The causes of the unrest in France owe quite a bit to the policies adopted by France’s President Macron and those like him in Paris, Brussels, and elsewhere.
Whatever else there is to be said about the causes of the current unrest in France, they owe quite a bit to the policies adopted by France’s President Emmanuel Macron and those like him in Paris, Brussels, and elsewhere, members of a ruling class who claim to be “centrist” or (in the European sense) “liberal” but show little evidence of being either or, I suppose, both.
So this story from the Financial Times comes as no great surprise:
EU regulators are examining possible foreign online interference and disinformation campaigns around the French riots and similar outbursts of violence and looting in other European countries in recent days.
According to security officials, pro-Russian and far-right social media accounts linked to previous disinformation campaigns have spread violent videos in an attempt to sow more chaos. Iran and Algeria are also suspected of being behind some of the messaging, experts said.
“We want to know how co-operative the platforms are,” said an EU official. “It is possible that Russian information campaigns . . . are happening, but platforms should not algorithmically amplify them.
The story’s opening is a classic of its kind. EU regulators “examining,” quotes from unnamed “security officials,” references to Russia, Iran, and, inevitably in the censorship-happy EU, shoot-the-messenger content (designed, presumably, as a warning to wicked American social media companies) with dark talk of algorithms.
And it’s the opening of a story that tends to be remembered, as those pressing for even tighter control on European online speech know. Doubtless Macron will be grateful. Anything to change the subject.
Read on, however, to discover (in fairness to the FT, this is to the newspaper’s credit) comments from a researcher into disinformation. He says that the Kremlin’s lying squad has, as would be expected, been spreading false narratives but stresses that pro-Russian influencers “are not at the origin of the demonstration, nor . . . have they had an impact on the course of the events.”
Others referred to in the story deliver a similar message:
Officials have generally cautioned that, while there were indications of disinformation and foreign influence by state actors, it was unclear whether they had a significant impact.
Nevertheless:
The [EU] Commission said for now the situation was managed by national authorities, but Brussels would step in if the risk became “systemic” and online platforms failed to co-operate.
Meanwhile, financial markets have looked at what is going on in France and decided that they do not like what they see. The yield on ten-year French government bonds hit 5 percent for the first time since 2002 (it has fallen back a bit since), up from about 3.5 percent at the beginning of the year. Other factors, including the Iran war, have played a significant part in this rise, but the fact remains that the jump in rates, whatever the reason, has increased the pressure on France’s finances. Moreover, the trouble in the streets makes it even less likely that the country’s minority government will secure approval of a budget that does much or anything to scale back government spending, which now amounts to over 57 percent of GDP.
Another indication of market unease is the spread (difference) between the yields on French and German government debt. On the ten-year, it was about 71 basis points (a basis point is one-hundredth of a percentage point) in January. It’s now about 150 basis points.