The Week: A New National Security Strategy

• Nick Fuentes says “women are very difficult to be around.” We’re confident the feeling is mutual.

• Given the unusually fluid decision-making in this White House, President Donald Trump’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) should be seen as a snapshot of current thinking rather than holy writ. Nevertheless, its contents merit serious consideration for their strengths, weaknesses, and consequences. (The NSS is read abroad.) The emphasis on the continued value of deterrence is welcome, as is the greater focus on the Western Hemisphere. No harm can come from the recognition that success internationally is ultimately conditional on success at home. When it comes to the economy, however, this should not be used as an excuse for industrial policy that extends beyond defense or defense-related sectors. The document’s principal flaws are a lack of precision on the nature of the U.S. support for its allies and partners, a (perhaps feigned) naïveté about our ability to work productively with Russia and China, and the invective directed at Europe that may often be deserved but—at a delicate time—is unhelpful. There is also no recognition of the geopolitical damage inflicted by our trade wars. America First should not become America Alone.

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• Nick Fuentes says “women are very difficult to be around.” We’re confident the feeling is mutual.

• Given the unusually fluid decision-making in this White House, President Donald Trump’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) should be seen as a snapshot of current thinking rather than holy writ. Nevertheless, its contents merit serious consideration for their strengths, weaknesses, and consequences. (The NSS is read abroad.) The emphasis on the continued value of deterrence is welcome, as is the greater focus on the Western Hemisphere. No harm can come from the recognition that success internationally is ultimately conditional on success at home. When it comes to the economy, however, this should not be used as an excuse for industrial policy that extends beyond defense or defense-related sectors. The document’s principal flaws are a lack of precision on the nature of the U.S. support for its allies and partners, a (perhaps feigned) naïveté about our ability to work productively with Russia and China, and the invective directed at Europe that may often be deserved but—at a delicate time—is unhelpful. There is also no recognition of the geopolitical damage inflicted by our trade wars. America First should not become America Alone.