That Germany is an unreliable NATO ally is no secret.
That Germany’s decision to rely heavily on Russian natural gas (without any credible backup) made a major contribution to a geopolitical catastrophe is undeniable.
That Germany’s deep (and deepening) economic involvement with China reveals that the country’s leadership has learned nothing from its entanglement with Russia is hard to refute.
And the mess doesn’t end there. To say that Germany’s attempt to decarbonize its economy has had mixed (and hugely expensive) results is an understatement. But if decarbonizing its economy is an objective that Berlin wishes to pursue, then, rationally, it should be turning to nuclear energy as a key element in achieving that aim.
Unfortunately, when it comes to nuclear power, superstition (or, to be kinder, a form of primitive dread), not reason, has long been a powerful force in Germany. That’s why then-chancellor Gerhard Schröder of the center-left SPD (which was then in coalition with the Greens) agreed to phase out the country’s nuclear-power stations in an agreement reached in 2000. Under the terms of the deal, the last of them would go offline in 2020 or so. Back then nuclear energy supplied around one-third of Germany’s electricity.
Say what you will about Angela Merkel, well qualified in both physics and chemistry, she was a good scientist. In 2006, she had this to say: “I will always consider it absurd to shut down technologically safe nuclear power plants that don’t emit CO2.” Indeed, she slowed down the phaseout, only to reaccelerate it after the Fukushima disaster, for political rather than scientific reasons, a decision rather at odds with her image as the principled and resolute “leader of the free world.”
Three of Germany’s last six remaining nuclear stations were shut down at the end of 2021, but, in light of the war in Ukraine, the other three were given a brief respite. That’s now come to an end.
Writing for CapX, Lincoln Hill is not impressed:
This weekend, Germany will shut down the second, sixth and eighth most productive nuclear reactors in world history. In so doing, the German government has persisted in a senseless act of folly, against all the science and available evidence. . . .
The decision itself has no basis in science. Ostensibly, the accident at Fukushima drove the Merkel Government to revive the nuclear phaseout. The most important thing to know here is that Japan, where Fukushima happened, is trying hard to restart its 30GW nuclear fleet, even as Germany finishes shuttering a fleet of 20GW. Japan has recognised that they can and should fix the foreseeable failures in plant resilience (water-proof back-up generators, build higher seawalls) and regulatory oversight that led to an entirely avoidable accident, minimise seismic risks, and continue safe nuclear operations. Germany, of course, had neither the shortcomings in plant resilience, nor the regulatory failures, nor the seismic risks that Japan had. They had no case for their decision. . . .
Yes, Germany built out renewables massively, but that on its own is never enough. Without nuclear baseload, Germany burns coal, and lots of it. On a windy day yesterday, with 26GW of wind on the bars, they were still burning 16GW of coal for power. France, with its large nuclear fleet, and Sweden, with its strong mix of nuclear, hydro and wind, were burning no coal at all. In fact, Germany’s own climate plans mean that they will burn more coal than anybody in Europe, much of it lignite, the dirtiest most polluting kind.
Mr. Hill may serve as director of policy and external affairs for Britain’s Nuclear Industry Association, but facts are facts.
And geopolitics are geopolitics.
Hill adds this (with reference to Germany’s dependence on Russian gas):
We know where that gas came from, we know what it funded, we know what that money did. We should never forget that whenever anyone calls for the end of clean, reliable, sovereign nuclear power generation.