In The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy, T. R. Reid provides an overstated but inadvertently insightful treatment of the European challenge to American hegemony. On his intended thesisโ€“that โ€œthe planet has a second superpower nowโ€โ€“Reid fails to convince. Nevertheless, his book offers a valuable portrait of a continental political class obsessed with โ€œcounterweightingโ€ the United States of America. Indeed, the book prompts the question of whether the EU actually needs a degree of anti-Americanism to generate a shared identity for a fractious pastiche of nations tied together by nothing more than soccer and the technocratic tendrils of the Brussels bureaucracy.

Admitting Europeโ€™s military impotence, Reid instead bases his argument on economics. He points to the โ€œmiraculousโ€ euro, the global power of European regulators, and increasing European investment in the U.S.

So far, it is true, the euro has succeeded, but double-digit unemployment, a declining birthrate, soaring taxes, and a union-dominated welfare state suggest a grimmer economic future. A controversial blue-ribbon commission, chaired by former Dutch prime minister Wim Kok, reported in November that Europe, with a growth rate roughly half the world average, will fail to meet its goal of outperforming the U.S. economy by 2010. Instead, its economy appears even more booby-trapped than our own.

Reid assumes that if EU regulators are strong, the EU must be too. Devoting an entire chapter, โ€œWelchโ€™s Waterloo,โ€ to the EUโ€™s veto of the GE-Honeywell merger, he misses the larger point. Europeโ€™s regulators legislate the length of leeks and the curves of cucumbers, mandate minimum tax rates, and prop up a pathetically inefficient agricultural sector. Rather than making a superpower, the EUโ€™s ham-fisted regulators keep the worldโ€™s largest unified market from reaching its full potential.

Regulatory power goes hand in hand with Europeโ€™s centralized, semi-planned economy. In a glowing account of the EUโ€™s all-but-state-owned Airbus program, Reid notes how, โ€œto keep its political support, Airbus has adroitly parceled out A380 fabrication work across the continent.โ€ The wings are built in Wales, the fuselage in Toulouse, and the engines are attached in Germany, where the uncompleted plane is flown on a special transport. This is โ€œadroitโ€?

Third, Reid argues that Europe derives much โ€œsoft powerโ€ from owning many familiar โ€œAmericanโ€ product lines. Motown Records is now French, Amoco is British, and Vaseline is in the hands of the Dutch. Suggesting that European investment somehow undermines U.S. power belies the fact that Europe invests in the U.S. in part because America offers a far friendlier business climate than the chokingly regulated EU.

Yet, even though his superpower arguments flop, Reid makes one point well: EU officials are as obsessed with โ€œcounterweightingโ€ the Americans as they are proud of their genuine economic achievements. He quotes EU Commission president Romano Prodiโ€™s exultation that โ€œthe historical significance of the euro is to construct a bipolar economy in the world.โ€ In other words, at the hour of Europeโ€™s greatest success, its top official celebrated not only the new currency, but also a new way to stick it to the Americans. The euro, Reid argues, โ€œis just one facet of the broader effort to create a โ€œbipolarโ€ world in every respectโ€“to see the European Union as a global superpower of American dimensions.โ€

The EU has not restricted itself to economic counterweighting. Led by France, the EU has blocked the U.S. purchase of German-made diesel submarines for Taiwan, is considering lifting a post-Tiananmen arms embargo on China, launched a joint project with the Chinese military to develop an alternative to the U.S.-run GPS system, and pursued a schizoid policy on terror by sending forces to Afghanistan and clamping down on its own restive Muslim population while bankrolling the Palestinian Authority and undermining American efforts in Iraq.

Like most Americans, Reid is dismayed that the EUโ€™s response to Americaโ€™s โ€œconsistent record of support can sometimes beโ€“as King Lear said of his ungrateful childrenโ€“โ€™sharper than a serpentโ€™s tooth.โ€™โ€ Anti-Americanism itself isnโ€™t exactly news; the question now is why the Iraq war should have provoked so much fury in Europe. Robert Kaganโ€™s maxim that โ€œAmericans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus,โ€ attributes the divide to political culture, but Reidโ€™s emphasis on โ€œcounterweightingโ€ suggests another source: โ€œThe sheer pleasure that Europeans take in denigrating America has become another bond unifying the continent,โ€ he writes. Might anti-Americanism be useful for European integration?

The EU remains far from united, and its institutions command little loyalty. EU diplomats were so divided over what images to print on the new euro banknotes that they ultimately settled on archetypal architectural designs. As the engraver tells Reid, โ€œit was totally forbidden to use any people or any familiar buildings. We used doors and windows on one side of the note to show openness. The reverse side shows bridges, to show our connections.โ€ The irony is telling.

At the same time, a deep gulf alienates ordinary Europeans from officials in Brussels. That EU governments organized a public-awareness campaign after having made the momentous decision to launch the euro nicely illustrates a phenomenon that commentators have come to call the โ€œdemocratic deficit.โ€

Reid makes much of โ€œGeneration Eโ€โ€“the GSM-phone-toting international youth as familiar with the nightclubs of Prague as the stadiums of Madridโ€“who supposedly identify with โ€œEuropeโ€ as a whole. Nevertheless, nationality and religionโ€“the truest sources of identityโ€“remain fractured or extinct in modern Europe. No one, Reid concedes, can imagine dying for Europe

Those trying to build a United States of Europe need a unifying principle to hold the enterprise together, especially as the EU moves from economic projects to even tougher political ones like a common foreign policy. Anti-Americanism is a natural choice; whether McDonaldโ€™s, the โ€œbarbaricโ€ death penalty, or le cowboy Bush, America offers something for everyone to hate. Is it any wonder then that Europeโ€™s elites have conjured up the hated hyperpower for the adolescent Union to define itself against?

Reid concludes by surveying the EUโ€™s members. Alongside some basic facts, he assigns each a score from 1 to 100 on โ€œReidโ€™s Anti-American Index,โ€ and the โ€œEurophile Index.โ€ Higher numbers correspond to greater resentment of America or deeper support for European integration. In most cases, the numbers parallel each other. Spain scores 75 and 85, France 85 and 90, Italy 65 and 85. The U.S. still remains relatively popular further east, with Poland scoring 20 and 80.

Notwithstanding its exaggerated estimate of the EUโ€™s power, Reidโ€™s warning of the EUโ€™s urge to โ€œcounterweightโ€ the United States is an important one. Europe, as yet unable to play the world-leadership role it demands, seems to have set out to unify itself in opposition to the only country that can. There may be little America can do to improve trans-Atlantic relations, if, as it appears, Reid has described not so much a superpower, as an anti-power.

โ€“Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, a former NR intern, is a student at Harvard Law School and a graduate of Princeton Universityโ€™s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.