Economic warfare is rarely confined, in the end, to economic methods.
The sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines (perhaps interestingly, one of the two Nord Stream 2 pipelines — both Nord Stream 1 and 2 are twin-pipeline systems — was not damaged) has left Europeans wondering about the security of other pipelines and, for that matter, that of other undersea networks.
The attacks have stirred not so remote memories in Norway.
Earlier this year an undersea fiber optic cable connecting a satellite ground station on Svalbard [a Norwegian Arctic archipelago in which, for historical reasons, the Russians maintain some mining facilities] to the Norwegian mainland was severed.
This incident followed the cutting of cables part of an undersea monitoring network in 2021. In both instances authorities explained that the breakages were likely caused by human activity and that no natural phenomena could have led to the damage…
On the Norwegian broadcaster NRK, Lieutenant-Colonel Geir Hågen Karlsen a defense and security expert at Norway’s Institute for Defense Studies (IFS) explained:
“Norwegian gas deliveries are probably the biggest target and strategically the most important for sabotage all over Europe at the present time”.
As Europe’s largest producer of natural gas and oil Norway operates an extensive network of pipelines throughout the North and Norwegian Seas.
As a response to this emerging threat the government announced further strengthening of security measures, including deploying its military, in addition to those already put in place by oil companies and pipeline operators.
While Norway’s government does not have any concrete indications of direct threats against this type of infrastructure, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre nonetheless warned that Norway would “react strongly” if similar sabotage would occur.
Political discussions also included speculation if attacks on energy infrastructure would trigger NATO’s article five on collective defense.
The answer, I imagine would be yes, especially if the infrastructure was located under a NATO member’s territorial waters.
There is, understandably enough, an increasing amount of speculation about the NATO response to a Russian nuclear attack within (or over) Ukraine, which is not, of course, a NATO member. But if we are looking out for a potential direct flashpoint between Russia and NATO, it will be worth keeping an eye on the energy pipelines that will, of course, be more than usually important this year.
Among the items being monitored by the sabotaged Norwegian monitoring system was Russian submarine traffic.
From The Drive (November 2021):
Undersea sensors off the coast of northern Norway that are able to collect data about passing submarines, among other things, have been knocked out, the country’s state-operated Institute of Marine Research, or IMR, has revealed. The cause of the damage is unknown, but the cables linking the sensor nodes to control stations ashore are said to have been cut and then disappeared. This has raised suspicions about deliberate sabotage, possibly carried out by the Russian government, which definitely has the means to do so.
The IMR, one of the biggest marine research institutes in Europe, described “extensive damage” to the outer areas of the Lofoten-Vesterålen (LoVe) Ocean Observatory, putting the system offline. LoVe, which was only declared fully operational in August 2020, consists of a network of underwater cables and sensors located on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, an area of strategic interest for both Norway and Russia….
The Financial Times (September 30, 2022):
European countries have stepped up military patrols to protect energy supplies in the North Sea and off the coast of Italy in the wake of the alleged sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines near Denmark.
Jonas Gahr Støre, Norway’s prime minister, said he had welcomed help from Germany, the UK and France to increase security as the country put on a show of force, flying F-35 fighter jets past oil platforms and sending torpedo boats and frigates to patrol near energy sites.
The Scandinavian nation has become Europe’s largest supplier of natural gas since Russia slashed supplies following its invasion of Ukraine. This has made its pipelines and gasfields a focal point for supply fears, as the continent faces a severe energy crisis this winter.
Italy said its navy would increase measures to protect gas pipelines bringing supplies from north Africa to Europe through the Sicilian channel, warning that it feared Russia could try and target key energy infrastructure….
Oil and gas operators in the Norwegian and Danish waters of the North Sea said that they had seen a number of unidentified drones near platforms in recent weeks.
US energy company ConocoPhillips said on Friday that it was raising the security level at its Norwegian assets after one of its platforms was approached by a drone. The platform was reported in Norwegian media to be part of the Ekofisk oilfield that sits close to the maritime border with the UK.
The New York Times (October 1, 2022):
On Saturday, natural gas is set to start flowing through Baltic Pipe, the only new natural gas pipeline to come online in Europe in decades.
Started in 2018, the brainchild of Poland and supported by the European Union, Baltic Pipe will bring gas from the bountiful energy riches of Norway to Central Europe, through the Polish coast. The gas could then flow through overland pipelines to other European Union countries in the region…
Poland has envisioned Baltic Pipe since the 1990s and considers it a key step to ending its dependence on Russian gas — which hasn’t been flowing to the country since Russia cut off supplies in April.
Useful things, pipelines — not that this is something that the Biden administration always appears to appreciate.
Reading about the scale of the network of which Baltic Pipe now forms a part gives an indication of the challenge faced by those who want to preserve its integrity, and the opportunity it represents for those who don’t.
The New York Times (my emphasis added):
Baltic Pipe is the third major gas line running under the Baltic Sea, along with the now ruptured Nord Stream lines. The Polish pipeline begins in the North Sea west of Denmark, where it branches off from the Europipe II line, one of a web of thousands of miles of pipeline carrying Norwegian natural gas to Northern Europe across the North Sea…
Experts point to the vulnerability of all undersea infrastructure, which beyond the energy pipelines includes thousands of miles of communication cables that in recent decades have been strung across the oceans’ floors to connect a globalized world. Keeping it safe is virtually impossible, Johannes Peters, an expert at the Center for Maritime Strategy and Security at the University of Kiel told the German reporting collective RND…
Many experts believe that the timing of the suspected attacks [on Nord Stream 1 and 2], which laid bare the vulnerability of critical infrastructure, was no coincidence. News that the leaks had reached the surface broke on Tuesday, hours before Mr. Morawiecki and his Danish counterpart ceremoniously opened Baltic Pipe. [Benjamin] Schmitt [a research associate at Harvard and former European energy security adviser at the U.S. State Department] noted that the new link played a key role in securing energy independence in a region formerly controlled by Moscow.
Norway, meanwhile, has deployed troops to guard onshore energy infrastructure, and the Brits are buying two new ships (one won’t be available until next year) equipped to increase surveillance of the seabed.
The Washington Post, in an editorial, notes the importance of repair services in the North Sea. Details of what (in 2020) was available can be found here.
Economic warfare is rarely confined, in the end, to economic methods.