The Corner

The Dutch Hit Back at the EU (Via Ukraine)

As tends to happen when EU voters are given a direct say on the European project, Brussels has just lost another referendum.

This time, Dutch voters have said ‘nee’ to the EU’s association agreement (a trade deal and much more besides) with Ukraine.  I posted a bit about the coming vote here on the Corner in January, drawing heavily on analysis by Open Europe’s Pieter Cleppe.

This (by Cleppe) gets to the heart of it:

This should first and foremost be seen as a proxy for many Dutch citizens’ desire for a broader debate about the EU and the direction it is heading in. Given that a full on referendum about EU membership is explicitly excluded in the [Dutch] legislation establishing the referendum mechanism, campaigners latched onto the EU-Ukrainian Association Agreement as the best option for forcing the debate. They needed a piece of EU legislation which was yet to come into force and upon which they could hang their broader concerns, this agreement seemed to fit the bill.


As readers may remember, a few years  back Angela Merkel, the “indispensable European” (The Economist), pushed through a decision by the EU to ignore the Dutch and French referendum votes against a proposed EU constitution and effectively ‘reintroduce’ it through the notorious Lisbon Treaty. Today’s result can be seen as part of her legacy. 

The Dutch electorate has now taken the opportunity to punch back. Just over 61 percent of those who voted rejected the Ukraine deal.  Crucially, turnout exceeded the required threshold of 30 percent, if only barely (32.2%).  Interestingly enough, an almost identical percentage (61.54%) rejected that proposed EU constitution back in 2005, although on a much higher turnout (63.3%). The geographical split (for and against) was also very similar.

The last time round, the Dutch government said it would abide by the referendum if the turnout exceeded 30 percent. We saw what eventually happened. Adding insult to injury, the current Dutch prime minister reneged last year on an election pledge not to participate in Greece’s third bailout (and adding further injury to that, it’s looking increasingly as if another Greek crisis may be brewing).

Writing for Open Europe yesterday, Cleppe had this to say:

Popular dissatisfaction with “EU overreach” can lead to “collateral damage” to what should be the EU’s core business: trade. The EU has failed to properly address its many internal problems including its crisis of accountability and democratic legitimacy, prompting campaigners to take the EU-Ukraine deal hostage.




That’s too benign a view  of the EU (it has never been primarily about trade) but Cleppe’s broader point holds good, and it’s a useful reminder of just how destabilizing the European project has become. And, not for the first time, Vladimir Putin is one of the beneficiaries. 

Back in January, I wrote:

This [vote] is very bad luck for Ukraine. The EU has historically been a force for good in Eastern Europe and an association agreement between the EU and Ukraine would be a useful step forward for the country. As such, it would be something to be welcomed.   But the democratic sovereignty (or what’s left of it) of the nations of Western Europe counts too. As things stand, at least for now I think that the Dutch should vote no…

If the result does turn out to be a no (and the government respects it), it will also be a poignant reminder of how helpful to Putin the economic and political disarray provoked by the EU’s push for ‘ever closer union’ (despite the lack of democratic consent for it) has proved to be.


So what now?  Legally, speaking this referendum is non-binding, so how will the government respond?

Cleppe (again, writing yesterday):

This question has divided the governing coalition with Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s liberal/centre-right VVD party declaring that “our stance won’t change” regardless of the outcome, but the centre-left PvdA has said it will respect the outcome if the 30% turnout threshold is met.

Certainly, the Dutch government would have a big crisis on its hands, in the middle of its EU Presidency. Geert Wilders’ anti-EU formation Party for Freedom is already firmly leading the polls, gathering more votes than the VVD and PvdA combined. Rutte also said that if the Dutch parliament decides not to ratify the agreement – a big question mark right now – this would, according to him, be the “end of the exercise”, meaning that the EU would need to renegotiate or give up the association deal with Ukraine.

That said, the trade chapters of the EU-Ukraine deal have already entered into force provisionally at the start of the year, and officials have told the Financial Times that a No-vote would leave it in force – full unanimity in the Council is needed to end provisional application. Therefore, the agreement could be stuck in limbo pending a more sustainable solution. One option would be for the Netherlands could do the dirty work for other member states and block visa free travel for Ukrainians as a condition of ratifying the Treaty and appeasing Dutch public opinion.


In a way, that’s not the worst result. Ukraine continues to draw closer to the West (as it ought to, although I suspect that many Ukrainians will take umbrage at a Dutch vote that is unlikely to have been explained too well over there) and Europeans will have been given a lesson in the meaning of  the EU’s post-democracy. The  Dutch vote can change quite a bit by changing nothing. As political theater, if nothing else, it is likely to prove useful.

And what play is complete without a villain or two?

Cleppe:

[F]ormer European Council President Herman Van Rompuy said it would be a “disgrace for the Netherlands” while former EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht, a Belgian, stated in his own very straight talking style: “I hope Rutte ignores the result of the referendum”.


Cleppe also believes that “a clear “No” vote would also embolden the Leave camp ahead of the UK referendum” on June 23. It will certainly be a boost to morale, at least, but I doubt that it will make much difference in the end. Like Britain’s bookies, I continue to think that the British referendum is one that the EU will win.  Brexit is (alas) unlikely, mainly because of anxiety what life outside the EU might look like. Bearing that in mind, it’s worth reading this Standpoint article by Oliver Wiseman.

Here’s the conclusion:

John Curtice’s study, “How Deeply Does Britain’s Euroscepticism Run?”, which uses answers to questions asked as part of the annual British Social Attitudes survey, is a good example of how sophisticated polling can inform political decision-making. The survey was thorough: 3,000 people interviewed face-to-face between July and the beginning of November last year. Curtice looked at the relationship between Euroscepticism in Britain and a desire to leave the EU. His conclusion is that the referendum will be decided by the relationship between cultural concerns about the EU and economic concerns about life outside the Union. Explaining his findings, he said: “When it comes to things like immigration and identity it is perfectly clear that the public is deeply sceptical about the EU, but when it comes to the risks associated with leaving, the public are clearly inclined to stay inside the EU, and it is a question of how those two play out.”

As he puts it in his report, “Only two in five (40 per cent) of those who believe that the EU is undermining Britain’s identity but are not convinced that the economy would be better say they wish to withdraw from the EU. But that figure is at least double (82 per cent) among those whose cultural concern is married with a belief in the economic benefits of withdrawal.”

The study explains the Remain side’s focus on the economic risks of Brexit. The lesson for Leave is to listen to the electorate’s economic worries. The Eurosceptic but risk-averse chunk of the electorate will decide June’s referendum. If the Leave campaign dismisses their concerns as a product merely of Project Fear brainwashing, Leave will lose.


Which is why more Brexiteers need to be talking about adopting a variant  (PDF here) of the deal that Norway has with the EU.

But that’s a topic to return to on another day. 

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