and Constraints in Maintaining Immune Homeostasis, Project No. 5R35GM149197-02, Univ. of Mich. at Ann Arbor, PI: Ping He, <https://reporter.nih.gov/search/W6sZ3q4pTkyeuOoRwsjovg/project-details/10884188> (last visited June 5, 2025). NSF grants associated with Shan and He—where one or both are listed as a principal investigator (PI) or co-PI—total \$7,080,945 across eight awards (Nos. 1030250, 1252539, 1906060, 1914707, 1951094, 2049642, 2307322, and 2421016). National Science Foundation, NSF Award Search, <https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch> (last visited June 5, 2025).

²⁷ *Id.*; National Science Foundation, CAREER: Mechanisms of Plant Immune Signal Perception and Integration by Cell Surface Receptors and Peptide Ligands, Award No. 2421016, Univ. of Mich. at Ann Arbor, PI: Libo Shan, https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2421016&HistoricalAwards=false (last visited June 5, 2025).

²⁸ For example, see Zunyong Liu et al., Phytocytokine signalling reopens stomata in plant immunity and water loss, *Nature* (May 2022), <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35508659/>; Yunqing Jian et al., SUMOylation regulates pre-mRNA splicing to overcome DNA damage in fungi, *New Phytologist* (Mar. 2023), <https://nph.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/nph.18692>; Kewei Sun et al., HapX-mediated H2B deub1 and SreA-mediated H2A.Z deposition coordinate in fungal iron resistance, *Nucleic Acids Research* (Oct. 2023), <https://academic.oup.com/nar/article/51/19/10238/7256996>; Yongliang Zhang et al., The PTI-suppressing Avr2 effector from *Fusarium oxysporum* suppresses mono-ubiquitination and plasma membrane dissociation of BIK1, *Mol. Plant Pathol.* (Oct. 2023), <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37391937/>; Shuguo Hou et al., Small Holes, Big Impact: Stomata in Plant-Pathogen-Climate Epic Trifecta, *17 Mol. Plant* 26 (Jan. 2024), <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38041402/>; Jun Liu et al., The antagonistic role of an E3 ligase pair in regulating plant NLR-mediated autoimmunity and fungal pathogen resistance, *Cell Host Microbe* (July 2024), <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38955187/>; Shuguo Hou et al., Small Holes, Big Impact: Stomata in Plant-Pathogen-Climate Epic Trifecta, *Mol. Plant* (Jan. 2024), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.molp.2023.11.011>; Yunqing Jian et al., An emerging connected view: Phytocytokines in regulating stomatal, apoplastic, and vascular immunity, *Current Opinion in Plant Biology* (Dec. 2024), <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369526624001146>.

²⁹ Zunyong Liu et al., The Receptor Kinases BAK1/SERK4 Regulate Ca²⁺ Channel-Mediated Cellular Homeostasis for Cell Death Containment, *Curr. Biol.* (2019), <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982219311789>.

³⁰ U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the E.D. of Mich., Alien from Wuhan, China, Charged with Making False Statements and Smuggling Biological Materials into the U.S. for Her Work at a University of Michigan Laboratory (June 9, 2025), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/alien-wuhan-china-charged-making-false-statements-and-smuggling-biological-materials>.

³¹ *Id.*

³² Sources on file with the Committees.

³³ Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, <https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/huazhong-university-of-science-and-technology/> (Nov. 18, 2019), <https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/huazhong-university-of-science-and-technology/>.

³⁴ 76 National Defense Students from Huazhong University of Science and Technology Set Out for the Military; Over the Past 20 Years, the University Has Trained More Than 2,000 Naval Talents [华中科大 76 名国防生奔赴部队 20 多年来该校为海军培养了 2000 余名人才], *Hubei Daily* [湖北日报] (Aug. 21, 2020),

https://web.archive.org/web/20221024185001/http://www.hubei.gov.cn/hbfb/rdgz/202008/t20200821_2817175.shtml.

³⁵ National Security Presidential Memorandum on United States Government-Supported Research and Development National Security Policy, NSPM-33 (Jan. 14, 2021), <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-united-states-government-supported-research-development-national-security-policy/>; OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, Request for Information; NSPM-33 Research Security Programs Standard Requirement, 88 Fed. Reg. 14,187 (Mar. 7, 2023), <https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-04660>.

³⁶ WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, *Memorandum to Heads of Federal Research Agencies: Guidelines for Research Security Programs at Covered Institutions* (July 9, 2024).

³⁷ Section 223, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283); 42 U.S.C. §6605.

³⁸ National Science Foundation, “Agency Information Collection Activities: Comment Request; National Science Foundation Proposal/Award Information-NSF Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide,” 88 Federal Register 22488, April 13, 2023, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/04/13/2023-07780/agency-information-collection-activities-comment-request-national-science-foundation-proposalaward>.

³⁹ CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-167, 136 Stat. 1366 (2022), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346>.

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² CHIPS and Science Act, H.R. 4346, 117th Cong. (2021), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346>.

⁴³ H. Res. 5, § 4(a), 119th Cong. (2025).

⁴⁴ RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 119th Cong. at 9 (Jan. 16, 2025), <https://rules.house.gov/sites/evoosubsites/rules.house.gov/files/documents/houserules119thupdated.pdf>.