China Won’t Save Ukraine

O ne of the emerging delusions about the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that the Chinese government is waiting to step in and help resolve the issue, to provide its client Vladimir Putin an “off-ramp.” There are so many problems with this school of thought that it’s hard to know where to begin. But it helps to realize that one of the more consistent purveyors of the thesis is the Chinese Communist Party government in Beijing. That might sound hopeful, but PRC actions thus far have signaled zero inclination to try to end the conflict. That hasn’t stopped the PRC disinformation machine from shifting into full vigor on the point, realizing that an eager Western press is always on tap to repeat its propaganda.

In an opinion piece in the Washington Post on March 15, Qing Gang, PRC ambassador to the United States, wrote that he wanted to “dispel any misunderstandings and rumors” about Beijing and the war. He started with the claim that any “assertions that China knew about, acquiesced to or tacitly supported this war are purely disinformation.” This from the government that has said the Covid-19 virus originated in U.S. biolabs and that the PRC has had fewer confirmed cases overall (125,000) than Washington, D.C. (134,000), just to pick two current whoppers. Tread lightly with PRC statements of “fact.”

From this unlikely premise, Qing proceeds through a field of subtle threats (let’s work together, the U.S. and the PRC, to contain “Taiwan independence”), non sequiturs (“As a staunch champion of justice, China decides its position on the basis of the merits of the issue” — cf., the Hong Kong betrayal), and other empty assertions before arriving at the destination with a flourish: “As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and a responsible major country, China will continue to coordinate real efforts to achieve lasting peace.” Someone please tell the ambassador that the PRC abstained from the U.N. resolution condemning the invasion.

Qing’s line in the piece — that the PRC can play a unique role in the resolution of this war as friend of all, enemy of none — is an oft-repeated theme. Days prior to its publication in the Washington Post, the New York Times ran a piece by Wang Huiyao, a scholar at a Beijing think tank affiliated with the government and a frequent contributor to Western opinion sites and at elite gatherings, including Davos. Wang offers not-so-subtle threats similar to the ambassador’s, noting that the war could result in global military buildups, which, he says, could distract Beijing from its priorities of “lucrative economic ties with the West and . . . domestic development.” Wang dangles a conjecture at complete odds with reality when he writes that “playing a constructive role in ending the war could help cast China as a strategic and not just economic partner,” as though Beijing has given any indication it seeks to be a strategic partner of the democratic West.

That Wang’s piece is little more than an artful attempt to seduce Western elites with the CCP “Can’t we all just get along?” line has been well deconstructed elsewhere. Wang has long been affiliated with the United Front, the PRC’s global propaganda machine. In 2018, researchers at Hudson Institute and Foreign Policy documented his pedigree. Senator Marco Rubio challenged the Wilson Center in Washington for inviting Wang, without reference to his United Front affiliation, to join a panel about . . . wait for it . . . Chinese information operations (propaganda) in the U.S.

It is obvious that Beijing wants it both ways. Its spokespeople in the U.S. and other Western capitals want to sustain the impression that Beijing alone has the credibility and clout to deal with a recalcitrant tyrant whom the rest of the world wants to isolate. If that sounds familiar, it’s because it is the same fashion by which the PRC has duped the U.S. for decades concerning its supposed influence with North Korea. In fact, Xi Jinping and his cronies have passed on every opportunity to condemn the Ukraine war and have not pressured Putin to withdraw his forces and stop the killing. Instead, Ambassador Qing reasserted on March 20 that China wants “friendly, good neighborly relations with Russia” and will keep up “normal trade, economic, financial, energy cooperation with Russia.” If Beijing has such a unique role in creating an “off-ramp,” what is it waiting for?

Beijing’s cynicism goes further than the disconnect between official rhetoric and actions. There are 6,000 Chinese citizens in Ukraine. Qing in his Post piece duly notes them as one more example of why China has outsized influence. But it’s just another example of how the PRC is abdicating leadership, not seeking it. For instance, contrary to the warnings given to U.S. and EU citizens in Ukraine by their governments prior to the war to seek safety and leave the country, China Insights and other netizen journalists have documented how Beijing did nothing to prepare their own citizens in Ukraine for what was coming. (Of course, to believe Ambassador Qing is to believe that China did not know what was coming.) Since the war began, the PRC’s support for Russia’s bloody aggression has included state media parroting the Russian line about self-defense and blocking any reporting to the contrary, placing Chinese citizens in Ukraine in even greater danger. There are interviews online with Chinese in Ukraine who fear for their lives because of their government’s perfidy, which is well acknowledged inside Ukraine and has led to Ukrainian threats of violence against them.

Beijing also has shown a willingness to hold the Ukraine crisis up for the world to see what might happen in Asia if we’re not careful. Referring to the threat of the Quad nations (U.S., Japan, India, and Australia) arrayed against China and the perceived parallel to NATO as a threat to Russia, Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng recently remarked that “the Ukraine crisis provides a mirror for us to observe the situation in the Asia-Pacific. We cannot but ask how can we prevent this from happening in the Asia-Pacific.” This as Mariupol is being destroyed for all the world to see.

Expect the CCP’s double game of pretending to want peace while actively undermining it to continue in many forms. Beijing will seek every avenue to gain advantage, recognizing that it has backed a loser in Putin but is unable or unwilling to pursue its own off-ramp. One obvious area where that should be anticipated is how Beijing harps about the economic impacts from the war. The economic sanctions on Russia are taking their toll, and Beijing knows that if it is perceived to be assisting Russia’s war effort, or helping it evade sanctions, it could find itself facing its own global economic squeeze.

Consider the implied threats of the Qing and Wang propaganda pieces: China can help minimize the possible economic fallout from this war by working with the West. The EU and the U.S., while closely in synch about Russia, remain less in line about relations with the PRC. Beijing will attempt to exploit perceived divisions by exaggerating the potential economic fallout from the war and the sanctions. How might it do so? Is it not just conceivable that the draconian Covid lockdown that is underway in China advances that objective? Might the EU and possibly even the Biden administration start to go wobbly about further sanctions if they start to believe that a Covid-driven economic shock in China will tip the world into a recession?

The war in Ukraine is far from over. According to the Institute for the Study of War, the military conflict has reached a stalemate, which suggests a longer, more violent conflict as each side continues offensive operations with no gains to be made. Quite apart from whether Beijing has a unique role in ending the war, the presumption that Putin is even seeking such a thing is questionable given the facts on the ground. After a month of conflict and thousands of civilians killed by the Russian offensive — and Russian military losses that are approaching the level of the Soviet losses after a decade in Afghanistan — Putin has made no gains beyond what he had before the war: effective control of the Donbas region and Crimea. Why would he consider this a time to seek an exit to the war?

The Biden administration should continue on the path it is on: Keep the European and Asian democratic allies aligned with as strong a package of responses — military and economic — as can be achieved together. Despite Beijing’s doublespeak, the administration should continue to engage the PRC. On March 21, White House press secretary Jen Psaki called out China for failing to condemn the invasion but also said the administration plans to keep talking. The president in his lengthy discussion with Xi Jinping on March 18 made clear what is at stake and what roles Beijing could play if it wants to be constructive. This starts with not providing weapons and knowing that, if China does so, Congress will push hard for sanctions on it. The administration seems to accept that Beijing does not intend to play an outsized role in resolving the crisis. But it will be important to keep open a path on which Beijing can back out, as the rest of the world continues to ratchet up the pressure on Putin, who seems to be in this for spite more than anything else. Perhaps Xi Jinping can take a positive first step by reminding his Russian BFF of words of caution from the great sage Confucius: “When you are out for revenge, better to dig two graves.”