On weakening a major source of Russian influence in Europe.
On weakening a major source of Russian influence in Europe.
W alking through Sofia’s city center in 2019, I was struck by the Bulgarian capital’s multilayered history. Its Slavic roots are evident, its jewels of Roman architecture are stunning, its centuries as an Ottoman outpost are recognizable, its remnants of Communist blight are saddening, and its European aspirations are palpable.
Looming just offstage, always, is Russia.
On April 27, the bear to Bulgaria’s northeast dealt the Balkan country of 7 million people a harsh blow, cutting the natural gas that supplies roughly half of its heating fuel for refusing to assent to the Kremlin’s new demand for payment in rubles. The Russian move effectively ends what was a long-term contract seven months prematurely. More attention will be paid to Poland — the other target of the Kremlin’s punitive action and a country with five times Bulgaria’s population, eight times its GDP, and rather more military weight — but the story in Bulgaria is the more complex and nuanced.
Kremlin Satellite or Euro-Atlantic Aspirant?
Since the Iron Curtain was torn down, Bulgaria has experienced an internal struggle between its Westernizers and its Russophiles, not entirely unlike what has taken place in Ukraine. Digging out from the wreckage of a controlled economy has been a tangled process in Bulgaria, with oligarchs rising and the Kremlin meddling.
Bulgaria has been a member of NATO since 2004 and of the European Union since 2007. Throughout this period, however, an internal tug-of-war has raged between Bulgarians who embody the New Europe championed by Bush-era Atlanticists (and who, relatedly, embody Bulgaria’s own indigenous tradition of independent-minded Russo-wariness) and Bulgarians who see Russia as Bulgaria’s natural and proper dance partner. Energy has played an integral part in this struggle, with the Western-oriented advocates looking to diversify Bulgaria’s fuel supplies and the Russophiles more than happy to sign deals with Russian companies such as Gazprom.
Russia, for its part, has used a multipronged approach to ensure that its interests are embedded in Bulgarian public policy, including funding anti-fracking activism and courting Bulgarian political elites. The result is that Moscow’s influence has remained pronounced right up to the present, owing to, in the words of the German Marshall Fund’s Bradley Hanlon and Alexander Roberds, “Bulgaria’s lack of energy diversification, the Kremlin’s infiltration of Bulgarian politics, and the deep cultural and historical ties between the countries.” As with its efforts to bind Germany’s fate to continued fuel deliveries, Russia has used its energy resources as a means of leverage in Bulgarian affairs. “For Russia, energy has always been a means for the Kremlin to extend its geopolitical priorities and financial interests,” said former Bulgarian energy minister Traicho Traikov. “Enough people in Bulgaria owe favors to Russia so [this policy] is successful.”
In 2006, on the eve of Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, Russia’s ambassador to that body alluded to Bulgaria’s serving as the Kremlin’s Trojan horse in Brussels and, by extension, NATO. Given that Bulgaria was sometimes referred to as “the 16th Soviet Republic” during the Communist era, the notion is not without historical mooring. Indeed, well-placed Bulgarian Russophiles remain a pressing security concern. Just last month, Bulgarian prosecutors announced charges against six Bulgarians (several of them “senior or former defense officials,” according to CNN) on suspicion of delivering to Russia “state secrets of Bulgaria, NATO and the European Union.”
At the time of my 2019 visit, the pro-Russia camp held sway. But as Maxim Samorukov, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, predicted in 2018, it would not last. “In due time,” Samorukov wrote, “Sofia’s rapprochement with Moscow will raise traditional fears of subjugation by Russia, and new politicians will come forth promising to rescue Bulgaria from humiliating bondage.” The government to which Sumorukov referred — that of former prime minister Boyko Borissov — has indeed been replaced by one with more interest in anchoring Bulgaria in the European project.
In November last year, Bulgarians voted for the party We Continue the Change to form a coalition government, and by December, its leader, Kiril Petkov, had done so. Petkov, a young and decidedly pro-Western Harvard Business School graduate, argued that Bulgaria has the potential to be “an amazing growth success story” but that it has been “brutally plundered.” With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Petkov’s loyalties — as well as those of his party and his nation — are now being put to the test.
In March, Petkov sacked his defense minister, who had published a Facebook post in which he argued for Bulgaria to avoid any distinctly “pro-Russian, pro-American, or pro-European position.” Amid the fallout from that embarrassment, Petkov sought to reinforce his country’s commitment to the Euro-Atlantic position, saying, “We supported all the sanctions [on Russia].” He added that “Bulgaria is not anymore a soft country that has only balancing acts.”
But Petkov still faces significant domestic opposition to his preferences. Because of resistance from pro-Russia members of the coalition government, Bulgaria has not yet supplied arms to the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, the Kremlin’s patience with Sofia (or at least Petkov) is exhausted.
The Russian gas cut came just one day after Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba thanked Petkov publicly on Twitter, writing,
Grateful to Prime Minister of Bulgaria @KirilPetkov for initiating a public campaign to raise funds for Ukraine and help us strengthen our defenses. This move demonstrates true Bulgarian solidarity with Ukraine. I felt it well when I was received by PM Petkov in Sofia last week.
According to the Wall Street Journal, Bulgaria’s energy minister, Alexander Nikolov, said Wednesday that the country has enough gas in storage for the coming month and is seeking alternative sources. “Because all trade and legal obligations are being observed, it is clear that at the moment the natural gas is being used more as a political and economic weapon in the current war,” Nikolov added.
Following the Russian decision to cut gas supplies to Bulgaria, Petkov pushed back, traveling to Kyiv, putting an arm around Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, and committing to a shared European future, declaring, “Ukraine will win this war.” Tactically, Petkov announced that Bulgaria will facilitate the export of Ukrainian electricity and wheat, use the Trans-Balkan pipeline to deliver gas to Ukraine, and repair damaged Ukrainian military machinery in Bulgaria.
The Energy-Security Imperative
Back in 2019, while in the country on behalf of an American nongovernmental think tank — the Institute for Energy Research — I could see the purposefulness of the city’s Euro-Atlanticist intelligentsia. What the Bulgarians with whom I conversed wanted was access to American natural gas to help them break their reliance on Russia’s Gazprom. They saw this threat coming — if not that it would be triggered by a Russian war against Ukraine.
Talking to people who recognize the importance of energy security and who lament their lack of it served as a stark reminder of the recklessness of jeopardizing it. I wonder what those Bulgarians thought when a U.S. presidential candidate stumping for votes in 2020 said, “I guarantee you we’re going to end fossil fuel” — and won.
Bulgaria and Poland’s plight is a vindication of former U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo’s championing of the notion that American natural gas — “molecules of U.S. freedom” — could weaken a major source of Russian influence in Europe. Ideally, the hydrocarbon molecules with which the U.S. is so plentifully endowed can finally serve that role. If the latest timelines are reliable, a new project will facilitate the U.S.–Balkans gas trade and relieve Bulgaria’s stress by the end of 2023. Bulgaria’s Bulgartransgaz has put in for 20 percent of the imports at the in-progress liquefied-natural-gas (LNG) import terminal at Alexandroupolis on the Greek coast. In the meantime, Bulgaria will use its reserves until a new pipeline interconnection enters operation later this year, bringing Azerbaijani gas directly to Bulgaria.
The new interconnection will have a “transformational effect on the security of gas supply to Bulgaria,” according to Martin Vladimirov, director of the Energy and Climate Programme at the Centre for the Study of Democracy. But it will need to look for “additional alternatives including by signing long-term LNG supply contracts with alternative players such as the U.S., Qatar, or Algeria.”
Bulgarians have been thrust into a crisis they did not choose. And while American companies cannot be the Bulgarians’ sole salvation, this episode is a grim reminder of energy realities. People need access to trustworthy sources of energy but are all too often beholden to unscrupulous sellers. American companies are among the most trustworthy around. To its credit, the administration has responded to this crisis by removing barriers to sales to Europe from numerous existing and new LNG projects, including Golden Pass LNG and Magnolia LNG in the past week. Let us build on these measures and ensure our government does not get between American natural-gas producers and those who, for both economic and strategic reasons, need access to this resource.