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Among those arguing seriously, the alternative presented by many opponents of military action to effect a regime change in Iraq was not more of the same toothless UN inspections. It was a regime of more aggressive inspections, backed up by a beefed-up force-in-waiting based in Iraq’s neighbors, mainly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Estimates for the necessary size of such a force ranged from 50,000 to 200,000, if I remember correctly. So those now arguing “opportunity costs” should consider the costs of maintaining a large, semi-permanent force in the Gulf States. Besides the obvious costs in troops unavailable for other contingencies and in resources spent on maintaining the force in the region (in other words, costs we would bear with or without regime change, albeit in different amounts), there are the intangible political and strategic costs. Among these was the most obvious: that Saddam Hussein’s regime would have remained in power, seeking to exploit divisions among the coalition arrayed against him and rebuilding his military capabilities.
But there was also the political cost of our troop presence in Saudi Arabia. A common criticism is that our occupation of Iraq is serving as a casus belli for a generation of terrorists and terrorist sympathizers.
But recall that our “occupation” of Saudi Arabia, a necessary expedient to protect the Kingdom from Saddam Hussein’s regime, was already cited as a casus belli, if not the main casus belli, by the terrorists who killed thousands of Americans and others in Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, Pennsylvania, Washington, DC and New York City.