Lo and behold! As we celebrated this Fourth of July amid the debt-ceiling fight, the netroots and progressive pundits suddenly discovered the Constitutionโ€™s relevance in fiscal matters. It doesnโ€™t seem like that long ago โ€” because it wasnโ€™t that long ago โ€” that they ridiculed the very idea of constitutional limits on Congress in economic policymaking, and even mocked the GOPโ€™s public reading of the Constitution at the beginning of the current session.

Of the new House rule requiring a statement of the constitutional authority for bills, Ian Millhiser wrote at ThinkProgress that โ€œthe constitutional lunatics are now in charge of the GOPโ€™s asylum.โ€ It was completely unnecessary for Congress to cite constitutional justification for its actions, Millhiser proclaimed, because โ€œArticle I of the Constitution gives Congress broad authorityโ€ and โ€œleaves budgeting decisions almost entirely to the judgment of Congress.โ€

But now that the GOP Congress is exercising this โ€œbroad authorityโ€ โ€” or rather, what has always been its basic authority โ€” over the nationโ€™s purse strings to press for spending cuts as a condition of hiking the $14 trillion debt ceiling by another trillion or so, Millhiser, the Huffington Post, and The New Republic have suddenly discovered that in at least this one instance, the Constitution supposedly limits Congressโ€™s economic powers. Section 4 of the 14th Amendment, which states that โ€œthe validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law . . . shall not be questioned,โ€ makes the debt ceiling itself unconstitutional, their argument goes. Folks who were railing against the โ€œunitary executiveโ€ a few years ago now argue that if Congress doesnโ€™t give Obama what he wants, this section gives him the constitutional authority to issue new debt by himself; otherwise, there would not be enough money to pay the existing debt, and the 14th Amendment does not allow that.

Just a few months after arguing majestically about how the Constitution puts virtually no limits on the โ€œjudgment of Congress,โ€ Millhiser now hopes the White House begins โ€œseriously exploring whether the Constitution will save Americaโ€™s economy from the GOPโ€™s extortionary tactics.โ€ And David Dayen of FireDogLake, who thought it was โ€œsillinessโ€ for members of Congress to read the Constitution in its entirety at the start of the session, now thinks itโ€™s okay to read this one little section. He urges Democrats to stop tussling with Republicans over spending and taxes and just go with โ€œa strategy that works: reading the Constitution.โ€

But this tortured interpretation of the 14th Amendment actually shows why members of Congress โ€” as well as the pundit class โ€” should have participated in the public reading of the entire Constitution earlier this year. If they had done that, they might not have skipped over an essential passage regarding the power to borrow. Article I, Section 8 โ€” the same part of the Constitution that gives Congress the power to tax, appropriate, and โ€œregulate commerce . . . among the statesโ€ (long the Leftโ€™s justification for any regulation of activity, or in the case of Obamacare, the inactivity of not buying health insurance) โ€” also explicitly states: โ€œThe Congress shall have power to . . . borrow money on the credit of the United States.โ€

The 14th Amendment doesnโ€™t affect this power one bit. It applies only to debt โ€œauthorized by law,โ€ and as Catholic University Law School distinguished scholar John S. Baker wrote recently in NRO, โ€œOnly Congress โ€” not the president โ€” makes law.โ€

What it perhaps does do โ€” based on one Supreme Court case โ€” is require the Treasury Department to prioritize payment of existing debt to bondholders over other spending in the event the debt ceiling isnโ€™t raised. So if the government finds itself short on cash, it has to keep paying the bondholders and find the necessary savings in some other part of the budget. This is exactly what conservatives like Sen. Pat Toomey (R., Pa.) have been trying to codify through legislation. As Michael McConnell, the distinguished director of the Stanford Constitutional Law Center, has put it, โ€œthe real effect of Section Four of the Fourteenth Amendment is almost the opposite of what hopeful voices in Washington are saying.โ€

Hereโ€™s why Professor McConnell is right:

1. The debt ceiling is a consolidation of borrowing authorization that Congress has always exercised.

When reviewing the debt ceilingโ€™s constitutionality, itโ€™s important to recognize that what is now called the โ€œdebt ceilingโ€ or โ€œdebt limitโ€ was actually created as an expansion of the Treasury Departmentโ€™s ability to borrow, rather than a constraint on it. As the Congressional Research Service noted in a 2008 report, before World War I, Congress โ€œauthorized specific loansโ€ and โ€œallowed the Treasury to issue specific types of debt instruments.โ€

This practice in which Congress approved specific loans and debt instruments did not change in the five decades after the adoption of the 14th Amendment in 1868. As the CRS report noted, Congress approved specific borrowing to finance construction of the Panama Canal in the 20th centuryโ€™s first decade. It wasnโ€™t until the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917 that, as the report describes, โ€œCongress enacted aggregate constraints on certificates of indebtedness and on bonds that allowed the Treasury greater ability to respond to changing conditions and more flexibility in financial management.โ€

But what hasnโ€™t changed is the constitutional requirement that the dollar amount of the nationโ€™s borrowing can be approved only by Congress. As McConnell put it: โ€œThe โ€˜debt ceilingโ€™ is simply the limit Congress has imposed on how much money the country may borrow. The executive branch cannot constitutionally borrow a dime in excess of this amount.โ€

2. Perry v. United States may require paying bondholders first, but it does not allow the issuing of new debt without congressional authorization.

So far, the new constitutionalists have found just one Supreme Court case that purportedly supports their case for borrowing without congressional authorization: Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), a case challenging the Roosevelt administrationโ€™s repudiation of a โ€œgold clauseโ€ in a U.S. bond. But the Courtโ€™s opinion in this case reaffirms that only Congress can approve the issuance of new debt. โ€œIn authorizing the Congress to borrow money, the Constitution empowers the Congress to fix the amount to be borrowed and the terms of payment,โ€ the Court stated.

The Court also ruled that the U.S. government canโ€™t shirk its obligations to bondholders from existing debt, a point that, if held as binding precedent, works to conservativesโ€™ advantage. As Professor Baker noted, the ruling is somewhat ambiguous. The plurality opinion did not rule that the plaintiff was entitled to payment in gold, but merely upheld the obligation of the government to pay the bondholder in โ€œlegal tender currency,โ€ which was the government was already offering.

Nevertheless, the case did hold that the 14th Amendmentโ€™s language concerning โ€œthe validity of the public debtโ€ went beyond the Civil War debt that had been one of the amendmentโ€™s motivating factors. โ€œHaving this power to authorize the issue of definite obligations for the payment of money borrowed, the Congress has not been vested with authority to alter or destroy those obligations,โ€ the court ruled.

Given the Courtโ€™s ruling in this case that while only Congress can approve new borrowing, the government is obligated to pay existing debt, it is plausible to argue that the Constitution requires the Treasury Department to set up debt-ceiling contingency plans along the lines proposed by Senator Toomey in his โ€œFull Faith and Credit Act.โ€ By ensuring that creditors are paid first, this law would both fulfill the governmentโ€™s obligations under Perry and reassure the market that a breach of the debt ceiling does not mean a default. And as Toomey has noted, โ€œwith roughly 10 times more income than needed to honor our debt obligations,โ€ there is little danger of default if the debt-ceiling hike is delayed.

3. โ€œPublic debtโ€ does not include government benefits, the Supreme Court has ruled.

Progressive constitutionalists argue that the term โ€œpublic debtโ€ embraces every transfer payment of every spending program under the sun. But the Supreme Court has already shot down the argument that government benefits โ€” even if they are labeled โ€œentitlementsโ€ โ€” represent contractual obligations. In Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), the court ruled that a deported member of the Communist party did not have any โ€œearned rightsโ€ to his Social Security benefits, and neither did other recipients. Calling benefits a โ€œnoncontractual interest,โ€ the Court declared, โ€œTo engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of โ€˜accrued property rightsโ€™ would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing conditions which it demands.โ€

Ironically, proposals for personal accounts championed by center-right groups would give recipients a contractual interest in some of the taxes they pay, but the Left shot this down in favor of keeping Social Security as a pay-as-you-go Ponzi scheme with โ€œguaranteesโ€ not worth the paper they are written on.

Despite the obvious hypocrisy of these newfound defenders of constitutional limits, they have the chutzpah to attempt to tar the tea-party movement with hypocrisy if conservatives and libertarians donโ€™t profess absolute fealty to this new constitutional theory. But genuine constitutionalists should respond simply that all parts of the Constitution should be honored, and that Article I and the 14th Amendment do not conflict with each other.

The Constitution places a burden both on borrowing and on default of valid existing debt. As difficult as they may make the legislative process, both provisions serve to prevent short-term and long-term fiscal catastrophe.

โ€” John Berlau is director of the Center for Investors and Entrepreneurs at the Competitive Enterprise Institute. CEI counsel for special projects Hans Bader provided invaluable insights and assistance with this article.