A good staff analysis of the bill making the rounds in the Senate:

The two limitations of greatest operational significance are the restriction of combat operations to targeted strikes against Al Qaeda and the restrictions on training of Iraqi Security Forces: Targeted operations against Al Qaeda: The bill probably does not authorize all those activities that the military thinks necessary for targeted operations against Al Qaeda. Under U.S. military doctrine that would include the entire current campaign plan in Iraq, which would entail no transition of mission. We are left to wonder what mix of strategy and tactics the bill authorizes as necessary for targeted operations against Al Qaeda. Can we supply the frontline troops fighting Al Qaeda with food and water? Probably yes. Can we clear neighborhoods where Al Qaeda are suspected to be hiding, even if we don’t know the particular house? Maybe; maybe not. Can we do intelligence-gathering and surveillance? According to current Army doctrine, intelligence-gathering requires making the population feel safe enough to expose the terrorists. No population security equals no intel for targeted operations, and population security is the essence of the Petraeus strategy.
Limitations on training Iraqi Security Forces. Two limitations are imposed on the training of Iraq security forces: training former insurgents is prohibited, and both joint combat operations and embedding U.S. forces with Iraqi forces are prohibited.
· Prohibition on reconciliation with former insurgents. It is not clear whether this provision would prohibit training of all those convicted of carrying out attacks against U.S. forces (which would include virtually nobody in the Iraqi Security Forces) or rather suspected former insurgents (e.g., former detainees, which would include many current members of the ISF who are entirely innocent of wrongdoing). If the latter, it is impossible to imagine how the bill would be implemented. Small units of the ISF are likely to contain either former insurgents or former detainees or both. Should those still train with their units, but not when the U.S. is providing them with training? If, however, the bill refers only to those known to have carried out attacks against U.S. soldiers, then the effect of the bill would probably be negligible as a limitation on training of ISF. This provision also runs counter to the U.S. policy of encouraging reconciliation among former insurgents and militia-members. And because it would disproportionately affect Sunni members of the ISF, it also contradicts the policy of encouraging national political reconciliation.
· Prohibition on joint combat operations and on embedding with Iraq Security Forces. This provision would close the door on the most vital element of the military’s exit strategy for Iraq. Almost all operations in Iraq now – from neighborhood patrols, to targeted strikes against Al Qaeda – are conducted jointly with Iraqi Security Forces. There are many benefits:
o The ISF takes heavy casualties that would otherwise be borne by U.S. forces targeting Al Qaeda on their own;
o Joint operations are the most effective way to train local forces;
o Iraqi troops help us interact with the population; we help them by providing logistics, tactical surge capability, and long-range mobility;
o The Iraqi population has become friendly to us because they see our soldiers working side-by-side with theirs to provide security
o The influence of the American military on Iraqi military culture will pay dividends for decades. The ISF are becoming the most capable – and most committed– military ally of the U.S. in the Arab world. And that relationship-building would be impossible if U.S. and Iraqi soldiers were not sharing the same bases and outpost facilities.
Moreover, the prohibition on “embedding” U.S. forces is presumably meant to prevent U.S. and Iraqi soldiers sharing the same base facilities. But this would in effect prohibit the over-lapping of Iraqi and U.S. soldiers at the same base, which is the basic modality by which U.S. bases and outposts are “transitioned” to the Iraqi Security Forces.