Lindsay Clancy Case: What Our Society Would Lose If She Is Exonerated

What is the minimum we owe one another, and when is that minimum excused? This question has become a disorienting cultural flashpoint following the prosecution of Lindsay Clancy for strangling her three young children. Clancy has conceded that she killed her children, but has argued that because of severe postpartum mental illness, she is innocent. Demonstrators gathered outside the courthouse advocating for her exoneration; scholars (some in the formal capacity as witnesses for the defense, others in the media) have claimed it is unequivocal that Clancy should be “acquitted by reason of insanity.”

Exonerating Clancy would require stripping her of moral standing and existential dignity. It would leave children vulnerable to like-situated caregivers who could more readily claim incompetence. It would erode the standards of basic regard for the welfare of others — the central principle in a society of justice and safety. That her first trial ended with a hung jury, with all but one juror choosing to acquit, shows how tenuous the commitment to such principles may be. These principles are not only central to criminal justice; they are the pillars of a just and safe society. To strip away this moral standing too readily — particularly in the context of motherhood, where these obligations are at their most powerful — threatens every meaningful social value, from individual dignity to collective welfare. These foundational commitments are the true stakes of Clancy’s trial.

JE

About the Author

Jacob Eisler

Jacob Eisler is the James Edmund and Margaret Elizabeth Hennessey Corry Professor at Florida State University College of Law.

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What is the minimum we owe one another, and when is that minimum excused? This question has become a disorienting cultural flashpoint following the prosecution of Lindsay Clancy for strangling her three young children. Clancy has conceded that she killed her children, but has argued that because of severe postpartum mental illness, she is innocent. Demonstrators gathered outside the courthouse advocating for her exoneration; scholars (some in the formal capacity as witnesses for the defense, others in the media) have claimed it is unequivocal that Clancy should be “acquitted by reason of insanity.”

Exonerating Clancy would require stripping her of moral standing and existential dignity. It would leave children vulnerable to like-situated caregivers who could more readily claim incompetence. It would erode the standards of basic regard for the welfare of others — the central principle in a society of justice and safety. That her first trial ended with a hung jury, with all but one juror choosing to acquit, shows how tenuous the commitment to such principles may be. These principles are not only central to criminal justice; they are the pillars of a just and safe society. To strip away this moral standing too readily — particularly in the context of motherhood, where these obligations are at their most powerful — threatens every meaningful social value, from individual dignity to collective welfare. These foundational commitments are the true stakes of Clancy’s trial.