As Michael notes below, Theresa May has had a rather rough day, but, like a First World War general, she plods on amid the carnage convinced that her plan (a dog’s dinner of a Brexit if ever there was one) will be vindicated in the end. It won’t. Even if it survives (and she survives) the next few weeks, her proposal is likely to be shredded by Brussels — but not probably until the last minute, forcing the British government to decide between a potentially catastrophic “no deal” or an agreement more or less dictated by Brussels. Rock meet hard place.
May’s handling of Brexit has, like much of what she has done since assuming office, been a display of staggering ineptitude, but her job has been complicated by the so-called Hard Brexiteers whose quest for, well, I don’t know quite what (and nor seemingly do they) has stood in the way of what always has been the logical first stage (it doesn’t have to be the final destination) of a transition away from the EU, some variant of what’s usually known as the Norway Option. This (essentially) off-the-shelf Brexit would involve leaving the EU with relatively little disruption, a process that would be more or less as business-friendly as the place where it would end up. The U.K. would remain in the EEA, the fabled Single Market, via EFTA, the far smaller, far less intrusive European Free Trade Association.
What this switch would do is extract the U.K. from any involvement in the EU’s political project for an “ever closer union” while retaining the economic advantages that Britain derives from membership of the Single Market, a market of which (it should not be forgotten) Margaret Thatcher was possibly the most important architect.
Membership of the EEA on this basis would automatically allow the U.K. to introduce slightly more restrictive immigration rules. Additionally it would enjoy the (admittedly debated by some) right to introduce a far more restrictive immigration regime under certain circumstances. It would also leave the U.K. free to cut its own trade deals with countries outside the EU. Even if we ignore (and we shouldn’t) the fact that such a move would give Britain a seat of its own (rather than 1/28th of an EU seat) in many of the bodies that set the rules for global trade, the frequently repeated claim that switching to this status would leave the U.K. as a mere rule-taker is untrue in law, untrue in practice, and, given the far greater bargaining position of an EFTA boosted by British participation, would be untrue politically too.
Whether as a destination in its own right or as the starting point in a longer journey, EEA/EFTA has been the right way out of the EU for years. It still is. There was, quite clearly, a time when this would almost certainly have been a deal that could have been cut with the EU. Whether that is still the case is anyone’s guess. Brussels recognizes a weakened negotiating partner when it sees one.
So what happens next? For now, the attention is focused on the drama within the Conservative party. Theresa May became the Tories’ leader in 2016 because (after Michael Gove’s betrayal of Boris Johnson) there was no obvious alternative. That’s why, despite blunder after blunder, she still holds on to that position and, incredibly, may yet continue to do so. After a year in which they have repeatedly made fools of themselves, neither of the leading two figures (David Davis and Johnson) who resigned today have much left in the way of credibility, while Gove (who has not, so far, resigned) is (rightly) trusted by no one. As for the Party’s Darling, Jacob Rees-Mogg, he could perhaps win the leadership, but his victory would throw open Number 10’s door to Jeremy Corbyn the next time a General Election came round. The Labour party has not lost its talent for class war.
If you want a name to watch, keep an eye out for Sajid Javid, the Home Secretary (interior minister), but, frankly, it’s anyone’s guess what happens next.