Whatever one might think of the final (or not) terms of the proposed Russo-Ukrainian peace deal, the manner in which it was first presented to Kyiv — sign within a few days, or else — delivers another message to America’s allies in Europe and elsewhere that the U.S. is not, when the going gets tough, as dependable as they had once assumed. The current confusion over what is or is not on the table is unlikely to be much of a confidence-booster either.
President Trump has rightly been pushing NATO’s European members to assume more responsibility for their own defense, as indeed many are. An interesting question is how far their (surely) reduced faith in American reliability will lead some countries to go in order to boost their own security (others, sadly, may hedge their bets by taking a softer line towards Moscow).
I touched on this in a post back in March in which I wondered whether some American allies (on top of the U.K. and France, which are already in the nuclear club) might be thinking about getting their own nukes. After these latest developments it is worth revisiting that issue, particularly the topic of what Poland — a country that takes its defense very seriously — might do.
In March, Poland’s (then) President Duda told the Financial Times that it was “obvious” that some U.S. nuclear warheads currently stored in western Europe or the U.S. should be moved to Poland, an idea previously put forward by (then) Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki in 2023. In fact, said Duda, “it would be safer if those weapons were already here.” Duda was not wrong, and nor was he wrong to consider whether Poland could shelter under France’s nuclear umbrella, an idea also floated by Polish prime minister Tusk.
There is of course a considerable difference between sheltering under someone else’s umbrella and having one’s own. Needless to say, there is no conceivable way in which Poland could match Russia’s nuclear capabilities, but even building up a small stock of nuclear weapons could have some deterrent effect.
According to the FT, Duda poured cold water over the suggestion by Tusk, a political opponent, that Poland could develop its own nuclear arsenal, saying it would “take decades,” an unconvincing assertion but perhaps a necessary one: Poland is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and for it to acquire nuclear weapons would put it in breach of its obligations under international law. That should count for nothing in the face of an existential threat, but at this point it would mean that any Polish program would have to be…discreet. That is not the worst thing. That suggestion that Poland might have some nuclear capacity would also act as some kind of deterrent, and the ambiguity might diminish the risk of a Russian pre-emptive strike.
Duda’s successor, Karol Nawrocki, has also reiterated Poland’s willingness to host American and/or French nukes. He has also talked about Poland developing its own nuclear capabilities to enhance its energy security and appears, in theory anyway, to be willing to contemplate Poland developing its own nukes, although no time soon.
To be clear, the chance that Poland is currently building or acquiring any nukes must be next to zero. But were Ukraine to collapse and a triumphant revanchist Russia to resume its rearmament, matters might change. In that connection it’s worth remembering that South Korea has become a major supplier of weapons to Poland: In 2024, 46 percent of South Korea’s exports of defense equipment went to Poland.
South Korea itself is not a nuclear power and is a signatory of the NPT. It also has an alarming neighbor, nuclear-armed North Korea, which might well launch a preemptive strike in the event that Seoul went nuclear. Nevertheless some 70 percent of South Koreans are thought to support the country having its own nuclear deterrent (fairly recent polling would suggest that the equivalent number in Poles is a little over 50 percent). One intermediate option would be for South Korea to develop nuclear “latency,” the ability to develop its own nuclear defenses in short order, a point that it could probably reach quickly. It is not hard to see how that could be of interest to Warsaw and, indeed, open up avenues for cooperation.
Even writing about this topic is a dispiriting exercise. For reasons that need no explanation, nuclear proliferation would mean a more dangerous world. The best way to avoid it, at least on the “Western” side of the geopolitical divide is for the U.S. to leave no room for doubt that its nuclear umbrella extends over NATO member-states, South Korea, and Japan. Doubt undermines deterrence and tempts an aggressor to try its luck. Ukraine is not a member of NATO and does not benefit from an American nuclear guarantee—nor should it. Nevertheless, how the U.S. handles its attempt to end Russia’s war against Ukraine is bound to be read as an indicator of its willingness to stand by its guarantees to countries with which it has treaty obligations. For now, that is not a reassuring thought.