Itโs not entirely a slippery-slope argument if you buy that โweek-old blastocystsโ are human beings, however early on in their lives. They deserve protection as such. Supreme Court decisions aside, the law gives cover for that; not to be positively grade-school about this, but really ABC civil/social agreements like the Declaration of Independence & Constitution, and, forgive me, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights include this principle. Thatโs not exactly a โsingle, precise, all-encompassing moral dogmaโ being imposed on a people clamoring for a form of research that hasnโt even been subject to an intelligent national debate. (When it comes to imposing my absolutist RTL will on the country, I wouldnโt hold too strongly to the argument that Americans are overwhelmingly agreed on the โweek-old blastocyst.โ And even if we were, again, itโs a fundamental that deserves the least amount of fudge and compromise as is possible and plausible. )
I suppose the rest of my argument is a slippery-slope argument, but as a matter of principle Iโm not opposed to making slippery-slope arguments when youโre on an obvious slide.
Just quickly (deadlines, deadlines): As for your voting comparisonโI guess I just donโt see the voting age to be as fundamental as the right to life, and I canโt see the hypothetical pro-nine-year-olds voting advocates having too much of a compelling case.
Back to the slide, I go to Ponnuru again, because heโs already written it. This time in NRODT (โCells, Fetuses, and Logic,โ July 23, 2001):
A pro-life position not rooted in logic ends up having the same line- drawing problem. When do pro-life supporters of stem-cell research believe life begins? They would seem to believe that a clump of matter that is not a person somehow becomes inhabited by a person as it develops. Rather than defend this theoretical disaster bordering on superstition, some of these pro-lifers have resorted to the name games that pro-choicers have used in the past: Blastocysts arenโt embryos, embryos that have not been implanted are pre-embryos, etc. But none of these nominal distinctions-nor the biological distinctions they denote- mark a point of moral distinction.
[Robert] Bartley describes himself as a member of the โmushy middleโ on abortion as though it were good in itself not to draw principled distinctions. He opposes partial-birth abortion because it is ugly, supports stem- cell research because nobody grieves for blastocysts, seeks a middle ground because the extremists are off-putting: a clump of positions united only by sensibility.
The trouble with this middle ground is that, in addition to giving up territory that should be defended, it is itself indefensible territory. Slippery slopes are slippery because the logic that starts you down them will lead you further down. During the stem-cell debate, people have said that itโs okay to use embryos for research because we already โdiscardโ plenty of embryos as a byproduct of in vitro fertilization; they could with equal validity say that we should allow research on five-month-old fetuses because we allow them to be aborted. Judges have said that we have to allow partial-birth abortion, or even euthanasia, because we allow abortion. The Washington Post says that the logic of abortion rights does not permit the law to charge people with murder when they kill an unborn child in the course of an assault on a pregnant woman, even if the woman considers it murder.
Slippery-slope arguments rarely succeed because people discount the possibility of remote future horrors; they think they will be able to stop the slide. But horrors can get less horrible as the future becomes less remote. People adjust their sensibilities. In 1973, not even pro- abortion lawyers were challenging Texasโs law against partial-birth abortion. Back then, embryo-killing research would have seemed monstrous. I have read the argument (in Reason, the libertarian magazine, as it happens) that people predicted all kinds of dire consequences from in vitro fertilization that did not happen, so why not allow cloning? One of the dire consequences of in vitro fertilization, however, is precisely that we are debating cloning now.
A common trope of the press coverage of the stem-cell conflict-which reeks of weariness at the continued existence of pro-lifers-is that itโs a shame this โscientific issueโ has gotten caught up in the โpoliticsโ of abortion. But it is caught up in the issue because the premises of the arguments are the same: Either conception results in a new human being deserving of legal protection or it doesnโt. No amount of sophisticated hairsplitting over bioethics is going to work if it ignores that awkward, obvious question.





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