China’s advance in the South Pacific may have suffered a (temporary?) setback, but it seems to be making progress elsewhere.
Officials from China and Cambodia broke ground on a controversial, Chinese-funded upgrade of a naval base in southern Cambodia on Wednesday, with Beijing’s envoy in the country calling military cooperation part of the countries’ “iron-clad partnership.”
The launch of the project at the Ream Naval Base, which Cambodian officials said will use grant aid from China to renovate the port, comes amid Western concern that Beijing is seeking a military outpost at the Gulf of Thailand facility.
Cambodian Defense Minister Tea Banh dismissed such claims, stressing during the ceremony that the project is in line with Cambodia’s constitution, which bars foreign military bases on its territory, and that the Southeast Asian nation is open to development assistance from other countries.
More specifically, both Beijing and Phnom Penh would like everyone to know that this upgrade should not in any way be confused with the construction of a separate facility for Chinese use on the northern part of the base. Nothing like that is going on, not at all.
Earlier last week, the Washington Post had published a report, citing “Western officials” on the construction of, well, just that, but such allegations have gently been dismissed by Beijing as “a typical [American] bullying act.” Well, perhaps not that gently dismissed.
The Washington Post:
Having a facility capable of hosting large naval vessels to the west of the South China Sea would be an important element of China’s ambition to expand its influence in the region and would strengthen its presence near key Southeast Asian sea lanes, officials and analysts said. . . .
“We assess that the Indo-Pacific is an important piece for China’s leaders, who see the Indo-Pacific as China’s rightful and historic sphere of influence,” one Western official said. “They view China’s rise there as part of a global trend toward a multipolar world where major powers more forcefully assert their interests in their perceived sphere of influence.”
Beijing, the official said, is banking on the region being “unwilling or unable to challenge China’s core interests,” and through a combination of coercion, punishment and inducements in the diplomatic, economic and military realms, believes it can get countries to bend to its interests. “Essentially, China wants to become so powerful that the region will give in to China’s leadership rather than face the consequences [for not doing so],” the official said.
China’s strategic goals here are political, economic and military. Beijing has long taken a mercantilist view of natural resources and doesn’t trust normal commercial trading rules. Like Japan in the 1930s, Beijing believes that a far-flung base network is necessary to guarantee the supply of oil, minerals and other raw materials in case of sanctions, global shortages or conflicts.
“Like Japan in the 1930s . . .”