Another point I think needs making. Lots of folks argue — including President Obama — that Mousavi isn’t that different from Ahmadinejad on issues like Israel and Iran’s nuclear program and so why make such a fuss? I think this is an awfully static analysis of the situation. Sure, if the election had gone swimmingly and Mousavi had won, he might have been the dutiful Egon Krenz of the Mullahcracy, with some window dressing reforms to placate the masses. Or he might have done better than that. Who knows? But all of that is academic now.

Moreover, that debate is a little annoying because it tends to support the idea that this was a legitimate election in the first place. Mousavi was a handpicked hack. His leadership of the reform forces is by default or as Michael Ledeen put it, “He is a leader who has been made into a revolutionary by a movement that grew up around him.” At this point the question is, do the people of Iran succeed or does the clerical politburo and its henchmen succeed. If the people succeed, the regime is in real trouble. It’s amazing how so many observers doubt something the regime itself manifestly knows. If these protests weren’t a threat to the regime and the established theocratic order the regime wouldn’t be shooting people. It wouldn’t be tearing down the web, raiding the universities, kicking foreign journalists out, or showing documentaries about archeology while the streets filled with millions.

Lastly, I understand why Obama is fixated on keeping Iran from getting nukes. I don’t want Iran to get nukes either, even though I think Obama’s approach to that goal has been flawed and is getting worse. But if Iran is determined to have nukes regardless of who leads it — and I think it pretty much is – then it is very much in our interest for Iran to become more democratic and “normal.” Of course, we are a long way from Iran being a healthy, normal, democracy, but it’s worth remembering that healthy, normal, democracies are much less likely to export terror or lob nuclear missiles at their neighbors.

Behind Curtain #1 is Ahmandinejad. He is a known quantity. We know that Ahmandinejad isn’t interested in giving up his nuclear program. We know that he’s keen on Israel being wiped from the map. We know that he is not a rational actor. Of course it is possible that what we would find behind Curtain #2 is not that different from what lurks behind Curtain #1. But there’s a very good chance that it would be a lot better and that’s in our vital national interest. Could it be worse than the devil we know? No conservative can ever rule out the “it could be worse” potential of any choice. But it’s hard to see how the reformers would be worse than what we’ve had for 30 years.

Sure, there’s a certain leap of faith there. But there’s also a leap of faith involved in betting Ahmandinejad and the mullahs can be reasoned with.

So if we have to take such a leap, why not have the wind of our principles and ideals at our back?