I wrote last year about China’s advance in the South Pacific, yet another sign of the Beijing regime’s expansionist ambitions. One of the island nations in China’s sights was (and is) the Solomon Islands, something I discussed here. The fact that Guadalcanal is in the Solomons is a reminder that their strategic position is of some importance.
In an article on the home page, Jimmy Quinn explains where things stand (not well) in the Solomons and describes a lunch meeting organized last week by the National Review Institute for Daniel Suidani, who until February led the government of the Solomons’ wealthiest and most populated island, Malaita. He was ousted for his outspoken opposition to growing Chinese influence. I was at the lunch, and as Jimmy reports (please do read the whole thing) the news was not good.
Here’s an extract:
Suidani and [Celsus] Talifilu [an adviser to Suidani] were in town to attend meetings at a U.N. forum on indigenous peoples, and they plan to return to the Solomon Islands in a few weeks, after a swing through Washington, D.C. They said there are rumors that they will be arrested when they return, and they plan to have a lawyer ready in case anything happens.
In 2019, a pro-Beijing government led by Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare came to power in the Solomon Islands, switching the small but strategically located country’s recognition of Taiwan to that of Mainland China and setting in motion a broader alignment with Communist Chinese strategic goals. Since then, the Solomon Islands’ national government has inked a secretive security pact with China and served as a Pacific Island stopover for People’s Liberation Army transport jets.
There were also reports that the Solomon Islands planned to host one of China’s first overseas military bases, and the Pentagon said in its annual report on Chinese military power last year that Beijing “has probably already made overtures” to the country. Following an international outcry, however, Sogavare denied that that was the case.
The one (small) bit of positive news is alluded to in Jimmy’s reference to an international outcry. Attention is now being paid. Unusually for China, which has been patiently attempting to increase its reach in the region for years, it has recently pushed too hard, and that is generating a reaction.
The Rand Corporation’s James Grossman provided some useful background last year:
In late May [2022], Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi embarked on a whirlwind 10-day, eight-country tour of the South Pacific to win concurrence on “China-Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision,” a sweeping multilateral development and security agreement that would permanently enmesh Beijing in the region. In the end, Pacific Island foreign ministers rebuffed Chinese overtures, and Wang returned to Beijing empty-handed.
On the other hand, China has also enjoyed considerable success with Kiribati, another Pacific island nation, which like the Solomon Islands, has, in recent years, switched diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan to Beijing.
Grossman:
Beijing is refurbishing the airstrip on Kanton Island that Tarawa says is for tourism, but Washington fears it could be used as a future air base that would be about 1,600 miles from Hawaii.
As Grossman notes, ten Pacific Island nations are very low-income and thus dependent on overseas aid. That makes them vulnerable to overtures accompanied by cash, although the history of China’s “aid,” which has a way — according to its critics — of becoming distinctly unhelpful, ought to make some potential recipients pause.
The U.S. is now reacting, not least by reopening its embassy in the Solomon Islands. And James Cleverly, Britain’s foreign minister (prior to independence, the islands had been a British “protectorate,” and the country remains in the Commonwealth) has just been there.
As James Cleverly took the rutted gravel road from the main airport of the Solomon Islands that leads to the prime minister’s residence, he passed under a flag bearing the red background and yellow stars of the People’s Republic of China.
It fluttered prominently on Thursday above the motorcade passing the construction site of a $50 million (£40 million) stadium for the upcoming Pacific Games – a gift from Beijing and a giant symbol of its growing footprint in the Solomons.
Placards saying “China Aid for Shared Future” lined the corrugated fences around the site…
A string of other deals, including the athletics stadium “state gift”, signalled China tightening its grip around an island chain which is fast becoming ground zero in the great game to control the Pacific.
Fears are growing from Washington to Tokyo of a carefully crafted “elite capture” of the Solomons that could have a potentially huge cost to Western security.
The Telegraph’s reporters spoke to, among others, a youth activist in Malaita, who had this to say:
“Our biggest fear is not about the Chinese people but the Chinese Communist Party because they have a totally different system from democracy. We are afraid it might influence our government system.”
There are signs that it already may be doing just that.
The Daily Telegraph (emphasis added)
As China expands its presence, there is growing unease about suspected disinformation campaigns against critics of its intentions.
Beijing now exerts more influence over the training of the police, and a planned $66 million (£53 million) loan from Beijing to build 161 mobile communication towers, supplied by Chinese telecoms giant Huawei, has prompted fears of surveillance and that [the Solomons] could fall into debt.
Huawei’s involvement is also worth noting. The company’s ownership structure is somewhat murky (and the subject of debate). What cannot be disputed is that Huawei should also be seen as an agent of the Chinese state, as, to a greater or lesser extent, should all Chinese companies: Corporatism (with Chinese characteristics) is what it is. That’s something that Western investors in China would do well to remember.
The Telegraph’s writers also report on two efforts by another Chinese company to secure a 75-year lease over Tulagi, an islet in the Solomons with a natural deep harbor, which has been used by other navies in the past. According to a leaked letter, the second attempt was accompanied by a proposal specifically including plans to “study” the idea of developing infrastructure there for the Chinese navy. These may have been superseded by the broader (but still obscure) deal between China and the Solomons.
In April 2022, Financial Report’s Kathrin Hille noted that the would-be lessee was:
just one of a growing breed of Chinese companies scouring the globe in an effort to secure strategic strips of land. In dozens of cases examined by the Financial Times, mostly little-known Chinese investors have proposed taking long leases or have tried to buy large chunks of land, often in sensitive locations.
In some cases, the land is close to US allies or military installations, on islands along key sea lanes of communication, or overlooking important straits and channels.
Nothing like that could happen here, of course.
Chinese company’s purchase of North Dakota farmland raises national security concerns in Washington.
Oh.