BAGHDAD & SULAIMANI, IRAQ–Iraqi politicians have been congratulating themselves on the interim constitution that they agreed on March 1, 2004. Adnan Pachache, a Sunni Arab representative on the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), called the transitional administrative law “an inspirational document which looks to the future.” The initial coverage has been favorable, viewing the text as a series of sensible compromises, such as over the role of Islam in Iraqi politics and Kurdish autonomy. An arguably more accurate interpretation is that the carefully drafted document, with its often deliberately vague language, will struggle to survive the ambitions of Iraqi politicians. Not one of the Iraqi parties and factions has given up their sometimes-incompatible aims. Instead, they have simply agreed to delay the inevitable clash between them.

The compromise on the role of Islam is particularly unconvincing and could prove to be a time bomb. The provision on the role of religion is riddled with contradictions. Islam is “a source of legislation,” but not the sole source. The document, however, is careful not to name other sources of legislation. Under the interim constitution, no law can be adopted which is inconsistent with the basic principles of Islam, which implies an Islamic veto on legislation. Yet the document goes on to say that no law can be adopted which contravenes democratic principles or civil rights, a counter veto to that handed to the Islamists. The contradiction may not be apparent to American diplomats who repeat the claim religion is not incompatible with democracy like a mantra, but the inconsistency is obvious to secular Iraqis, particularly women and the Iraqi Kurds.

One need look no further than the controversy over December 2003’s IGC decree 137 which introduced sharia (Islamic religious law) in the place of secular family law to see how poorly democratic values are entrenched. Passed at a time when key secular members of the IGC were out of the country, and the chairman of the IGC was a Shia Islamist, decree 137 was denounced by the Kurds, women’s groups, and some secular parties as undemocratic and discriminatory. Ambassador Bremer refused to sign decree 137, which meant that it could not be implemented.

Although decree 137 never had any force, the IGC bowed to pressure from women’s groups in particular and symbolically repealed the decree on February 27, 2004. The reaction of some of the Shia Arab members of the IGC to the February 27, 2004 vote was troubling and revealing. Unhappy at losing the vote on decree 137, eight Shia members of the IGC walked out of the session when women’s groups in the room cheered and shouted their pleasure at the vote. The eight Shia members did not just accept their defeat with ill grace. They then attempted to nullify their defeat through the interim constitution negotiations, a bid to put Islam on the statute books by every route available. The Shia Islamists and their allies are likely to continue with these tactics and can be expected to seek to undermine the current compromise text.

The provisions on oil revenues are similarly lacking in detail. In theory, oil revenues will be equitably distributed, but the recently closed U.N. Oil for Food program had a similar aim and failed dismally. The Kurds, always denied their proper share of Iraq’s national wealth, are happy with the promise in the interim constitution that the future central government of Iraq has a duty to parcel out oil income in a fair manner. There is, however, nothing in this document that will prevent a future Iraq government from short changing the Kurds as had happened so often in the past. The best protection is for the regions, whether Kurdish or Shia Arab, to own and control the oil within their regional boundaries–which Ambassador Bremer has consistently opposed.

Women have done poorly in the interim constitution. The aim is to give women 25 percent representation in the future national assembly, but the goal is not binding. The British government has taken the view that 25 percent should be the minimum. By contrast, Ambassador Bremer, understandably unwilling to pick more fights with the Islamists than was strictly necessary, has been keen to avoid any provision that smacked of quotas for women.

The most positive elements in the interim constitution, the clauses that could keep the interim constitution and Iraq together, relate to federalism. Kurdish autonomy, established in a federal region in all but name in 1992, has been accepted and validated. The agreement now extends the federal-style autonomy under which the Kurds have flourished to the rest of Iraq. Arab provinces can now join together as autonomous regions. Federalism could prevent a return to past abuses. Concentrating power in the hands of a few politicians in a Baghdad based centralized state is what allowed men like Saddam Hussein to seize power so easily in Iraq. As importantly, federalism could thwart the Islamists, should they seize power in Baghdad, from imposing their views on the rest of the country.

The terrible irony is that Ambassador Bremer, fearing that Iraqi might break up, has consistently stressed a strong central state with only token federalism. The unitary state has been the disaster of Middle Eastern politics, creating the context within which tyranny can flourish. By distributing power away from the center, through giving the long-repressed Kurds and politically disenfranchised Shia Arabs in the provinces control over their own affairs, the interim constitution could give Iraqi democracy a sporting chance.

–Andrew Apostolou is director of research at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. He is presently traveling in the Middle East.