Just a follow-up to Gary Marx’s excellent and alarming posts (Part 1 and Part 2) on how Iowa’s judicial nominating commission severely constrains Governor Branstad’s nominating authority: Under Iowa’s system (per Art. V, section 15 of the state constitution),

If the Governor fails for thirty days to make the appointment [from the list of nominees submitted by the judicial nominating commission], it shall be made from such nominees by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Thus, under Iowa’s system, the governor can’t simply reject all the names on the nominating commission’s list and require it to submit a new list. The judicial nominating commission therefore has effective power to force the selection of one of its candidates.

Proponents of the deceptively named “merit selection” system often try to give the impression that the only alternative to that system is election of judges. But, as I’ve discussed before, one obvious alternative is the federal model, in which the executive nominates judges and a legislative body votes on whether to confirm the nominees. Another alternative would place full appointive power in the governor (e.g., no need for confirmation).