European diplomats are trying to hammer out a compromise on a draft EU constitution before a summit convenes at the end of the week in Brussels. It is a fascinating process to watch, and has strong echoes of the situation faced by the Founding Fathers two centuries ago. For example, the small states object to the proposal by former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to weigh EU votes by population, which would work against them in the same way the “Virginia Plan” worked against Rhode Island. Germany has threatened to veto the draft unless the proposal is approved, and keen students of the obvious everywhere are waiting for the Europeans to stumble onto the magic of bicameralism. Perhaps the Germans could check out their own American-inspired federal constitution. There is also a flap over the proposal by Poland for the constitution’s preamble to make reference to Europe’s Judeo-Christian heritage, which is strongly opposed by France, probably to placate the Arab world or some such silly thing.

The European constitution is being debated at the same time the U.S. is seeking closer diplomatic and defense relations with states of Eastern Europe. Eight East European counties, in a line from Estonia south to Slovenia, will join the EU in May 2004. By then these same eight will all be NATO members, along with Romania and Bulgaria. The countries of Eastern Europe want to join the EU primarily for economic reasons. In essence, they will be entering a Euro-wide free-trade zone. However, this in itself is no guarantee of prosperity, and it will take decades of sustained growth for even the wealthiest eastern countries to reach the average economic level of the western European states. In exchange, these states will be giving up a degree of sovereignty, though how much has yet to be determined. They will forfeit currency control, and perhaps immigration limits, and will be subject to a daunting array of regulations. But the most important question from the U.S. point of view is, will the member states in a unified Europe be able to maintain their own national defense forces and pursue independent foreign policies?

The interplay between the growth of the EU and NATO is critical to U.S. security concerns in Europe. Generally speaking, it is not in the interests of the United States to see the formation of a unified, nuclear-armed European super state. This is the vision being pursued by some of the more radical Eurocentrists, and particularly the French. France has been the strongest proponent of the development of the European Defense Force (EDF) as an alternative to NATO. The long-term goal of the plan is a true European military establishment; that is, not an agglomeration of national forces but a centrally controlled, unified defense structure. It would be analogous to the shift in the United States from an Army based on state militias to a professional national force. It makes sense from a European point of view, because it would end duplication and allow for comprehensive strategic planning. The smaller European states, primarily in the east, fear that an EU dominated by France and Germany commanding a fully integrated, non-national EDF would mean the end of their sovereignty, which of course it would. A country that completely surrenders its national defense to a greater political entity has relinquished the most fundamental sovereign right next to taxation. And if Warsaw, Budapest and Prague, among others, are content to offer their newly won political independence to Brussels, so be it.

But there is a sense of mistrust about the Franco-German axis, and with good reason. Nothing in their behavior would lead one to believe that the two largest continental powers are content to be first among equals in a united Europe. In November the EU allowed both countries to exceed budget deficit limits put in place to discipline national governments and maintain economic stability. Paris and Berlin lobbied to have the caps suspended in their case in order to pursue government spending plans to boost their economies, and this preferential treatment outraged the states with less pull. Also, French President Jacques Chirac did nothing to dispel the sense of arrogance of the senior partners in Europe last February when he said that east European states supporting the US-led war against Iraq should “shut up.”

This is why NATO has become increasingly important to the states in the “New Europe.” Membership in NATO gives these countries leverage. It allows them to interact with the United States in ways they might not be able to as the EU gobbles up their remaining sovereign rights. There are also substantial security advantages. Being in NATO obligates them to modernize, to develop post-Soviet security structures that are up to NATO standards. The new member states emerge for the process with highly professional, capable forces adaptable to a variety of missions. Polish special forces showed their mettle in Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example, and their peacekeepers are now doing excellent work in southern Iraq.

At the most basic level of self-interest, being part of a US-led defensive alliance protects the eastern states from a resurgent Russia. It may seem all very 19th century to discuss this type of power politics in Europe today, but of the ten states that have either recently joined NATO or will next year, every one of them has been occupied by the Russians–Slovenia only briefly, but the Baltic States and Poland having struggled for independence for centuries. And one suspects that it is not only Russian dominance that they are wary of–who, after all, can protect them from the Europe they are preparing to join?

American interests in expanding ties to the east are clear and convincing. The U.S. is planning to shift its overseas force deployments, to reposition globally in a manner better adapted to the contemporary security climate. There are no proximate threats in western or central Europe, yet of the 116,000 US troops on the continent, 70,000 are in Germany. The Eastern European states are closer to the regions that pose potential threats, and have greater troop basing potential. Germany has become too crowded and too regulated for large-scale basing, let alone extensive exercises and training. Further east there are wider spaces, and room to build the kinds of advanced installations the U.S. will need to support new strategic and operations concepts such as surge capability and expeditionary warfare. One is also struck by the sense of affinity between the U.S. and these countries. It is an area of the world in which people still admire and respect Americans. The states of Eastern Europe have been very open to U.S. overtures, not only because it is in their economic and security interests, but because of the legacy of the Cold War. They know what liberals in this country go to excessive lengths to deny; namely, that Ronald Reagan was instrumental in securing their freedom from Soviet tyranny. While critics in this country dismiss the term “Evil Empire” and try to explain how fax machines were the real reason the Soviet Union collapsed, the East Europeans understand that peace comes through strength, and freedom is something earned, not granted. Their values as newly free peoples are closer to those we most admire in ourselves. To the extent we can assist them in maintaining their freedoms and developing their unique, individual democratic and cultural experiments, we should. And if nothing else, it is nice to be wanted.