Of the four great governing institutions called into being by the Constitution–the two houses of Congress and the other two branches of government–the one to which the fewest Federalist essays are devoted is the Senate. There are just five such essays, Nos. 62 to 66. Although its democratic credentials are more open to question than those of the House of Representatives, the Senate seems to have occasioned less criticism and concern on the part of the Constitution’s opponents. Probably that is because the equality of representation for every state, and the (original) method of state legislatures electing senators, tracked with prior experience under the Articles of Confederation. A reader of the new Constitution who went looking for where it honors the traditional understanding of federalism and state sovereignty would find it in the Senate. In that respect, the Senate needs the least defending.

If there are just five essays on the Senate, however, what essays they are! All three authors–Madison, Hamilton, even Jay–contribute their thoughts on this institution (the only one of which that is true). And the character of the argument, particularly in the first two essays, by Madison, is remarkable. He bluntly calls the readers’ attention in No. 62 to the shortcomings of representative institutions in their own experience:

A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities: Most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert that in the American governments [i.e., the states], too little attention has been paid to the last. The federal constitution avoids this error . . .

The Senate, Madison argues, makes a signal contribution to the attainment of good government, and it does so precisely by being constituted to maintain some distance from the “sudden and violent passions” that can characterize the most democratic institutions. The contribution of the Senate is variously described by Madison as “wisdom and stability” and as “order and stability.” The evil it seeks to remedy is “mutable government,” a pattern of chaotic and inconsistent policymaking that we can expect when public opinion has too much power and immediacy.

By various means the Senate is structured to overcome this problem and achieve stable government. The chief means are the longer term of office and the smaller number of members, when compared to the House. Madison continues on this theme, and has still sharper words for unmediated democracy, in his next essay.

(For explanation of this recurring feature, see here.)