I wish this report was surprising, but I fear itโ€™s the tip of the waste/fraud/corruption iceberg:

Somewhere in Sheberghan, a medium-sized Afghan city in the northern province of Jowzjan, lies a simple gas station with just a handful of pumps. The humble facility, which was supposed to provide cheap natural gas to local Afghan drivers, cost $43 million to build โ€” and the US Department of Defense footed the bill.
The station was conceived of and paid for by the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), a Department of Defense program that has since been disbanded. โ€œWe do capitalism,โ€ said Paul Brinkley, the programโ€™s former head. โ€œWeโ€™re about helping companies make money.โ€
In the case of the Sheberghan station, โ€œdoing capitalismโ€ meant going over budget by $42.5 million to build a little-used gas station. An equivalent facility just across the border in Pakistan cost just $500,000.

And hereโ€™s the best part:

Why the project cost so much โ€” and where that money went โ€” is still a big mystery The latest report from the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) singled out the facility as an example of profligate Pentagon waste . . . According to SIGAR, nobody at the Pentagon wants to talk about the gas station, or the $800 million TFBSO program that has been offline for just over a year. SIGAR has repeatedly asked the Department of Defense to explain why the Sheberghan facility cost $42.5 million more than was required, and the agency is now accusing the Pentagon of stonewalling.

There are at least two problems here. Of course one is the corruption and/or incompetence on display when spending $43 million on a gas station. (Oh, the irony of a government official saying, โ€œWe do capitalism.โ€) But thatโ€™s less interesting than the mistake of constructing gas stations in the first place, a symbol of the uncounted billions wasted on nation-building. The sad reality of this project, like so many others, is that itโ€™s entirely possible that much of the lost money ended up in Taliban hands. At best itโ€™s lining the pockets of a corrupt Afghan โ€œallyโ€ or a local warlord and his cronies.

When I was in Iraq, the instant anyone in a community knew that American aid dollars were available, hands went out. Yet spending all the money in the world was less valuable than defeating the enemy in the field. Victory โ€” like respect โ€” was earned, not purchased. Money all too often merely bought us contempt.