In the modern world, elections are how governments typically win their legitimacy. But on prudential grounds, I’m not sure a new election would be my highest priority in Afghanistan. I’m guessing most Afghans will judge the legitimacy of the government more on how it delivers the most basic aspects of governance–most fundamentally, security and some kind of justice free of corruption–than on election returns. Given the choice, I’d have been tempted to use whatever leverage we had over Karzai to get him to do some things that will actually improve governance on the ground–better governors, better cabinet ministers, etc.–rather than twisting his arm on a run-off. At the moment, we appear to be putting process above substance and risk further alienating Karzai, who we’re going to have work with for the duration. He’s very likely to win the run-off and, whatever his flaws, it’d be a disaster if he didn’t. Abdullah is associated with the Northern Alliance. If he won, the Pakistanis would never reconcile with Afghanistan and the central government would have zero chance of extending its writ into the Pashtun south. Also, the run-off might well be nearly as flawed as the original count, a ramshackle affair pleasing no one. Both Amir Taheri here and Rajan Menon here give voice to misgivings about the whole business. Maybe there was no alternative, since the rules are the rules and Karzai clocked in at under 50 percent. And perhaps he’ll win in a cleaner vote that takes away the taint of the first election. But, either way, the hard work in Afghanistan is going to remain.