Coronavirus Response & Groupthink: Failures Come from Underestimating Possibility of Unexpected

In October 1973, every intelligence organization on the planet believed all was well in the Middle East. This included the much celebrated Israeli Mossad, which knew of formulated Arab plans to attack Israel and retake the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights, but didn’t really believe the Arabs had any immediate interest in going to war.

In the weeks leading up to war, Egypt and Syria both held “training exercises” near the Israeli border. Yet even then, the Israelis were more puzzled than threatened, because the Mossad and other intelligence services still were not convinced that either enemy was ready for war. Though several analysts disagreed, they were widely ignored by Israel’s military and political leaders in the days before the war began.

PJ

About the Author

Pradheep J. Shanker

Pradheep J. Shanker is a radiologist who focuses on health policy.

Featured Tags

Manage following

Coronavirus

In October 1973, every intelligence organization on the planet believed all was well in the Middle East. This included the much celebrated Israeli Mossad, which knew of formulated Arab plans to attack Israel and retake the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights, but didn’t really believe the Arabs had any immediate interest in going to war.

In the weeks leading up to war, Egypt and Syria both held “training exercises” near the Israeli border. Yet even then, the Israelis were more puzzled than threatened, because the Mossad and other intelligence services still were not convinced that either enemy was ready for war. Though several analysts disagreed, they were widely ignored by Israel’s military and political leaders in the days before the war began.