“The alternative philosophical tradition begins in precise opposition to the new conservatives’ confidence in faith and reason as direct, accessible routes to universal truth. The conservatism of doubt asks how anyone can be sure that his view of what is moral or good is actually true. Conservatives of doubt note that even the most dogmatic of institutions, such as the Catholic or Mormon churches, have changed their views over many centuries, and that, even within such institutions, there is considerable debate about difficult moral issues. They understand that significant critiques of human reason—Nietzsche, anyone?—have rendered the philosophical quest for self-evident truth even more precarious in the modern world. Such conservatives are not nihilists or devotees of what Pope Benedict XVI has called ‘the dictatorship of relativism.’ They merely believe that the purported choice between moral absolutism and complete relativism, between God and moral anarchy, is a phony one. Their alternative is a skeptical, careful, prudential approach to all moral questions—and suspicion of anyone claiming to hold the absolute truth. Since such an approach rarely provides a simple answer persuasive to everyone within a democratic society, we live with moral and cultural pluralism.”

Here is where things start to go seriously awry. In a way, this passage represents a step forward for Sullivan, since he is making it fairly clear that his quarrel is not with “fundamentalist” religion so much as it is with reason and truth (although, as you can guess, fundamentalism will make a re-appearance in the essay). It isn’t terribly persuasive: To conclude from the existence of disagreement that there is no certain truth is simply an error. Moreover, the pope has not offered a “choice between moral absolutism and complete relativism.” The only person conjuring up that choice, in order to reject it showily, is Sullivan himself. And as the rest of the essay goes on to demonstrate, Sullivan’s view of a “skeptical, careful, prudential approach to all moral questions” turns out to be a view that reaches his preferred positions on all controversial moral issues. It is not at all obvious that his views are any less “absolutist” than contrary views.