As we have seen before, Linda Greenhouse is fond of using the incendiary term crusade to stigmatize the cause of religious liberty, and she has even faulted other liberal commentators for giving effect to an โ€œimpulse not to appear unduly antagonistic toward religion.โ€ So itโ€™s not surprising to see her (or her editors) miscast a new case on the Courtโ€™s docket, Groff v. DeJoy, as โ€œThe Latest Crusade to Place Religion Over the Rest of Civil Society.โ€

Greenhouseโ€™s analysis is once again as shoddy as her anti-religious bigotry. The legal issue in Groff concerns the scope of protection that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides employees. Title VII forbids employers from discriminating against (or otherwise adversely affecting the status of) an employee because of the employeeโ€™s religion. In 1972 Congress added this definition of โ€œreligionโ€ to Title VII:

The term โ€œreligionโ€ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employeeโ€™s or prospective employeeโ€™s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employerโ€™s business. [Emphasis added.]

The grand crusader in the case is a postal worker, Gerald E. Groff, whose religious beliefs call for him to observe Sunday as his sabbath. His terrifying crusade seeks to have the Postal Service accommodate his religious observance. (Amazon hired the Postal Service to do Sunday deliveries.) The legal question posed by Groffโ€™s certiorari petition is whether the Court should revisit the statement in its 1977 decision in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison that an employer faces an โ€œundue hardshipโ€ whenever accommodating an employeeโ€™s religious observance would require it โ€œto bear more than a de minimis cost.โ€

Iโ€™m not going to undertake here to present a full account of the competing arguments in Groff. (The merits briefs havenโ€™t been filed yet.) Iโ€™ll instead just note some of Greenhouseโ€™s errors and omissions:

1. Perhaps most striking, Greenhouse fails to mention that her usual judicial heroes, Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan, vigorously dissented in Hardison. In his dissent, Marshall (joined by Brennan) expressed bewilderment that โ€œsimple English usage permits โ€˜undue burdenโ€™ to be interpreted to mean โ€˜more than de minimis cost,โ€™โ€ and he condemned the decision as โ€œdeal[ing] a fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to accommodate work requirements to religious practices.โ€

2. Greenhouse observes, as though it were a defense rather than an indictment, that the decision in Hardison โ€œreflected the spirit of the timesโ€ by โ€œ[t]reating religion as nothing particularly special.โ€

3. Greenhouse charges that disapproving the โ€œde minimisโ€ statement in Hardison would be โ€œbold activismโ€ that would deviate from the strong stare decisis to which statutory interpretations are entitled. She does not inform her readers of (much less offer any response to) Groffโ€™s argument that the statement was dictaโ€”about a then-existing EEOC guideline, not Title VIIโ€™s definition of โ€œreligionโ€โ€”and is entitled to no precedential weight.

4. Greenhouse contends that Hardison โ€œis clearly in tension with the current courtโ€™s [supposed] privileging of religious claims above all others.โ€ But as Justice Gorsuch explained two years ago (in a dissent from denial of certiorari in another case), the courts โ€œare far more demandingโ€ in applying the undue-hardship standard under other civil-rights statutes that Congress has enacted since Hardison, so โ€œTitle VIIโ€™s right to religious exercise has become the odd man out.โ€ Far from โ€œprivileging โ€ฆ religious claims above all othersโ€ (Greenhouseโ€™s charge), overruling Hardison would enable the Court to ensure that religious claims under Title VII are treated the same as claims under those other statutes.

5. Even as she states that โ€œ[i]t may just be a coincidence,โ€ Greenhouse insinuates that there might be something nefarious about the fact that the Court, after denying review in cases involving a Jehovahโ€™s Witness and Seventh-day Adventists, granted certiorari in a case in which the plaintiff is an evangelical Christian. But the Court has all sorts of procedural reasons for denying review. More to the point, a victory for rural postal carrier Groff would, contra Greenhouse, be โ€œa vindication of minority rightsโ€โ€”a powerless individual standing up to the combined force of the Postal Service and Amazonโ€”and it would redound to the benefit of all religious claimants.

6. Greenhouse asserts that a victory for Groff would โ€œsignify the courtโ€™s complete identification with the movement in the countryโ€™s politics to elevate religion over all other elements of civil society.โ€ I have no idea what that means. Does she think that employment with the Postal Service is an important part of โ€œcivil societyโ€?

7. Greenhouse closes by declaring that โ€œReligion is the lens through which the current [Supreme Court] majority views American society.โ€ I also have no idea what that means. But she citesโ€”tada!โ€”herself as authority: she links to what I will very charitably call an unpersuasive piece of hers on Dobbs as she harrumphs that โ€œthere is no other way to understand the overturning of Roe v. Wade.โ€